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EDITOR'S

COMMENTS

OUR first article by John Appleby *A Pathway Out of Debt: The Privateering Activities of Sir John Hippisley During the Early Stuart Wars with Spain and France, 1625-30* is of interest because it explains much about privateering in the early period of the seventeenth century. This privateering in the English Channel was profitable to Sir John, despite the small vessels which he seized, mainly because he had a patron at court, the Duke of Buckingham, who protected him. Had that not been so, it might have netted him very little in the way of hard cash.

Then we have D. Peter MacLeod's *The French Siege of Oswego in 1756: Inland Naval Warfare in North America*. This tells the story of how the British lost control of Lake Ontario to the French—and marks the first chapter in a series of maritime conflicts on the Great Lakes that were to continue down to the end of the War of 1812. It helps us to understand what was at stake in these conflicts and how naval operations on these great fresh water lakes were conducted. Then we turn our attention to Southern Atlantic waters in an article of Jerry W. Cooney entitled *Trials of a Yankee Sailor: Robert Gray on the Río de la Plata 1798-1802*. In this piece the author traces the story of Captain Robert Gray who discovered the Columbia River in the Northwest and his attempt to open up markets for Yankee traders in another river region; that of the Río de la Plata in Argentina. This effort, it seems, was unsuccessful and Captain Gray had to abandon attempts to gain profit in this western Spanish Imperial area that was slipping away from the control of its mother country in Europe. Profits here for Yankee captains would only come much later on.

Next we have an article by A.B. Dickinson which is called *Southern Hemisphere Fur Sealing from Atlantic Canada*. It tells the story of Canadian sealing operations in the Falkland Islands and other Southern Antarctic areas during the last years of the nineteenth century and down to World War I. Though the sealing was often illegal in the eyes of the British authorities in the Falklands and was not very profitable, it did result in the decrease in the stock of fur seals in this part of the world until recent efforts to protect them since World Wars I and II finally became effective.

Our focus finally changes back to North America with a long article by Anthony S. Nicolosi on *The Founding of the Newport Naval Training Station, 1878-1883, An Exercise in Naval Politics*. As its title implies, this naval station owed much to politics and particularly to the role played by Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, as it did to the natural advantages of a location in Narragansett Bay. Politics, then and now, often turns out to control the Navy's lifeblood.

We then close this issue with a large number of book reviews, an index and the hope that the recent court decision in New York means the America's Cup will finally return to the United States until it is again defended in 1992.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS

Salem, MA

A Pathway Out of Debt: The Privateering Activities of Sir John Hippisley During the Early Stuart Wars with Spain and France, 1625-30

JOHN APPLEBY

THE English wars with Spain and France, from 1625 to 1630 and 1627 to 1629, were a disastrous start to the reign of Charles I. The failure of the large scale naval expeditions to Cadiz and La Rochelle undermined domestic support for the conflict, fuelling political discontent in parliament and the provinces. At the same time, the disruption of the Spanish and French trades brought widespread commercial depression and insecurity especially in the outports. These short term economic difficulties were exacerbated by the depredations of Dunkirk privateers along the vulnerable southern and eastern coasts.[1] Ports such as Dover were seriously affected by the economic ravages of war. A survey of the port's shipping in 1626 revealed that no less than 35 vessels out of a total of 58 were laid up idle in the harbour "for want of trade" and men.[2] But if war brought disruption and depression to many local merchants and shipowners, it also created new opportunities for those willing to bear the risks of the business of plunder. Thus in May 1627 the anonymous author of an "Advise from Dover" reported:

> "We have six shipps of Warre [now at sea], With letters of reprisall, Whereof Sir John Hippisley hath three . . . [which] daylie bring in prises . . . , So the taking of prizes is now our trade."[3]

Privateering, as during the long Elizabethan conflict with Spain, enabled the maritime community to deal with some of the dislocations of war. Indeed from January 1626 until the end of the wars in November 1630, between 17 and 22 Dover ships were set out on voyages of reprisal.[4] As a business, however, privateering had a varying appeal and impact on the local economy. Local merchants and shipowners such as Nicholas Eaton, William Ledgent, or Abraham Hugessen were certainly involved in setting out privateers, but their interests were dwarfed by those of Sir John Hippisley, Lieutenant of Dover Castle—as the author of the "Advise" implies. Hippisley's ventures, which can be pieced together from his numerous surviving letters and other evidence from the high court of admiralty, provide an interesting example of a leading promoter of privateering in the outports, who was engaged in a long established, almost anachronistic form of enterprise. For unlike many of the big London adventurers, who were involved in long-distance privateering to the coasts of Spain and Portugal, or across the Atlantic, Hippisley's privateering was firmly focussed on short-distance French targets across the Channel. That Hippisley managed to survive in this competitive and risky business was at least partially due to his close connection with the Duke of Buckingham, the dominant political figure at court un-

1. Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629* (Oxford, 1979), and B. E. Supple, *Commercial Crisis and Change in England 1600-1642* (Cambridge, 1964), provide the general context.

2. British Library (hereafter B.L.), Egerton MSS. 2584, ff. 374-80. The point is substantiated by the surviving Dover port books for before, and during, the war. Vizt. Public Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.), Port Books, E. 190/653/6, 190/655/7, 190/656/2 & 3.

3. P.R.O., State Papers (hereafter S.P.), 16/65/10.

4. J. C. Appleby, "English Privateering During the Spanish and French Wars, 1625-1630" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull 1983), II, pp. 66-70. And on the local impact of the war see J. S. Kepler, *The Exchange of Christendom. The international entrepôt at Dover 1622-1641* (Leicester, 1976), pp. 30-5, and Peter Clark, *English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution: Religion, Politics, and Society in Kent 1500-1640* (Hassocks, 1977), pp. 319-20, 329-31.

til his assassination in 1628. As a favourite of the Duke, Hippisley had access to an unrivalled source of influence which could be exploited in a variety of ways to further his privateering interests.

This paper examines how these varying elements of patronage, plunder and power became enmeshed in Hippisley's ventures during the 1620s. Moreover, an analysis of these ventures indicates that private profit could still be reaped from a conflict which lurched from one disaster to another. Contemporaries were no doubt right to complain loudly and bitterly about the depredations of Dunkirk men-of-war on trade and shipping; but the other side of this gloomy picture was the reprisal campaign against Spain and France, involving hundreds of English privateers. The impact of this wave of depredation is much less well documented, yet by the summer of 1627 there are signs that merchants in the French channel ports were withdrawing from commerce because of the dangers posed by privateers from Dover and other ports along the south coast.[5] And one of the leading entrepreneurs engaged in this irregular, private war of plunder in the channel was Sir John Hippisley.

I

Hippisley's background and early career are rather obscure. As a younger son of gentry family in Somerset he was something of an adventurer, eager to make his fortune in Jacobean society, and prepared to exploit any opportunity to do so. As a young man, in the service of the fifth earl of Northumberland, he seems to have acquired an unsavoury reputation for his attempts to win the hand of the younger daughter of one Mrs. Jones. Although the daughter bemoaned her subsequent marriage to the son of a merchant, John Chamberlain the letter-writer caustically commented that

> "yt falles out better then if she had ben cast-away upon Epsley (a man that belongs to the earle of Northumberland) who had her in chase."[6]

Despite this setback, Hippisley's fortunes improved considerably over the next few years. His knighthood in April 1617 probably reflected the development of a close connection with Sir George Villiers, the king's increasingly powerful young favourite, who was soon to become Duke of Buckingham. Within a year Chamberlain was referring to Hippisley as "a principall favorite of the Lord of Buckingham."[7] Bonds of friendship strengthened and enhanced the usual client-patron relationship. Early in 1619 Hippisley acted as second to Buckingham's younger brother, Sir Edward Villiers, in a quarrel with Sir Henry Rich; four years later he accompanied Buckingham and the Prince of Wales when they travelled to Spain. The following year, when Buckingham became Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, Hippisley was appointed Lieutenant of Dover Castle.

By the early seventeenth century the Lieutenant had become the "chief officer in Admiralty affairs" in the Cinque Ports. In December 1624, Edward Nicholas, Buckingham's secretary for the Ports, advised Hippisley to proceed "with Moderacion & caution" until he was fully acquainted with his new position.[8] As Nicholas pointed out the Lieutenancy combined civil and military duties, which were complemented by private functions concerning the Lord Warden's financial interests in the Ports. In return Hippisley received a salary made up of various perquisites, which varied from year to year, including £167 *per annum* from the rent of land belonging to Dover Castle.[9]

In addition to these official duties Hippisley was engaged in a wide range of other activities on Buckingham's behalf. In 1624 he was involved in provisioning Mansfeldt's expeditionary force to France; during the elections of 1625, 1626 and 1628 he was active in the support of the Duke in the Cinque Ports, as well as sitting for Dover in all three parliaments. Like Sir James Bagg in the south west, he was one of Buckingham's leading provincial agents, the arms and legs of a burgeoning system of patronage and power.[10] Yet the very size and complexity of Buckingham's network of official followers and clients could provoke inner con-

5. P.R.O., High Court of Admiralty (hereafter H.C.A.), Examinations, 13/230, Part 3.

6. N. E. McClure (ed.), *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1939), I, p. 513.

7. Ibid., II, pp. 152, 583. And M. F. Keeler (ed.), *The Long Parliament, 1640-1641* (Philadelphia, 1954), pp. 215-16.

8. K. M. E. Murray, *The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports* (Manchester, 1935), pp. 136-37; P.R.O., S.P. 14/176/50.

9. P.R.O., S.P. 14/173/114. Donald Nicholas, *Mr. Secretary Nicholas (1593-1669). His Life and Letters* (London, 1955), pp. 38-9.

10. S. J. Stearns, "The Caroline Military System: The expeditions to Cadiz and Ré" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California 1967), pp. 217-8; John K. Gruenfelder, "The Lord Wardens and Elections, 1604-1628," *Journal of British Studies*, XVI (1976), pp. 1-23; Roger Lockyer, *Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628* (London, 1981), pp. 304, 426.

flicts of interest. The entanglement of official and unofficial business, the rivalry between different institutional or legal structures, are of course familiar themes in early Stuart England. But the way in which these different elements became caught up in Hippisley's privateering ventures nicely illuminates some of the weaknesses of patronage and clientage at the time. As Hippisley's many surviving letters indicate, his maritime activities were based on the assumption that the Duke's patronage and influence would be used in his favour when need arose. Indeed, it was this combination of local enterprise with court connections in London that Hippisley hoped would be a "path way out of debt."[11] How well did he succeed?

II

In July 1625, on the eve of the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish war, Hippisley wrote a plaintive, begging letter to his patron in which he revealed that he owed debts of more than £2,500: "if you help me not according to your promise," he warned, "I am absolutely undone."[12] Buckingham's response is uncertain. This was a difficult period for the Duke, who was deeply involved in the preparations for the forthcoming expedition to Cadiz, and he may have had neither the time nor the resources to assist Hippisley. Certainly there is no evidence to indicate that Buckingham provided any financial assistance for Sir John, although the whole episode remains tantalizingly obscure. The subsequent war with Spain, however, followed by a resurgence of English privateering, presented Hippisley with a golden opportunity to remedy his financial situation through a campaign of maritime plunder. Towards the end of the year, indeed, he boldly promised to make Buckingham "a great profit" if the lord admiral would issue letters of marque freely out of the Cinque Ports, as the high court of admiralty in London was already doing.[13] As Buckingham was both lord admiral and lord warden of the ports, he might easily have taken this course. The Cinque Ports, once a powerful and privileged organization, had enjoyed their own admiralty jurisdiction which included matters of prize. Following the outbreak of the war with Spain in 1585, for example, the warden was empowered to issue letters of marque out of the ports, as well as to adjudicate all captures. Despite repeated promptings from Hippisley to follow the same course, the Duke was clearly reluctant to revive the prize jurisdiction of the ports. On 23 January 1626 he asked Hippisley to send him precedents for the issue of such commissions from the ports, warning that he could not

> "give warrant to any man of warr to goe to Sea to take prize but in the ordinarie course, and accordinge to his Majesties Commission and the lords of the Councells Instruccions for letters of marque."[14]

As these instructions contained no reference to the ports their ancient prize jurisdiction was thus allowed to lapse.

This curious incident, of such importance for the institutional history of the Cinque Ports, probably reflected a deliberate decision on Buckingham's part to suppress their admiralty jurisdiction. Although the motive remains unclear, it is obvious that what the Duke lost as lord warden he gained as lord admiral. The effect, however, was to heighten tension between the ports and the high court of admiralty in London, whose officials had long looked with disfavour on such local liberties. It also dashed Hippisley's ambitions of organizing a privateering campaign, in his own interest, based in the ports.[15] All this helped set the scene for the bitter dispute which blew up between Hippisley and Sir Henry Marten, towards the end of 1626, over the disorderly activities of Sir John's privateers.

That dispute came towards the end of Hippisley's first year of privateering operations. His interests in the business of plunder began officially in January 1626, when Buckingham issued a warrant authorizing him to set out the aptly named *Have at All* against Spain, with a letter of marque from the high court of

11. See, for example, Hippisley to Buckingham, 3 March 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/56/21.

12. *Calendar of State Papers Domestic (addenda) 1625-49*, pp. 35-6.

13. *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Twelfth Report, Appendix*, Part 1, pp. 230, 237. R. G. Marsden (ed.), *Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea*, 2 vols. (Navy Records Society, 1915-16), pp. 404-08.

14. R. G. Marsden, "Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England," *English Historical Review*, XXIV (1909), pp. 687, 691; ibid., "Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England," *English Historical Review*, XXV (1910), p. 257, which confirms that the prize jurisdiction of the Ports was not exercised from 1625 to 1630; B. L., Additional MSS. 37816, f. 57^{v}.

15. In March 1627, for example, Hippisley offered Buckingham £5,000 to become the farmer, or collector, of his tenths in Dover (and the other Cinque Ports) if he would issue letters of marque out of the ports. P.R.O., S.P. 16/56/21.

admiralty in London. Thereafter his interests mushroomed, as Table 1 indicates.

At the height of the conflict, in 1627 and 1628, Hippisley regularly had four ships at sea in search of prize and profit. He was also a part-owner of the *Hercules*, of 240 tons, which was out on reprisal in 1627 and 1628; and he may have had a share in the *Speedwell* of Rye, which was at sea in 1628.[16] In addition to these official ventures Hippisley was engaged in several irregular enterprises, involving setting out vessels without any commission from the high court of admiralty. On 8 May 1627 he informed Buckingham that he was about to send out three vessels (not included in Table 1), without any letters of marque: "I goe," he added, somewhat speciously, "as I shall duringe Lyfe upon your grases word."[17]

The extent of these interests made Hippisley the leading promoter of privateering ventures in Dover, as well as one of the most active gentry-adventurers operating during the war years. The bulk of Hippisley's privateering fleet, however, was made up of fairly small vessels: of the six privateers which were officially set out, no less than four were of 30 to 80 tons burden. Of the other two the *Have at All* was of 100 or 140 tons, and the *Revenge* of 240 or 300 tons. There are no surviving detailed descriptions of these vessels, but the *Have at All* was described by a Dutch skipper as being "builte after the manner of the Dunkirkers," while the *Hercules* was also a Flemish-built vessel.[18] This implies low-built, manoeuverable and quick-sailing ships, ideal for cross channel raids. It also suggests that, unlike most other English adventurers, Hippisley was self-consciously modelling his ventures on the activities of Dunkirk privateers. Like many English men-of-war, however, Sir John's ships went to sea with large complements of men; as the data in Appendix 1 indicate, the smaller privateers were manned at a rate of nearly one man per ton. Only a year after the survey of Dover shipping revealed that there were too few mariners to man the port's idle merchant vessels, Hippisley's privateers were at sea with an aggregate complement of more than 300 men.[19] In addition, most of these ships were reasonably armed with heavy ordnance—even the smaller privateers carried six or eight pieces each.

Privateering ventures during the 1620s were usually organized in the form of a terminable joint-stock in which any number of adventurers could have a stake. This form of organization helped tap a wide range of investment capital, and went some way to reducing the risks involved in the business of plunder. Hundreds of such syndicates were set up during the war years, involving thousands of adventurers attracted by the prospect of prize and profit. Most of Hippisley's privateering fleet, however, was set out at his "sole Costs & Charges."[20] In effect this meant that he was wholly responsible for the capital investment of the vessels, their armaments and their provisioning. There were some advantages to this type of organization, particularly at the decision-making end of the business, but they were far outweighed by the increased risks. Once Hippisley's privateers left Dover, and sailed beyond his direct control, a heavy investment was committed to a highly hazardous enterprise. Like other ventures of this sort, which were more typical of privateering enterprise in the smaller ports like Dover, Sandwich or Southampton, Hippisley tried to reduce the level of risk by using relatives and kin to command his privateers. Thus his brother, Richard, was captain of the *Have at All* in 1626, 1627 and 1628; while a cousin, Barnaby Burley, was captain of the *John & Fortune* in 1626 and 1627. Burley's brother, Henry, formerly a soldier in the United Provinces, also served as a lieutenant aboard one of Hippisley's vessels.[21]

Despite this apparently close control, there are signs that Hippisley's ventures were not well organized. In May 1627 he complained to Buckingham that the crew of one of his privateers were reluctant to put to sea: "thay are such mowtenose [mutinous] fellowes," he

16. Appleby, "English Privateering," II, pp. 66-70; P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/46, f. 310 (among the other owners of the *Hercules* were Edward Kempe and Nicholas Eaton of Dover); H.C.A. 25/211-5.

17. Hippisley to Buckingham, 8 May 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/62/80.

18. See Appendix 1 for this data. P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/46, ff. 20-2, 310.

19. Towards the end of August 1627 Hippisley informed Sir John Coke that there were only 16 men in Dover Castle, but he was prepared to call his ships home to supplement this guard from the crews of his privateers. *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Twelfth Report, Appendix*, Part 1, p. 318.

20. See the data in Appleby, "English Privateering," II, pp. 66-70; *Acts of the Privy Council 1627*, pp. 10-12; P.R.O., S.P. 16/64/46.

21. Barnaby Burley probably went with his father, and two brothers, on Sir Thomas Roe's expedition to Guiana in 1610, J. K. Hosmer (ed.), *Winthrop's Journal "History of New England" 1630-1649*, 2 vols. (New York, 1908), I, pp. 25-6; petition of Henry Burley to Buckingham, May 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/65/52.

TABLE 1—PRIVATEERS SET OUT BY SIR JOHN HIPPISLEY, 1625-1630

	1626	*1627*	*1628*	*1629*
Vessels:	*Have at All* *Sweepstake* *John & Fortune*	*Have at All* *Sweepstake* *John & Fortune* *Revenge*	*Have at All* *Holdfast** *Revenge* *Dainty Kate*†	*Revenge*
Total:	3	4	4	1

* Set out as a pinnace with the *Have at All.*
† Set out as a pinnace with the *Revenge.*

reported, "I was Forste to give them £20 to keep them quiate." A few days later he had to give the crews of the *John & Fortune* £150, and the *Sweepstake* £117, to get them to sea again.[22] Usually the crews of privateers served on a principle of "no purchase, no pay," forgoing cash payment for a share of all captured prizes. Such unexpected payments like these only sent Hippisley's investment costs spiralling upwards.

The character of Hippisley's privateering effort magnified problems of this nature. Most of his privateers were engaged in short distance raids across the Channel. Their major targets were the small and poorly armed vessels which scurried back and forth along the northern coasts of France. Although this type of privateering was less subject to the risks and dangers of long distance plundering in the Atlantic or the Caribbean, as well as being cheaper to finance, it was heavily dependent on a rapid and large turnover of prizes to finance subsequent ventures. For this reason Hippisley and his captains were often prepared to bend, break or ignore the regulations drawn up by the privy council for the conduct of the privateering war. The seizure of French shipping before the outbreak of the war with France (in March 1627), the attacks on other neutral vessels sailing through the Channel, and the illegal disposal of captured prizes, all brought Hippisley into direct conflict with the high court of admiralty in London. Of course other adventurers were engaged in similar activities although not, apparently, on the same scale. Moreover, when one of Buckingham's "most slavish dependants" was known to be involved in questionable, even piratical, activity, not only did this cast doubt on the ability of the admiralty to effectively regulate privateering, it also raised awkward questions concerning the patron-client relationship in the early seventeenth century.[23]

22. Hippisley to Nicholas, 8 May 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/62/84; same to Buckingham, 2 May 1627, S.P. 16/62/16 & 16/63/20.

III

Hippisley's first full year of privateering, from January 1626 to January 1627, was an unprofitable experience. During the course of the year he had three ships at sea: the *Sweepstake, John & Fortune* and the *Have at All.* The first spent most of the year fruitlessly sailing up and down the Channel. Early in January 1627, at the end of eight months at sea, her captain, Tristram Stephens, informed Sir John that he had "onlye mett with a derelict . . . Dutch ship, partly laden with French wines," which was left at Helford in Cornwall. The *John & Fortune* spent the first half of the year on government service as a spy-ship along the coast of France; when she was set out on reprisal during August, or September, leaks forced her to return to Dover for repairs. Although the *Have at All* seized a couple of prizes in June, these gains were offset when she was forced into Mount's Bay to revictual—at a heavy and unexpected charge of £240. Her captain, Richard Hippisley, remained optimistic: "be not out of Hope," he wrote to his brother on 12 July 1626, "for if [it] please God to Blesse me I will have it agayne with advantage."[24] The remainder of the voyage, however, went from bad to worse. Captain Hippisley's subsequent seizure of three neutral Dutch ships raised a storm of controversy, which embroiled his brother in a

23. For the regulation of the privateering war see Appleby, "English Privateering," I, chapter 2; *Calendar of State Papers Venetian* (hereafter *C.S.P.V.*) *1626-28*, p. 571.

24. Hippisley to Nicholas, 18 October 1626, P.R.O., S.P. 16/38/11; Tristram Stephens to Hippisley, 14 January 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/49/31 & 16/51/16; Richard Hippisley to same, 12 July 1626, 16/524/26; B.L., Additional MSS. 37816, ff. 78, 154.

lengthy dispute involving the Dutch ambassador in London, the judge of the high court of admiralty and the privy council.

There was, in fact, no legal justification for the seizure of the Dutch vessels. However, the Hippisleys refused to release them without some form of payment from their masters. Sir John justified this heavy-handed action by asserting that his brother had saved the ships from going aground after the crews had tried to flee ashore. This carried little weight with the judge of the high court of admiralty, who, on hearing the Dutchmen's complaints, ordered the immediate release of the ships. Sir John ignored these orders, claiming that the commissions from the court were false because some of their wording was inaccurate.[25] At the prompting of the Dutch ambassador the privy council issued letters of assistance, ordering the return of the three vessels without delay. But Hippisley again refused to comply, claiming that the earlier admiralty commissions had been issued before his brother had been heard in court. In response he urged that the dispute be resolved by a special committee of the council. On 13 December 1626 the council agreed to the request. A few weeks later, on 30 December, the committee met and confirmed the previous orders, instructing that the Dutch ships be returned "without any further dispute or delay." By a subsequent order the privy council also awarded "damages and satisfaction" to the Dutch masters. The ships were eventually restored in January 1627—nearly six months after their original capture.[26]

The case concerning the three Dutch ships indicates how small disputes over plunder could easily degenerate into lengthy disputes involving a complex range of issues and interests. The capture of neutral vessels usually raised serious legal, political and diplomatic questions. Earlier in 1626 the seizure of the *St. Peter*, a French ship which was released then re-arrested on the grounds that she was laden with enemy goods, partly on Hippisley's advice, contributed to the deterioration in Anglo-French relations during the year, and caused political problems for Buckingham in the House of Commons.[27] Relations with the United Provinces were likewise periodically unsettled by the seizure of Dutch shipping by English privateers. The legal grounds for such seizures were that Dutch shippers were trading to the enemy in contraband goods. But this was not at issue in Hippisley's case. The spurious arguments he put forward for the seizure and continued detention of the Dutch vessels clearly failed to convince either the judge of the court of admiralty or the privy council. Their subsequent restoration soured relations between the judge and Sir John, who blamed him for his mounting misfortunes at sea and in court.[28]

In the aftermath of these early failures Hippisley turned to more illegitimate means of plunder, sending out his ships without letters of marque from the high court of admiralty. Although this was contrary to the regulations, he relied on his connection with Buckingham to protect him from charges of piracy. Indeed when the *Sweepstake* brought three French prizes into Weymouth, in April 1627, she was arrested by local admiralty officials as a pirate ship.[29] She was soon released, however, along with her prizes. A question mark still hung over the legality of these captures which, together with another seven French vessels, had been taken before the official outbreak of the war with France. On 10 May 1627 Hippisley begged Buckingham to procure the French ships for him, "otherwise," he warned, "I am undon." Just over two weeks later he received a special "free graunt" of all ten ships from the King—clearly as a result of the Duke's influence at court.[30] About the same time his lingering dispute with Sir Henry Marten, judge of the court of admiralty, was patched up through the media-

25. P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/45, ff. 482-83, 520-21; H.C.A. 13/46, ff. 20^{v}-2, 22^{v}-4, 47-8; P.R.O., S.P. 16/38/31-33; Richard Hippisley to Nicholas, 8 September 1626, S.P. 16/35/47; Hippisley to same, 18 October 1626, S.P. 16/38/11.

26. *Acts of the Privy Council, 1626*, pp. 373, 404, 444; *Acts of the Privy Council, 1627*, pp. 11-2.

27. On the *St. Peter* see Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, pp. 261, 267, 279-81. Both Hippisley and Sir Allen Apsley (also involved in the arrest) were blamed by Buckingham for the crisis which blew up over the *St. Peter*, and both, apparently, were "on their knees for it in the House of Commons" on 23 February 1626. R. F. Williams (ed.), *The Court and Times of Charles the First*, 2 vols. (London, 1848), I, p. 85.

28. See for example, Hippisley to Buckingham, 28 February 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/55/41; same to Nicholas, 18 October 1626, S.P. 16/38/11.

29. Gilbert Raleigh to Nicholas, 13 April 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/60/24 & 16/60/91; Hippisley to Buckingham, 8 May 1627, S.P. 16/62/80 & 16/58/62, 16/70/60.

30. Hippisley to Buckingham, 10 August 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/63/1 & 16/63/24; Charles I to solicitor general, 25 May 1627, S.P. 16/64/46.

tion of Sir Peter Heyman. Acting on discrete instructions from Edward Nicholas, Heyman pointed out that their "crossinges . . . must do hurt to themselves & can no way profit the Duke." This cunning appeal to self interest and loyalty to Buckingham appears to have worked, for within a few weeks Sir John was referring to Marten as his "good friend."[31] By the end of May 1627, with the hope of better profit ahead, he had taken out letters of marque against France for the *Have at All, Sweepstake* and *John & Fortune*.

IV

The outbreak of the French war saw a marked improvement in Hippisley's fortunes. Weeks before the official start of the conflict, Sir John was urging Buckingham to issue letters of marque against the French. The sense of anticipation in the Cinque Ports was nicely captured by Sir Peter Heyman when he informed Nicholas, on 12 March 1627, that

> "we all provide for such a kinde of warr as hath been mannaged hetherto with Spayne since the breach, but we hope for better successe because we lye neere, & are subject to less & fewer contingencies or hazards."[32]

Thus when the high court of admiralty began to issue letters of marque against France, there was a marked upsurge in privateering activity in the southeast. In consequence there was a large increase in the capture of French prizes as the coasting trades across the Channel were ravaged by the depredations of English privateers. Hippisley's small fleet led this assault on French shipping and trade. During 1627 his ships seized at least twenty prizes, all but two of which were French, as well as 13 Dutch vessels that were later restored. So great was the haul that in May 1627 he was complaining about the large numbers of French mariners brought in by his privateers.[33]

The scene for this hectic prize-taking remained confined to the Channel. Throughout the year Hippisley's privateers continued to "ply . . . betweene Deepe and Calis," plundering small French coasting vessels, and fishing boats, almost at will.[34] This was a sea war of small raids and petty actions, an uncoordinated hunt for prize and plunder, which could occasionally turn into a deadly game of cat-and-mouse. Nevertheless, the privateering assault on France probably contributed as much to the war effort as did the lamentable naval expeditions to relieve La Rochelle in 1627 and 1628. English privateers in general made deep inroads into the French coasting and fishing trades. Only a few months after the outbreak of the war, it was reported that French merchants and shipowners preferred to keep their ships at home rather than run the risks of capture at sea. Even the Dutch found it increasingly difficult to trade peacefully as their vessels were stopped in the Channel, and searched for contraband cargoes. And this bleak commercial situation was made worse by the rise in insurance and freight rates due to the disorder at sea.[35]

For most of 1627, therefore, Hippisley's privateers were busy at sea reaping a rich harvest of French prizes. Unfortunately it is impossible to estimate the total number of captures, for during the summer both Barnaby Burley and Richard Hippisley were involved in the illegal disposal of prize goods in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Wight.[36] In theory, at least, the regulations insisted that all captured ships and goods were to be formally adjudged as lawful, or otherwise, by the high court of admiralty. After adjudication, and once a tenth of the prize had been surrendered to the lord admiral and the customs paid to the crown, the captors were then free to dispose of their prizes as they wished. As in former privateering wars, however, some adventurers ignored the regulations, illegally disposing of prizes before any formal proceedings in the admiralty court. In some areas there was a flourishing trade in illegal prize goods. The Isle of Wight, where Burley's father was captain of Yarmouth Castle, was described as "another Argier" (i.e., Algiers) at the start of the Spanish war because of the scale of the

31. Heyman to Nicholas, 12 March 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/56/94; S.P. 16/57/59 & 89; S.P. 16/59/21, 23, 60.

32. Hippisley to Nicholas, 7 March 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/56/62; same to Buckingham, 22 March 1627, S.P. 16/57/89; Sir Peter Heyman to Nicholas, 12 March 1627, S.P. 16/56/94.

33. Appleby, "English Privateering," II, pp. 207-15; and Hippisley's surviving letters, vizt. P.R.O., S.P. 16/31/1 & 24; 16/64/46; 16/56/62; 16/57/89; 16/58/62; 16/59/21; 16/60/24; 16/62/16, 80 & 84; 16/63/20, 118; 16/67/32, 44 & 85; 16/74/43, 89. He was giving the French prisoners 6d. a day for food, clothing, and shelter.

34. John Watts to Nicholas, 22 May 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 16/64/19. Williams (ed.), *Court and Times*, I, p. 232. In May 1627 Hippisley planned to set out 4 ships to attack the French fishing fleets at Newfoundland, but the plans failed to mature, P.R.O., S.P. 16/63/118 & 120.

35. P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/230 Part 3.

36. P.R.O., S.P. 16/74/18; 16/95/34; 16/102/54.

local traffic with privateers and pirates.[37] Relying on his father's position for shelter and contacts ashore, Barnaby Burley was able to build up an extensive trade in a wide variety of captured goods during 1627. When Edward Nicholas, Buckingham's admiralty secretary, was informed of these activities, he immediately sent a sharp letter of reprimand to Hippisley:

> "This is of soe ill an example in a man that is knowne to be sett out by you, who have soe neere relation to my lord, as that a dutchman and some English (making him their president) sell, and dispose of their prizes without order, and in contempte of my lords Collector who canne gett noe tenthes."[38]

But for Sir John's relationship to Buckingham, Nicholas would have taken sterner action against Burley. Nor did Nicholas's intervention have the desired effect: the following year, in May 1628, John Ellsey, the Duke's tenth collector in Southampton, was still complaining that no other captain "dealt soe presummptuosly with my lord" as Burley. And because the latter was set out by Hippisley, Ellsey was almost powerless to take any action against him.[39]

Hippisley's privateers continued their assault on French shipping through 1628 and into the early part of 1629. During 1628 the *Have at All* and *Revenge* were at sea with two pinnaces, the *Holdfast* and *Dainty Kate*. These ships captured at least another 16 prizes before Sir John finally withdrew from the privateering war. As some of the relevant records of the high court of admiralty for 1628 are missing, this is clearly a minimum total; it also means that the total for 1628, presented in Table 2, is an underestimate when compared with the figures for 1627 or 1629.[40] Despite these apparent successes, however, Hippisley's interests in the business of plunder declined considerably during 1628. By the following year only one of his ships was still at sea, and not, apparently, for any great length of time.

The reasons for this withdrawal from privateering were a mixture of economic and political considerations. Like other adventurers who concentrated on the plunder of French shipping, Hippisley was probably faced with growing difficulties across the Channel as too many privateers chased fewer and fewer prizes. Faced with declining profit margins, he was probably reconsidering his business strategy long before the end of the French war in April 1629. Although he made some effort to re-direct his privateering towards Spain, this was a more capital-intensive form of enterprise which he did not persist with.[41] In any case business calculations of this nature were not made in a vacuum. The changing political environment, following Buckingham's assassination in August 1628, was an added factor in the equation, not least because the sudden death of the Duke cut Hippisley's access to power and influence, which he had exploited to further his privateering interests. Indeed the winds of change were soon felt in Dover. Towards the end of October 1628 Hippisley was ordered by the King *not* to attack the Calais fishing fleet, and instructed to restore any fishing boats recently taken by his privateers. According to the Venetian ambassador in London, the commissioners of the Admiralty, who had replaced Buckingham, also warned Sir John not to pursue his legal claim to the fishing boats, but "to be satisfied with some present" instead.[42] It was in these unfavourable circumstances, therefore, that Hippisley brought his interests in privateering to an end. Any remaining links with the sea were cut when he sold the Lieutenancy of Dover Castle to Sir Edward Dering, taking up the keepership of Bushey Park which he acquired earlier in 1628 through Buckingham's influence.[43]

V

Hippisley's privateering ventures during the 1620s were a gamble. They were an opportunistic attempt to reap reward through plunder and prize. But did the gamble pay off? Was privateering really a pathway out of debt?

37. And Burley, with his father, was also involved in these early irregularities, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/44, ff. 368-71. On 2 October 1626 Sir James Bagg complained of Burley's activities in the south west, commenting "he well discovers his first piratticall straine," P.R.O., S.P. 16/37/6.

38. Nicholas to Hippisley, 16 August 1627, P.R.O., S.P. 14/215, ff. 28-30, 31-2.

39. John Ellsey to Nicholas, 22 April 1628, P.R.O., S.P. 16/101/60 & 16/102/54, 16/103/85.

40. P.R.O., H.C.A. 4/1-3; H.C.A. 24/80-88; Appleby, "English Privateering," I, pp. 252-59.

41. In March 1629, for example, the *Have at All* was cruising off the coast of Galicia. P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/48, f. 273. There is very little other evidence that Hippisley's privateers visited the coasts of Spain or Portugal in search of prize.

42. *C.S.P.V. 1626-28*, pp. 379-80.

43. Sir Edward Dering to Hippisley, B.L., Stowe MSS. 743, f. 134; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1628-29*, p. 344. Earlier in the year Richard Hippisley had been appointed captain of Sandgate castle, ibid., p. 216.

TABLE 2—PRIZES TAKEN BY SIR JOHN HIPPISLEY'S PRIVATEERS, 1625-1630

Year	Total No. of Prizes	No. of Prizes Appraised	Value*	Average Value*	Nationality
1625	0	0	0	0	0
1626	0	0	0	0	0
1627	20	10	3,932	393	18F; 1D; 1u
1628	6	0	0	0	6F
1629	10	7	3,521	503	5F; 1S; 1H; 3u
1630	0	0	0	0	0
Total	36	17	7,453	438	29F; 1S; 1D; 1H; 4u

* To nearest £

F = French, D = Dutch, S = Spanish, H = Hamburg, u = unknown.

Unfortunately it is impossible to draw up any accurate profit-or-loss balance sheet for Hippisley's ventures during these years. The evidence simply does not exist to make any sophisticated economic assessment of this kind. However, the data in Table 2 provide details of the number and value of prizes taken by Sir John's privateers. Although this is based on incomplete and fragmentary evidence, it does form the basis for a rudimentary prize analysis, which casts some light on the complex, but difficult, question of profitability.

The information in Table 2 is based on a range of sources from the high court of admiralty and state papers. The most valuable of these sources are the appraisements of prizes, which provide detailed valuations of prize cargoes and ships, after they had been adjudged as lawful by the court of admiralty. Although these appraisements were returned to the court, and kept together in bundles, it is clear that only a proportion of the original total now survives. The gaps can be partly filled in from other records of the court, but they are usually not as detailed, and lack any estimate of prize valuations.[44]

Despite such drawbacks, however, the material in Table 2 provides an interesting commentary on Hippisley's privateering effort during the 1620s. Most obviously it is clear that, despite the inauspicious start, Sir John's privateers captured a large number of prizes during these years: at least 36 in the four years they were active. Yet the bulk of these prizes were of fairly low value. The average value of the 17 prizes for which an appraisement survives was only £438. And of this total no less than 14 were valued at less than £500; only two were appraised at more than £1,000. Compared to the rich Iberian prizes which were taken in the Atlantic or the Caribbean, and usually valued at between £5,000-10,000, this was pretty small beer. But most of the prizes taken by Hippisley's privateers were small French coasting or fishing vessels. Of the 32 prizes whose nationality is known, approximately 90% were of French origin, and many of these were from the Channel ports lying between Calais and Cherbourg.[45] The *St. Anne* of Newhaven, laden with a miscellaneous cargo of cheese, flax, tallow, pitch and tar, valued at £290, or the *Fortune* of Calais, laden with a small quantity of wines valued at £263, were typical of the kinds of French prizes taken by Hippisley's privateers. The only exception to this pattern was the seizure of a Spanish vessel, *Our Lady of Good Faith*, in 1629, whose cargo of sugars, tobacco, cotton wool, ginger and dye-wood was appraised at £2,334.[46]

The aggregate value of these prizes is less easy to ascertain. As Table 2 indicates, appraisements survive for only 17 prizes taken by Sir John's privateers. Their

44. P.R.O., H.C.A. 4/1-3 (appraisements); H.C.A. 13/45-48 (examinations); H.C.A. 24/80-89 (libels and sentences).

45. Appleby, "English Privateering," II, pp. 207-15; P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/229-38 (examinations on commission).

46. Appraisements of *St. Anne* (15 June 1627), *Fortune* (15 June 1627), and *Our Lady of Good Faith* (25 July 1629), P.R.O., H.C.A. 4/1-2, unnumbered.

total estimated value comes to £7,453. Assuming that the other 19 prizes were similar in type, it may be suggested that the total value of all 36 prizes was somewhere between £15,000-16,000. As the appraisements provide only a *valuation* of prize cargoes, which might have fetched a higher price on sale in the open market, it is likely that these figures underestimate the real value of return. And when some account is made of the incomplete nature of the evidence, and for the illicit disposal of prize goods, the actual total may have been closer to £20,000.

This grand estimate, however, is a gross total of return. To arrive at some notion of Hippisley's net profit from privateering account would have to be made of his total investment in the business, and deductions made for the customs payable on prize goods, for the tenths due to the lord admiral, for the shares due to the privateering crews, as well as for legal costs in the high court of admiralty. Even if a realistic assessment could be made of these deductions, no evidence survives of Hippisley's investment in privateering: and the capital investment of shipping, victualling and armament could have been considerable. Perhaps the best that may be deduced from this fragmentary data is that Hippisley's net return from privateering was almost certainly no more than one-third of the gross total of £20,000, and it may have been closer to a quarter, or rather less, depending on his ability to dispose of prize goods in the right market.[47]

VI

It is clear that Hippisley's privateering activities were profitable. Indeed, by the end of the war his financial position had improved considerably: in 1631, for example, he was able to lend the crown £1,000, at a rate of interest of 8%, and two years later he was prepared to invest £200 in the recently established "Society of . . . Fishing," in which Edward Nicholas was also involved.[48] Of course privateering was not the sole cause of this improvement. The lieutenancy of Dover Castle provided a steady income from 1625 to 1628, while the sale of that office to Sir Edward Dering brought with it something of a "windfall" profit, especially as Hippisley had apparently received it as a free gift from Buckingham. Nor did Sir John's privateering lay the basis for the accumulation of vast wealth: oranges and lemons, tar and lead, or nails and kettles, which made up the staple prize cargoes taken by his privateers, were not the stuff from which fortunes at sea were made.[49] Nevertheless, privateering had at least helped put Hippisley out of debt.

That Hippisley was able to enjoy the profits of war in this way was as much due to influence and patronage, as it was to any business acumen. His connection with Buckingham was an important factor in the success of his maritime ventures in the 1620s. The "special grant" of ten French prizes to Hippisley early in 1627, of which no other example survives for these years, is but the most obvious illustration of how patronage served Sir John's privateering interests. In the words of the Venetian ambassador in London, Hippisley (and other adherents of the Duke) were "protected by favouritism"; and this protection, based on a remarkable power base at court, was an essential feature of the structure of his privateering activities.[50] Yet Sir John's single-minded pursuit of profit, his willingness to break or bend the regulations governing the conduct of the privateering war, occasionally brought him into almost direct conflict with the Duke's position, and interests, as lord high admiral. The dispute with Sir Henry Marten in 1627, or the continuing irregularities of Hippisley's captains in 1628, no doubt embarrassed Buckingham, but they also raised worrying questions concerning the Duke's burgeoning network of power and influence. Indeed, Hippisley's dispute with the judge of the high court of admiralty, which was partly overlaid by the ancient hostility between the admiralty and the Cinque Ports, suggests that Buckingham's wide network of patronage was based on a delicate

47. It is clear from a letter by Hippisley to Nicholas (28 June 1629), that Sir John realised the importance of the London market for prize goods, P.R.O., S.P. 16/145/77. Prize ships were also sold locally in Dover, see, for example, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/46, f. 211.

48. *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1629-31*, p. 559; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1631-33*, pp. 510-11; Keeler, *The Long Parliament*, pp. 215-16.

49. See, for example, P.R.O., E. 190/656/2 & 3. On the sale of the lieutenancy, B.L., Stowe MSS. 743, f. 134.

50. *C.S.P.V. 1626-28*, pp. 22-3. The ambassador became entangled with Hippisley early in 1628, when the secretary of the latter stopped and opened the former's mail. The ambassador, however, suspected that Hippisley was to blame, and that he was acting on instructions from Buckingham, see ibid., pp. 8-9, 19-26, 32-2, 55-6, 571. On patronage, and related themes, see Lockyer, *Buckingham*, pp. 36-8, 275-6, 414-5, and Linda Levy Peck, "Corruption at the Court of James I: The Undermining of Legitimacy" in Barbara C. Malament (ed.), *After the Reformation: Essays in Honor of J. H. Hexter* (Manchester, 1980), pp. 75-93.

balance of negotiation between potentially rival interests. As this system grew in size, and as it was subject to growing pressure as a consequence of the wars with Spain and France, so it became increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between these different interests. And in this inherently unstable situation it was relatively easy for provincial agents to exploit the system for their own ends. In this way plunder, patronage and power became uneasily entangled in Hippisley's privateering ventures. Although the combination was certainly profitable for Sir John, it was an unprofitable and messy situation for Buckingham in which the reciprocal relationship between patron and client was in danger of being skewed off balance.

John Appleby has held research fellowships at University College, London and Queen's University, Belfast. The research for this article was completed while he held a Charles Phelps Taft Fellowship at the University of Cincinnati. *He is indebted to Professor Kenneth L. Andrews for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article.*

APPENDIX 1

Vessels Set Out by Sir John Hippisley with Letters of Marque, 1625-30

Vessel	*Date*[1]	*Captain*	*Tonnage*	*Ordnance*[2]	*Men*	*Victuals*	*Against*[3]
1) *Dainty Kate*[4]	28 Sept. 1628	—	40	—	—	5 months	S/F
2) *Have at All*	24 Jan. 1626	Richard Hippisley	120	10	60	2	S
	27 April 1627	Richard Hippisley	100	12	100	4	S/F
	21 May 1628	Richard Hippisley	140	14	80	6	S/F
3) *Holdfast*[5]	21 May 1628	—	30	—	—	6	S/F
4) *John & Fortune*	6 July 1626	Barnaby Burley	60	—	—	—	S
	27 Feb. 1627	Barnaby Burley	60	6	50	8	S
	27 April 1627	Barnaby Burley	70	6	50	3	F
5) *Sweepstake*	13 April 1626	Tristram Stephens	60	8	50	5	S
	27 April 1627	Tristram Stephens	80	8	60	3	S/F
6) *Revenge*[6]	30 June 1627	—	300	22	100	12	S/F
	28 Sept. 1628	John Greene	240	22	80	5	S/F
	14 Aug. 1629	John Greene	150	13	30	12	S

1. This is the date on which a warrant was issued by the lord admiral for the grant of letters of marque.
2. Pieces, usually unspecified.
3. i.e., Either for use against Spain or France.
4. Set out as a pinnace with the *Revenge*.
5. Set out as a pinnace with the *Have at All*.
6. Given the large disparity in tonnages this may represent two separate vessels rather than one. Thus the last entry in the list may not refer to one of Hippisley's ships.

Source: P.R.O., H.C.A. 25/211-14.

The French Siege of Oswego in 1756: Inland Naval Warfare in North America[1]

D. Peter Macleod

When the French chose to oppose Anglo-American expansion towards the Ohio valley in the mid-eighteenth century, they opened a new front deep in the interior of North America. This led to the emergence of a new phenomena in North American military history—the use of small inland navies to control key nodes of the riverine transportation network that linked New France and British North America. It quickly became apparent that, in the struggle for control of the lakes of North America, shipbuilding was more important than fighting, since numerical and qualitative superiority generally proved to be decisive. This was particularly apparent during the first example of this lacustrine maritime conflict, when, in 1756, a French army commanded by Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, Marquis de Montcalm, crossed Lake Ontario to besiege and capture the British outpost of Oswego [Oswego, New York]. The absence of actual naval engagements during this campaign demonstrates in sharp relief the essential elements of logistics and construction, in a campaign that was won by the French in the shipyard and along their lines of communication before Montcalm's army ever came in sight of the walls of Oswego.

Prior to the 1750s, warfare between the French and British colonies had been confined to coastal areas and the Lake Champlain corridor. Armies were small and mostly non-professional, military operations sporadic, and inland navies non-existent. But during the Seven Years' War, the intensity of conflict escalated to unprecedented heights, tens of thousands of European regulars crossed the Atlantic, major annual campaigns became the norm, and the area of operations spread westward to Lake Ontario and the Ohio valley.

The major engagements of the Seven Years' War in the interior were fought in the central theatre, which extended from Quebec to Lake Ontario, and comprised the seigneural tract of Canada, its Atlantic approaches, and the frontier zone between New France and New York. Within this area, armies marched and countermarched along the axes of communication between the rival colonies by way of the Hudson River–Lake George–Lake Champlain–Richelieu River and the Hudson River–Oswego River–Lake Ontario–Saint Lawrence River systems. In the roadless wilderness, whichever side dominated these waterways held the initiative, since troops and supplies could be moved much more quickly and efficiently over the lakes and rivers than by land. In the Ohio valley, on the other hand, where the British had no alternative but to construct roads through the forest, British columns took months to cross distances that their counterparts on the Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain routes covered in days.

Both powers erected forts at portages and river mouths.[2] Forts, however, could be bypassed, and, however strong their defences might be, they them-

1. This paper is a revised and expanded version of a chapter of my M.A. thesis, "The French Campaign of 1756 in the Lake Ontario Theatre and the Siege and Capture of Chouaguen," written at the University of Saskatchewan and directed by Dr. Dale Miquelon, for whose advice and support I am most grateful. I would also like to thank Dr. Hubert Johnson of the University of Saskatchewan and Commander Fraser MacKee, for their assessments of the original thesis; Dr. Roger Sarty of the Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, who was kind enough to read and comment upon an earlier draft of this article; and Catherine Plewes, who produced the final version of the map. Financial assistance was provided by the J.S. Ewart Memorial Fund. All archival material is on microfilm at the National Archives of Canada.

2. On Lake Ontario, Forts Frontenac [Kingston, Ontario] and Oswego controlled important harbours, but could only be used as passive bases for operations. Fort Niagara, at the foot of the Niagara portage, occupied a strategic location, but could not actually control passage along the road to Lake Erie. During the siege of 1759, a British column simply marched past the fort to attack and defeat a French relief force from the west.



The French Lake Ontario squadron, as sketched at Fort Frontenac in 1757 by Pierre Boucher de Labroquerie. Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada, from a transcript in the National Map Collection, NMC 6433.

selves gave their garrisons physical control only over the ground within range of their guns, and not an inch further. But in those areas where the rivers widened into lakes, ships could rove at will and dominate hundreds of miles of communication routes. A single small warship—a floating battery that was frequently more heavily armed than many North American forts—could devastate the convoys of bateaux and whaleboats that were used to carry men and supplies. Any power that could control one of the inland lakes could transport troops and artillery to besiege rival outposts, and prevent the enemy from attempting similar movements. And not only could an effective naval presence intercept an enemy attack, it's mere existence could deter an offensive from being launched at all. Under these conditions, small numbers of very small warships, forming squadrons that would have been insignificant alongside the blue-water fleets of the Atlantic, were in a position to change, in a modest way, the course of history.

After the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, the control of Lake Ontario became a primary objective for both combatants. For the British, this would be useful, but not vital. Since British North America was not threatened with conquest, control over invasion routes was not absolutely necessary. Moreover, Oswego was supplied via the Mohawk and Oswego Rivers, which were secure from interdiction by French maritime forces. So the British could maintain an effective presence in the region even when the French dominated the lake.

If control of Lake Ontario was merely a convenience for the British, it was of crucial importance for the French. Forts Frontenac, Niagara, and Toronto, the French outposts on Lake Ontario, could only be supplied by way of the lake, which meant that the British needed only to blockade the outlet of Lake Ontario or the individual posts (which were completely dependent upon the arrival of supplies from the central colony) to starve them out. The consequences of British control over Lake Ontario would not, however, end with the fall of three small forts. For it was on Lake Ontario that a British advanced post (Oswego) lay astride French lines of communications to the west. Were this lifeline to be slashed, the results would be catastrophic for New France. The severing of French links with the *pays d'en haut* would have made "Fort Duquesne [the principal French post in the Ohio

valley] fall of its own accord," along with the other upcountry posts,[3] choked off the western fur trade, gravely threatened the relationship of New France with its Amerindian allies, and opened the way for an invasion of Canada by way of the upper Saint Lawrence.

So in 1755, the British contemplated the capture of Forts Frontenac and Niagara, while the French eyed Oswego, as both sides prepared to take the offensive, and Lake Ontario became a combat zone in its own right. Possession of a squadron was a prerequisite for success, and, at Frontenac and Oswego, improvised shipyards went into operation.

The French occupation of the Ohio valley had been made possible, in part, by their ability to transport men and supplies over Lake Ontario to the west. At the beginning of the campaign of 1755, they were undisputed masters of the lake, and ran convoys of bateaux in plain sight of the garrison of Oswego with impunity. Far from attempting to intercept the French, the British, who had no naval forces on the lake, were concerned by the possibility that the fort might be snapped up by a passing convoy. On 24 May, for example, when the garrison numbered only one hundred, thirty French bateaux, each carrying fifteen men bound for the Ohio country, passed in front of Oswego. They were followed two days later by eleven more, a force which, in the opinion of an English commentator, "with a single mortar might in a few hours have taken possession of the place."[4] But this interval of uncontested French predominance proved to be fleeting. As the war in North America intensified, the French began to increase their naval presence, and the British prepared to challenge the French for mastery of the lake.

On 28 May, reinforcements of British regulars arrived at Oswego, with orders to strengthen the fortifications and make preparations for an attack on Fort Niagara. With them came the first contingent of shipwrights, who began to construct a British squadron. A month later, 320 men were hard at work, and the first British warship on Lake Ontario, the *Ontario* sloop, twelve metres long and mounting twelve swivels, had been launched.[5] In the course of the summer, she was joined by her sister ship, *Oswego*, and two small schooners, *George* and *Vigilant*, all under the overall command of Captain Housman Broadley, the senior British naval officer on Lake Ontario. Although these vessels made several patrols about the lake in the course of the summer, they never encountered the French, and there were no naval engagements on Lake Ontario in 1755.

Across the lake at Fort Frontenac, the French were neither idle nor unaware of British intentions, and were mustering their own forces to assail Oswego. In 1755, the French, who already had two small transports on the lake, *Louise* and *Victor*, decided to augment this force with two larger armed vessels, which were to both assist in the transport of men and supplies to the Ohio country and "to serve to destroy those [ships] which the English have built at Oswego."[6] By the end of the summer, *Hurault* had been built, fitted out, and launched, and the construction of a second and larger schooner was underway.

Despite the rapid expansion of naval forces in the region, and bellicose intentions of the combatants, the campaign of 1755 on the Lake Ontario frontier ended indecisively. The British abandoned their expedition to Niagara, while the French shifted the troops earmarked for the siege of Oswego to the Lake Champlain front to counter another British offensive.

In the spring of 1756, the naval race resumed. The British laid aside their plans for an offensive, but resumed work on a squadron which they hoped would be strong enough to control Lake Ontario by the end of the year. The French, however, continued to plan an attack on Oswego, spurred by the fear that the summer of 1756 would be their last opportunity to undertake the siege before the steadily increasing British naval strength would make it impossible. If, said the governor general of New France, Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the shipwrights of Oswego were allowed to continue unmolested, their ships would soon be "so numerous and so strong that they will give [the British] superiority over Lake Ontario," which he believed to be their "principal goal, according to several intercepted letters."[7] Rather than passively awaiting the

3. Doreil to d'Argenson, 1 September, 1756, France, Ministère de la Guerre [hereafter AG], A1: 3417.

4. "An Historical Account of American Affairs during the last two years, with a particular journal of the siege and surrender of Oswego," *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Quarterly*, 1757, 73.

5. "Historical Account of American Affairs," 75. This armament was later increased.

6. Marginal note in Duquesne to Bigot, 6 July, 1755, France, Archives des colonies [hereafter AC], C11A: 100.

7. Vaudreuil to Machault, 13 August, 1756, AC, F3: 14.



The British Lake Ontario squadron, also sketched in 1757 by Labroquerie, who was an officer in the French naval forces on Lake Ontario. Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada, from a transcript in the National Map Collection, NMC 6433.

completion of the British squadron, Vaudreuil resolved to act first and seize the initiative. A number of the metropolitan officers attached to his command were decidedly lacking in enthusiasm for the venture, as they believed that the British were already in a position to "oppose our landing, as they have a superior naval force on Lake Ontario."[8] Vaudreuil, however, maintained that British naval superiority was a future threat rather than a present reality, and one which could be neutralized by the destruction of Oswego.

Were a French army to reach Oswego, the capture of the fort and destruction of the shipyard was almost a certainty. The old trading post that formed the core of Oswego mounted only three guns, "which must not be fired for fear of bringing down the wall." Worse, it was dominated by the heights to the east and west. Two new forts were built to defend these hills, but one was badly designed and "defenceless against cannon," while the other was "by no means tenable," and considered to be "a work begun only, and what is done does rather more harm than good."[9]

Vaudreuil confidently predicted that, in the event of an attack, the forts of Oswego would fall like a row of dominoes, one after the other. Many officers of the garrison shared this view. With the fortifications incapable of resisting a serious attack, Oswego, in their opinion, "depended wholly for its defence upon a naval force on the lake, sufficient to prevent the French from bringing artillery against the forts, which could only be done by water carriage."[10]

But a squadron of warships could not simply be wished into existence. In order to build them it would be necessary to recreate European material civilization in miniature in the heart of the North American wilderness, using personnel and equipment from hundreds or thousands of kilometres away. Wood alone was available on the spot, and then only after it had been cut and labouriously handsawn into planks. Everything else, canvas, rigging, cables, ironwork, etc., together with the small armies of specialists who built the ships, and the seamen and officers who would sail and fight them, had to come by small boat from Montreal and Albany. Of particular importance were the guns, since unarmed ships could not so much as leave the harbour in safety, let alone advance French or

8. Montcalm to d'Argenson, 28 August, 1756, AG, A1: 3417.

9. P. Mackellar, "A Journal of the Transactions at Oswego from the 16th of May to the 14 of August 1756," ed., S.M. Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1756: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York: Appleton-18th Century, 1936), 190, 192, 209.

10. J. Barford, *et al.*, "An Account of the strength of the garrison and strength of the works at Oswego . . . ," Pargellis, *Military Affairs*, 219. This opinion was echoed among the privates of the garrison, one of whom asserted that in 1756, "For our defences against large cannon, we entirely depended upon a superior naval force upon the lake." P. Williamson, *French & Indian Cruelty, Exemplified in the Life and Various Vicissitudes of Fortune of Peter Williamson* (Glasgow: J. Bryce and P. Paterson, 1758), 68.

British interests. In 1755, logistics had seriously affected neither French nor British shipbuilding, but within a year, the availability or lack of supplies would come to dominate the naval race.

In the first year of the war, British supply lines along the Mohawk and Oswego Rivers had been unmolested. In 1756, however, the French made every effort to interdict this route with small parties of Amerindians and much larger detachments of Amerindians, militiamen and regulars. As a result, while many small convoys arrived without incident, the British sent important stores only in heavily guarded convoys,which tied naval construction to the rhythm of the transports. After the arrival of a shipment of naval stores, shipbuilding raced ahead until the new *matériel* was consumed. Then the shipyard lay idle, until another convoy came down the Oswego River. In May of 1756, the first large flotilla of bateaux reached Oswego carrying provisions and naval stores, and construction began on three new ships, *London, Halifax,* and *Mohawk.*

Almost directly to the north of Oswego, the French had also resumed naval construction, unhindered by the supply problems that plagued their British counterparts. Men and *matérial* flowed steadily up the St. Lawrence to the shipyard at Fort Frontenac. Work proceeded smoothly and, early in the summer, *La Marquise de Vaudreuil,* was launched in time to take part in the only naval encounter of the campaign.

Penned in their fort by roving bands of Canadians and Amerindians, the garrison of Oswego was forced to rely upon maritime reconaissance for intelligence. By late June, scouts in whaleboats had been involved in two skirmishes with French parties in canoes and bateaux. The French schooners were not involved in these encounters. Although they had sighted the British squadron several times in the spring and early summer, as the French vessels were "occupied with transports to Niagara, [they] could not pursue" the British.[11]

Nevertheless, on 27 June, the two small squadrons met in battle. *Ontario, Oswego,* and one of the small schooners were just west of modern Prince Edward County, when they sighted *Victor* and *Louise* returning from their third cruise to Fort Niagara. Both squadrons altered course and advanced towards the other. But as they drew nearer, the British lookouts noticed two more French vessels, the heavily-armed *La Marquise de Vaudreuil* and *Hurault,* bearing down on them. After the newcomers had closed to within eight hundred metres, the three British captains held a hasty council of war, at which "it was unanimously agreed that they [the French] were so much superior to us [that] it would be very imprudent to come into action with them."[12] The British squadron then broke away and ran for Oswego, with the two French warships in hot pursuit. But the French vessels, commanded by Réné-Hippolyte Laforce, a Canadian merchant sea-captain, never caught up with their counterparts. Since neither *La Marquise de Vaudreuil* nor *Hurault* was equipped with bow chasers, they lost time luffing up to the wind to fire their broadside guns. The small schooner was left behind and captured, but the British sloops escaped "by using their oars, after having thrown their dinghy and part of their baggage into the sea."[13] A day later, the French vessels spotted the remaining British schooner off Sackett's Harbour, and chased it back into Oswego.[14] The rival squadrons would not meet again until both were employed to transport prisoners and supplies from Oswego to Frontenac and Niagara.

More important than these trivial encounters, a week later, on 2 July, a second supply convoy arrived at Oswego bearing guns, rigging and stores for the three new vessels. The shipwrights sprang into action and the *London* brig and *Mohawk* sloop were fitted out and launched, thereby somewhat improving the British position on the lake, although the balance of force remained tilted in favour of the French.

Unfortunately for the British, it had been necessary to leave behind twenty-four six-pounders, intended for the new ships, at the Great Carrying Place [Rome, N.Y.], the portage between the Mohawk and Oswego river systems. The arrival of a third convoy was eagerly anticipated during the remainder of July and the first week of August.[15] The bateaux and their crews were, however, detained at Schenectady, waiting for the

11. Vaudreuil to Machault, 5 July, 1756, AC, C11A: 101.

12. At the time of this encounter, the British ships were armed only with four four-pounders, one three-pounder, and ten swivels each. Broadley to Cleveland, 28 June, 1756, Great Britain, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], Admiralty 1 [hereafter Adm 1]: 1487.

13. Vaudreuil to Machault, 5 July, 1756, AC, C11A: 101.

14. Broadley to Cleveland, 2 July, 1756, PRO, Adm 1: 1487; Vaudreuil to Machault, 5 July, 1756, AC, C11A: 101.

15. "State of facts relating to the loss of Oswego . . . ," ed., H.-R. Casgrain, *Collection de manuscrits . . . relatifs à l'histoire de la nouvelle-france, IV* (Quebec: L.-J. Demers, 1885), 60.



"First French war fleet beating up for Niagara to gather troops for the attack on Oswego, 1756," by C.H.J. Snider. Left to right: *La Marquise de Vaudreuil*, *Hurault*, *Louise*, *Victor*. Courtesy of the Metropolitan Toronto Reference Library, T 15213.

44th Regiment, which was to accompany them to Oswego.[16] So, for over a month, the guns that could have given the British command of Lake Ontario lay useless at the portage. The garrison of Oswego does not appear to have contemplated sending a force up-river to collect them.

By 29 July, *London* and *Mohawk* were ready for sea, but naval officers, seamen, and, most of all, cannon, were still in short supply. The personnel shortage was resolved by stripping *Oswego* of her crew and using them to man *London*, but artillery could not be conjured out of thin air. Thus, at the time of the siege, the effective British force on Lake Ontario consisted of *London*, with six six-pounders and eight four-pounders; *Ontario*, with six four-pounders; and *Mohawk*, with four four-pounders and two three-pounders.[17] As well, there were the remaining small schooner, which was used for reconnaissance, *Oswego*, and the partly rigged *Halifax*. The latter two were "both useless, as they had neither men nor guns for them."[18] Opposing these vessels were *La Marquise de Vaudreuil*, the French flagship, mounting eight eight-pounders and eight sixes, and *Hurault*, with eight six-pounders and four fours. *Louise*, *Victor*, and the captured small schooner were either laid up during the campaign or used as transports.[19]

From these figures, it is evident that the French enjoyed a considerable margin of superiority at the time of the siege, and would likely have had the upper hand in any naval clash. The British were well aware of this. Benjamin Franklin, while reporting on the opinions of a number of British officers, noted on 27 July that the "naval force of the enemy on Lake Ontario, is represented as superior to ours."[20] Of course, had the British been able to man and arm *Halifax* and *Oswego*, it

16. Shirley to Fox, 16 September, 1756, and two enclosures: extract from Bradstreet to Shirley, 24 July, 1756, "State of the dispute concerning the provisions for transporting the 44th Regiment to Oswego, and the true causes of the delay of its imbarcation," PRO, Colonial Office Records [hereafter CO] 5: 46.

17. Broadley to Cleveland, 28 June, 1756, PRO, Adm 1: 1487; Broadley to Cleveland, 2 July, 1756, *ibid;* Broadley to Cleveland, 26 September, 1756, *ibid*.

18. Barford, "An account of the strength of the garrison," Pargellis, *Military Affairs*, 219.

19. "Extrait des nouvelles en Canada: état de nos forces navalles[sic] sur le lac Ontario," AC, C11A: 101.

20. Franklin to Fawkener, 27 July, 1756, Pargellis, *Military Affairs*, 185.

would have been the French who were outgunned. Early in July, a French officer acknowledged in his journal that: "The English have three armed vessels on Lake Ontario. Three stronger vessels are about to be launched. If nothing happens before then, they [the English] will have superiority on the lake."[21]

As it was, the British warships fired a total weight of 52 kilograms, while their adversaries could loose off 86 kilograms, giving the French an advantage in firepower of about 65 percent. But had the missing six-pounders been delivered, and their 91 kilogram weight of shot been added to the British squadron, then it would have been Broadley who had a 25 percent advantage over his opponents. This would have eliminated the disparity between the two forces, given the British a comfortable, but not overwhelming preponderance, and enabled them to sally out and challenge the French for control of Lake Ontario with reasonable expectations of success. Indeed, had the twenty-four six-pounders arrived, there might have been no expedition and no siege. With a superior naval force on the lake, the British could have pinned Montcalm in Fort Frontenac like a butterfly to a card, and waited for the French army to be starved into surrender or attempt an overland march back to Canada. Instead of Oswego, it could have been Frontenac and Niagara that surrendered in 1756.

Be that as it may, by the end of July, the French had taken advantage of their naval superiority on Lake Ontario to concentrate a siege force of 3,000 men and 20 cannon at Fort Frontenac.[22] *Louise* was stripped of her guns and left behind at Fort Frontenac, while *Victor,* also disarmed, was sent to Fort Niagara as a transport, and the captured small schooner used to carry provisions for the expedition. Laforce and his two warships, *La Marquise de Vaudreuil* and *Hurault,* were ordered to sortie "to cruise off Oswego, in order to cover the convoys and prevent the English from going to Niagara, where we [the French] could leave only a weak garrison."[23] In the event, however, they were held up by contrary winds, and did not appear off Oswego until the day after the surrender. By 5 August, after a week of frantic preparation, Montcalm's army was ready to depart. They sailed in two divisions, with the second division, carrying the siege train, travelling a day behind the first.

The French approach was made with great circumspection, so as to avoid detection and interception by the British squadron. The bateaux hugged the coast and travelled only after dark. At first light, the flotilla halted and headed for the shore. The men drew the boats up on the beach, camouflaged them with foliage, and dispersed into the bush, where they lay concealed throughout the day.[24]

While the main body covered the entire distance by sea, an advanced party disembarked some distance away from the fort, and marched overland to Oswego. There, they secured the landing site, a small cove two kilometres from the fort, with a sandy beach suitable for bateaux, which was "the only place suitable for the disembarkation of the artillery" within reasonable distance of the objective.[25] On the night of 10 August, the main body reached the cove. After a shaky start, occasioned by the grounding of the bateaux a few metres from the beach, the landing proceeded without incident, and, long before dawn, the first division of the French army was safely ashore.

Even though the British had been informed by a prisoner of the impending attack, and the French squadron did not reach Oswego until after the siege, they failed to intercept the flotilla of bateaux that carried the French army. By 29 July, *London* and *Mohawk* had been fitted out and were ready for sea, but naval officers, seamen, and guns were still in short supply. Captain Broadley, however, thought that "it was for the good of his Majestys[sic] service that we should appear out on the lake as strong as we could, with what officers, men and guns we had got."[26] On 30 July, he sortied with his entire armed strength—

21. L.-A de Bougainville, "Journal de l'expédition d'amérique commencée en l'année 1756, le 15 mars," *Rapport de l'archiviste de la province de Québec* [hereafter RAPQ], 1923-1924, 206.

22. J.-G. Plantavit de Lapause de Margon, "Mémoire et observations sur mon voyage au Canada," RAPQ, 1931-1932, 27, 29. The garrison of Oswego at the time of the siege consisted of 1135 men. Barford, "An account of the strength of the garrison," Pargellis, *Military Affairs*, 218-219.

23. Ed., H.-R. Casgrain, *Journal du marquis de Montcalm durant ses campagnes au Canada de 1756 à 1760* (Quebec: L.-J. Demers, 1895), 91.

24. J.N. Desandrouins, "Précis des Evénments de la campagne de 1756 en la nouvelle france," AG, A1: 3417; Montcalm, *Journal*, 92.

25. J.N. Desandrouins, "Recueil et Journal des Choses principales qui me sont arrivées, et de celles qui m'ont le plus frappées, depuis mon départ de France," in C.N. Gabriel, *Le maréchal de camp Desandrouins, 1729-1792. Guerre du Canada, 1756-1760. Guerre de l'indépendance américaine, 1780-1782* (Verdun: Renvé-Lallement, 1887), 40.

26. Broadley to Cleveland, 26 September, 1756, PRO, Adm 1: 1487.



London, Ontario, and *Mohawk*—but the little squadron returned to port after *Ontario* had sprung a boom and *London* carried away a gaff. Five days later, they put to sea once more, but on 6 August, the gunpowder carried by *London* and *Mohawk* was discovered to be "so wet that we could not have used it."[27] Without ammunition the guns were useless, so Broadley returned to Oswego once more to repair the magazines and replace his powder. But while entering the harbour, the squadron was caught by "a violent thunder squall,"[28] and *London,* the most powerful British ship on the lake, ran aground. She was refloated the next morning, but was still drawn up on the beach and awaiting repairs when the siege began. These repairs required the services of every seaman in Oswego, except for the crew of the remaining small schooner, which was "employed cruising to the eastward and westward of the harbours mouth . . . [in order] that the garrison might not be surprized."[29]

The 11th of August began quietly for the garrison of Oswego. The troops were hard at work improving the fortifications, while the seamen were kept busy with repairs to the damaged *London*. Their first inkling that a powerful French army had disembarked within two kilometres of the fort came when a stray bateau was sighted down the lake. The small schooner was sent out to investigate, and soon returned to report that a large French force was encamped at the cove.

Ontario and *Mohawk,* "the only vessels then ready were sent out to make the enemy decamp."[30] However, as one of Broadley's seamen later related, as the two ships drew near the French, "before they could

27. Broadley to Cleveland, 22 January, 1757, PRO, Adm 1: 1488.
28. Broadley to Cleveland, 26 September, 1756, PRO, Adm 1: 1487.
29. Broadley to Cleveland, 22 January, 1757, PRO, Adm 1: 1488.
30. Mackellar, "Journal," Pargellis, *Military Affairs*, 207.

reach the shore where the enemy lay they were fired upon with cannon very briskly . . . [and] they did not think it advisable to make any further attempt."[31] They withdrew after *Ontario* had been hit by three shot from a French shore battery mounting four twelve-pounders, to which the British replied only with a single volley and two broadsides of grapeshot which fell short.[32] The two sloops cruised off the French camp for a while, then headed back to the harbour. The British were not allowed to return in peace, however, for as they sailed back some Canadians and Amerindians posted along the shore opened fire. *Ontario* and *Mohawk* responded, but only succeeded in knocking down a few trees near the French camp.

Early the next morning, the second division of Montcalm's army, carrying the supplies and siege train arrived, and were sighted by the British. *Ontario* and *Mohawk* sortied once more, but the French bateaux were safely under the guns of the shore battery before the sloops arrived on the scene.

Despite the successful landing and rapid progress of the siege works, French anxieties were aroused when *Ontario* and *Mohawk* appeared once again on the thirteenth and cruised for a time off the northern end of the French entrenchments. Their presence caused the French some uneasiness, since from this position "a cannon ball fired [from the sloops] would have raked the trench from one end to the other."[33] Fortunately for the besiegers, either this did not occur to the captains of the sloops or they were wary of the possibility that the French had covered the end of the trench with masked batteries, and the Royal Navy thereby missed an opportunity to inflict a shrewd blow upon the besiegers. During the last hours of the siege, Broadley's ships remained in harbour, and played no further role beyond firing a few ineffective shots at a body of Canadians and Amerindians crossing the Oswego River to occupy an outwork on 14 August, as the siege drew to a predictable conclusion.

Once Montcalm's army had landed, the flimsy stockades of the forts of Oswego proved to be no match for the French artillery. The beleaguered garrison watched helplessly as the French established their siege works and batteries, and methodically pounded the defences of Oswego. The fort surrendered on 14 August after a four-day siege. Fort Oswego was razed and the British squadron, which, if completed and armed, would "have assured the English of superiority on Lake Ontario,"[34] fell into French hands. The former warships were used by the victors to transport prisoners and captured provisions, munitions and armaments to Forts Frontenac and Niagara.

Even though the French naval forces did not arrive until after the capitulation, the French did successfully sea-lift an army and siege train to Oswego without encountering the slightest opposition from the Royal Navy. Thus, in the event, the British naval presence on Lake Ontario proved to be as ineffective as the fortifications of Oswego in deterring or interfering with French ambitions in the region. This came about because they were unable to bring their entire squadron into action. Throughout the summer, British attempts to augment their maritime forces were plagued by all of the difficulties that one would expect shipbuilders working at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communication to experience. Not only did Broadley have to cope with the delays imposed by the need to transport supplies in infrequent large armed convoys, but he had "great reason to believe . . . that many of the stores design'd for the use of the navy have been stop'd at the carrying places for the use of the forts built & a'building there."[35] His squadron consequently suffered from shortages of naval stores, skilled artisans, artillery, seamen, and naval officers. The British failed to man and arm *Halifax* and *Oswego*, the vessels that could have given them command of the lake, for want of a quantity of guns, seamen and naval stores that was insignificant relative to their total resources. That this was allowed to occur is a damning indictment of the incapacity and lack of vision of the British high command, that can most charitably be ascribed to the hiatus that occurred between the relief of one commander-in-chief and the arrival of his successor.

The British, moreover, were the victims of simple misfortune. Following a number of uneventful cruises in 1755 and 1756, during the critical period just prior to

31. Hardy to the Board of Trade, 5 September, 1756, ed., E.B. O'Callaghan, *The Documentary History of New York, I* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, & Co., 1850), 323.

32. Broadley to Cleveland, 26 September, 1756, PRO, Adm 1: 1487; Desandrouins, "Recueil et Journal," Gabriel, *Desandrouins*, 48.

33. Desandrouins, "Recueil et Journal," Gabriel, *Desandrouins*, 54.

34. "Journal du siège du Chouaguen commencée le 11 août 1756, et fini le 14 au soir," AG, A1: 3417.

35. Broadley to Cleveland, 7 July, 1756, PRO, CO 5: 47.

the siege Broadley's squadron was twice forced to return to harbour on account of broken spars and damp magazines. Moreover, his most powerful ship ran aground and was out of action during the siege. If Broadley had not been forced to turn back by these mishaps, he might have caught Montcalm's flotilla on the lake. On the other hand, while defending his conduct during the siege, Broadly asserted that "had we been out, we could not have prevented their coming; the enemy having taken precaution not to cross the lake; but to coast with their batteaus[sic] close to the shoar[sic] round bottom of it; where we could not have come near them."[36] The fact that the French travelled only by night and took very careful precautions to avoid detection would have made interception very difficult

The conduct of Captain Broadley did not meet with the approval of the Admiralty, and he was asked to justify his actions after his return to England.[37] It is certainly possible to argue that Broadley's conduct should have been more agressive, since his squadron ultimately contributed virtually nothing to the defence of Oswego. But considering the odds against him, the bad luck that dogged the British at sea during the crucial final weeks of the campaign, the caution displayed by Montcalm during his advance, and the vigorous reaction of the French when *Mohawk* and *Ontario* attempted to bombard their encampment, it is difficult to see just what he could have done. Broadley may have been somewhat lacking in enterprise, but he also lacked the means to challenge the French squadron on the open lake.

Between May, 1755 and August, 1756, the Lake Ontario region was the scene of a competition for naval predominance between France and England, whose ultimate result was the expulsion of the Royal Navy from the lake. This came about, not as the result of a dramatic and decisive "Battle of Lake Ontario," but because the Royal Navy proved to be unequal to the task of preventing the passage of the bateaux carrying the French army and siege train that captured and razed the British port and shipyard, along with Broadley's entire squadron. The real battle for control of Lake Ontario took place in the shipyards of Fort Frontenac and Oswego, and along the lines of communication that linked the two outposts to the colonial centres of population, and ultimately to France and England. In the end, the French logistics system delivered the human and material resources needed for the two warships that together outgunned their British counterparts. The British, on the other hand, at the time of the siege had control of the lake almost within their grasp, but were just unable to transport the men and *matériel* that would have enabled them to add *Oswego* and *Halifax* to their squadron.

Instead of facing the choice between being blockaded in Fort Frontenac or having to "oppose our two cruisers to six[sic] of theirs,"[38] the French invasion flotilla crossed the lake unopposed and landed two kilometres from Oswego, which fell after a four-day siege. Judging from the difference that a few score British seamen and the twenty-four six-pounders that were rusting away impotently at the portage could have made, it perhaps less correct to say that the French won control of Lake Ontario in 1756 than that the British lost it.

36. Broadley to Cleveland, 22 January, 1757, PRO, Adm 1: 1488.
37. Cleveland to Broadley, 19 January, 1757, PRO, Adm 2: 706.
38. Vaudreuil to Machault, 1 September, 1756, AC, F3: 14.

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Trials of a Yankee Sailor: Robert Gray in the Río de la Plata, 1798-1802

JERRY W. COONEY

HISTORIANS of the Heroic Age of American Sail always make a reference to Captain Robert Gray and his ship, the *Columbia*. This "Boston Man" was among the first to participate in the Pacific Northwest—China trade and in 1792 he discovered the Columbia River, naming that great waterway after his vessel. His exploration of the mouth of this river and his and other Americans' trading ventures in the Northwest laid much of the eventual United States claim to the region now composed of the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho.[1] Captain Gray, however, was always a merchant mariner first and like so many of his New England counterparts, he took to the sea after the American Revolution in search of one thing—profit.

In the course of his voyages in the last years of the eighteenth century, chance brought Gray to the Río de la Plata. At the time, this South American viceroyalty of Spain experienced economic and political stress as a result of the mother country's participation in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.[2] The Yankee sailor's experiences in the Plata between 1798 and 1802 reflected both the opportunities and risks American sea traders discovered in their new contacts with Spanish America on the eve of independence of this vast New World territory.

In 1798 Gray became master of a new Salem-built brigantine of 123 tons, the *Alert*. That vessel, owned by a consortium of Salem merchants, was laden with a cargo of trade goods that included "broadcloth, blankets, twine, hardware, copper, linen and cotton cloths, looking glasses, leather and sundry other articles consigned to the said master [Robert Gray]." The owners placed a value of $20,356.15 on ship and cargo.[3]

The *Alert* was bound for the Pacific Northwest by way of Cape Horn. Along the coast of present-day Washington Gray hoped to trade with Indians for sea otter pelts for the China trade. After obtaining a quantity of those furs, the captain intended to sail for Canton, there to exchange the pelts for tea, and then on to Europe to sell tea for specie or manufactures. Finally, the ship was to make its return to the United States. It is likely that Gray, an experienced sailor in the China commerce, shared in the profits of the voyage as was customary.

In September of 1798 the Yankee ship departed Massachusetts bound for the south. Off the coast of southern Brazil on November 17 the French frigate and privateer, *La Republicaine*, commanded by Pierre-Marie Bossac, and operating out of African ports, captured the *Alert*.[4] This seizure occurred in the first phases of the Quasi-War or the Franco-American Undeclared Naval War of 1797-1801, and Gray likely had the dubious honor of commanding the southernmost American prize taken by the French.[5]

1. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860* (Boston, 1921), pp. 46-51. Also see F. W. H., "Gray, Robert," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds), *Dictionary of American Bibliography* (New York, 1931), VII, 522-523. The *DAB* makes no mention of Gray's activities in the Río de la Plata.

2. The best survey of the Río de la Plata in the very last years of the eighteenth century is José M. Mariluz Urquijo, *El Virreinato del Río de la Plata en la época del marqués de Avilés (1799-1801)* (2nd rev. ed., Buenos Aires, 1987), *passim*.

3. "In the Court of Claims. Spoliation; Filed January 11, 1886. Robert M. Pratt." Brig *Alert*. Robt. Gray French Spoliation Claim No. 773 in the National Archives, Record Group 123, French Spoliation Claims.

4. *Ibid*. Charles Lyon Chandler, "Documents. I. The River Plate Voyages, 1798-1800," *American Historical Review*, 23:4 (July, 1918), pp. 818-826.

5. For the Quasi-War see Gardner W. Allen, *Our Naval War with France* (reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1967), *passim*; and Alexander De Conde, *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801* (New York, 1966), *passim*.

Captain Bossac, who earlier had also utilized Montevideo as a base while raiding in the South Atlantic, ordered the *Alert* and a Portuguese prize to that port.[6] There his agent, a Montevidean businessman, arranged the sale of the North American ship and its cargo. Although the United States and Spain were at peace at the time, Bossac's action was deemed legal under royal instructions dating from the War of the American Revolution and recently repeated to imperial officials: ". . . the sale of prizes which do not have a formal declaration of legitimacy only can be permitted with an accompanying and sufficient bond, or with the judicial deposit of its [the prize's] value in lieu of that bond."[7] In consequence, the *Alert* was purchased for 6000 pesos by Francisco Xavier Ferrer, a porteño merchant who then converted the North American ship into a cargo vessel for the Pacific coastal trade.[8]

Captain Gray naturally protested the legality of the Montevidean prize court in several petitions to José de Bustamante, *Juez de Arrivada y Commandante de Marina*, of Montevideo:

> . . . I related to you the circumstances of my capture and conveyance to this port [Montevideo] by the French frigate and privateer, *La Republicaine*, . . . and whereby you should have declared null said act, and that of the sale of my ship and cargo. That French cosair should not have taken me as a prize because the United States of America are at peace with that nation. I committed no offense against him. The fact that my brigantine was armed and its papers carried the expression of empowerment to take action against any French attack is not such a reason and authorization [for him to take me as a prize]. Rather it is a defensive precaution for which the French Republic has given notorious justification as the maritime commerce of my country has been plundered of more than ten millions of pesos by means of similar depredations. The sale of the said ship of mine and its cargo should not legally be permitted in this kingdom without having proceeded, in my presence, with the declaration that it be a legal prize.

Gray also requested a statement from Bustamante for use in future legal action as to why the latter's government permitted the French to sell the North American craft.[9]

Bustamante, however, in a curt reply to the North American, rejected Gray's contention that the seizure had been illegal. Furthermore, the official denied that the Spanish government had any obligation to state formally the reasons why "it permitted Citizen Le Borec[sic] the sale of your ship and cargo."[10]

The captain and his crew no longer had a ship and had to make their way back to the United States as best they could. They could appeal to no American Consul in the Plata or even a Seamen's Agent as the Spanish Empire forbade such representation to its platine ports. By 1799, however, more Yankee vessels took advantage of a temporary liberalization of neutral trade with the Spanish Plata and North American ships became available in which to take passage home.[11] It also seems likely that Captain Gray took advantage of his forced stay to survey the new trading conditions and to make contacts with local merchants. The cruise of the *Alert* was not his last to this region.

At much the same time of Captain Gray's futile complaint to authorities in the Río de la Plata, that viceroyalty and the mother country experienced great strains resulting from the general European war. And, in miniature, Gray's difficulties with the Montevidean prize court was a New World reflection of Spain's increasing dependence upon, and submission to, her ally, France. That alliance, forced upon Charles IV in 1797, was the consequence of reverses along the Franco-Spanish frontier when Spain was a member of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France. By

6. Captain Pierre-Marie Bossac to Commandante José de Bustamante y Guerra, Montevideo, August 10, 1798 in Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires), Legajo 9-1-2-4 (Marina de Guerra y Mercante (1798-1803). Hereinafter cited as AGN 9-1-2-4. For the activities of French privateers in the Río de la Plata in this period see Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois, *Ensayo sobre el Río de la Plata y la Revolución Francesa* (Buenos Aires, 1929), pp. 111n-114n. There was a concern on the part of viceregal authorities about the legitimacy of the Letters of Marque of *La Republicaine*, but they decided not to pursue this delicate question. Angel Yzquierdo to Viceroy Antonio Olaguer Feliú, "Reservada," Buenos Aires, January 16, 1799 in AGN 9-1-2-4 (Marina de Guerra y Mercante 1798-1803).

7. "El Exmo. S.or D.n Mig.l Josef de Azanza . . . ," San Lorenzo, January 3, 1796 in Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, *Documentos para la historia Argentina. VII. Comercio de Indias. Consulado, Comercio de Negros y de Extrangeros (1791-1809)* (Buenos Aires, 1916), p. 106. This volume hereinafter cited as *DHA. VII.*

8. Comandante Bustamante y Guerra to Viceroy Olaguer Feliú, Buenos Aires, January 25, 1799 in AGN 9-1-2-4 (Marina de Guerra y Mercante 1798-1803).

9. Robert Gray to Comandante Bustamante y Guerra, Montevideo, January (?) of 1799 in Chandler, "The River Plate Voyages," pp. 818-819.

10. Comandante Bustamante y Guerra to Gray, Montevideo, February 19, 1799 in Chandler, "The River Plate Voyages," p. 819.

11. "R.l Orn Permitiendo en Buques nacionales o extranjeros desde puertos de Potencias neutrales . . . ," San Lorenzo, November 18, 1797 in *DHA. VII*, pp. 134-135. For the arrival of American ships in the Río de la Plata in this period see Chandler, "The River Plate Voyages," pp. 816-817 & 820-822.

1796 Madrid was forced by military disaster to abandon that coalition and in the next year concluded the Treaty of San Ildefonso with its northern neighbor. Now Europe witnessed the strange spectacle of the most reactionary monarchy of Western Europe dancing to the whim of Revolutionary France.

Charles IV and his primary advisor, Manuel Godoy, believed the reversal of alliances necessary if the homeland of the Empire, and the monarchy as well, were to be saved from the French. On the other hand, they well realized that an alliance with France signified British hostility and a resultant collapse of commerce between the peninsula and Spanish America. In the face of the Royal Navy the Spanish merchant marine simply could not sustain the former monopolistic ties of empire.[12] To the exporters of Spanish America the curtailment of the peninsular commerce meant temporary disaster. In the Río de la Plata, for instance, the value of goods exported in 1796 amounted to 5,479,675 pesos; in 1797 it plunged to 334,408 pesos.[13]

What could be done? The solution to this problem was a decree which empowered Spanish American merchants to employ neutral vessels to bring manufactures owned by those merchants to New World ports, and in turn, carry away local products in exchange. Supposedly those neutral ships would make a "*retorno*" to peninsular ports, thus preserving the illusion of imperial control over this new commerce.[14] In the Río de la Plata the arrival of neutral shipping revolutionized commerce; and now great opportunities existed for North American merchant captains with local ties.[15]

Available to supply those international connections was the greatest merchant in the Río de la Plata, Tomás Antonio Romero of Buenos Aires. Romero, a "man of gallant spirit for great ventures," was active in the African slave trade, buying and chartering North American and Portuguese ships for that purpose.[16] His fleet traded extensively with Portuguese Brazil, as well as with other parts of the Spanish American empire. Romero also indulged in many partnership ventures with other platine merchants.[17] In 1799 this *comerciante* greatly extended his relations with North American counterparts, not only for the purchase of ships, but also for the charter of Yankee vessels for the neutral trade.

By this time some North Americans had taken up more or less permanent residence in either Montevideo or Buenos Aires in order to service the growing trade with New England, Philadelphia, and New York.[18] Whether or not Robert Gray gained an introduction to Romero through these resident foreigners is not clear, but in any case the next voyage of the New Englander was a charter for Romero.

Gray returned to Boston in early 1800 and there either acquired the schooner *James* of eighty tons, or what appears more likely, possessed only a minority share in this ship with other merchant-backers. Romero had an agent resident in Boston and a contract of charter was arranged. The *James* departed Boston in November of 1800 and after a long voyage reached the port of Ballizas, which served Buenos Aires, in the middle of April. The ship was duly inspected by the *resguardo*, or customs agents, of the viceroyalty. They reported that the North American craft was chartered to Romero with the aim of carrying away exportable local products and had arrived in no more than legal ballast of stone and twenty-one quintales (hundred weights) of iron bars.[19] From this point all went

12. The importance of imperial trade is revealed in John Fisher, "The Imperial Response to 'Free Trade': Spanish Imports from Spanish America, 1778-1796," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 17:1 (May, 1985), pp. 35-78. For the hard decisions that had to be made in Madrid see Jacques Barbier, "Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: The Dilemma of Charles IV's Spain," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 12:1 (May, 1980), *passim*.

13. John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810. The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata* (London, 1958), p. 143. Fisher gives a slightly lower sum of 5,124,300 pesos for platine exports. Fisher, p. 78.

14. "R.l Orn Permitiendo en Buques nacionales o extranjeros desde puertos de Potencias neutrales . . . ," San Lorenzo, November 18, 1797 in *DHA. VII*, pp. 134-135.

15. The best overview of the great changes happening as a result of the "neutral" trade is Sergio Villalobos R., *Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile, 1700-1813* (Buenos Aires, 1971), pp. 80-90. For a short survey of the activities of platine merchants in these new conditions, see Jerry W. Cooney, "Oceanic Trade and Platine Merchants, 1796-1806: The Challenge of War," *The Americas*, 45:4 (April, 1989), *passim*.

16. "Memoria del virrey Nicolás de Arredondo," Buenos Aires, March 16, 1795 in Sigfrido Radaelli (ed.), *Memorias de los Virreyes del Río de la Plata* (Buenos Aires, 1945), pp. 392-394.

17. At the present the best treatment of this very important entrepreneur is Hugo Raúl Galmarini, "Comercio y burocracia colonial: a propósito de Tomás Antonio Romero," *Investigaciones y Ensayos* (Buenos Aires), 28 (enero-junio, 1980), pp. 407-439, and 29 (julio-diciembre, 1980), pp. 387-424.

18. The activities of Yankee residents in the ports of the viceregal Río de la Plata still awaits a study—as does the entire history of United States contact with the Río de la Plata in the viceregal era.

19. D.n Juan Marcos Mauregade, sostituto del resguardo, Buenos Aires, April 18, 1801 in AGN 1-1-3-2 (Marina 1757-1809).

wrong for Robert Gray on his second voyage to the Río de la Plata.

Defenders of Spain's traditional trade monopoly to the Indies had persuaded the monarch in 1799 to revoke the earlier decree that permitted commerce in neutral craft.[20] However, the marqués de Avilés, Viceroy of the Río de la Plata, did grant a grace period of several months to those ships which arrived after the date of the revocation of that privilege. He felt his action only fair inasmuch as no advance warning about the termination of neutral trade had been given Spanish American merchants or foreign captains.[21] Communications being what they were, no doubt some neutral captains had set forth to the Plata not knowing they no longer were welcome.

The *James* arrived in 1801, far beyond the allowable grace period. Not only had Gray illegally anchored off Buenos Aires, but the original charterer, Tomás Antonio Romero, appeared strangely lethargic in mobilizing resources and connections so that the North American captain might acquire a cargo and permission to depart legally. The platine merchant's lack of concern over the fate of the *James* may have reflected the fact that a cargo for a schooner was rather small potatoes given the ramifications of commercial diffficulties arising out of the cessation of the neutral commerce. Not only did Romero have to struggle with viceregal authorities over the discharge of manufactures from other foreign chartered ships which arrived after the termination of the grace period, but at the same time he was also juggling some risky, but quite profitable, contraband operations.[22] In any case, Gray was now without a cargo, illegally anchored off Buenos Aires, and forbidden to depart until the circumstances of his arrival were investigated. He did not stand alone in this situation.

In the midst of these problems the Viceroy marqués de Avilés was replaced by Don Joaquín del Pino. The latter was determined to enforce imperial mercantile laws and regulations, even in the face of massive contraband activities by local merchants in collusion with his own bureaucracy.[23] Pino's attempts to enforce the law and his obvious dislike of the neutrals' presence in the estuary made him a target for those detained North Americans, some of them undoubtedly involved in the contraband traffic. Gray and others dispatched a forceful letter of complaint to Charles Pinckney, United States Minister to Spain. They accused Pino of a "mean and mercenary spirit of plunder on one hand and a shameful neglect or ignorance of duty on the other." Furthermore,

> All our petitions, whether individual or collective, have been passed over with silent contempt. Hospitality and justice have been denied us, and our persons and our property have been the sport of the most wanton tyranny. Where he dares not oppress us by an active cruelty, he unfeelingly ruins us by delay, and when he cannot reach us directly by his injustice, he aims it indirectly by the encouraging or compelling individuals to violate their contracts with us.
>
> The Government of Montevideo has not only been his able conductor, in thes ungenerous and unjust proceedings, but has ever appeared to place an ambition to excelling him.[24]

Eventual promise of a rescue for Gray did not come from his government or from Romero, the original charterer. Another porteño merchant, Martín de Elordi, in October of 1801 petitioned the viceroy for permission to charter the North American ship "in order to export to friendly colonies in the American schooner the *James*, which I have chartered from its captain, Robert Gray, part of the profits of 50,340 silver pesos which I have gained through the introduction of slaves in this capital . . . ."[25] Elordi claimed that such a charter to export "hides and other products of the land" was legal under a 1793 royal order which earlier had greatly liberalized the slave trade. The merchant claimed that royal orders and past precedents of special permission relative to the slave trade allowed such a charter, even with the revocation of neutral shipping rights.[26] The principal legal advisor to the viceroy, *Fis-*

20. "R.1 Ord. Derogando en todas sus partes la R.1 Orn. de 18 de Nov.e de 1797 . . . ," Aranjuez, April 20, 1799 in *DHA. VII*, pp. 157-159.

21. D. G. de Avilés y del Fierro, "Memoria a su sucesor D. Joaquín del Pino," Buenos Aires, May 21, 1801 in Radaelli, p. 513.

22. Galmarini, 29, pp. 412-415; and Jerry W. Cooney, "The *Marina* in the Río de la Plata: A Challenge to Spanish Commercial Policy," *The Mariner's Mirror*, 74:2 (May, 1988), pp. 153-157.

23. Viceroy Pino to Ministro de Hacienda Miguel Cayetano Soler, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1803 in Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla, Spain), Audencia de Buenos Aires, Legajo 132.

24. Robert Gray et al. to United States Minister to Spain Charles Pinckney, Buenos Aires, April 22, 1802 in Charles Lyon Chandler, *Inter-American Acquaintances* (2nd ed., Sewannee, Tennessee, 1917), pp. 35-37. For a different view of Pino's difficulties see Jerry W. Cooney, "Doing Business in the Smuggling Way": Yankee Contraband in the Río de la Plata," *The American Neptune*, 47:3 (Summer, 1987), pp. 162-168.

25. Martín de Elordi to Viceroy Pino, Buenos Aires, October 8, 1801 in AGN 9-31-1-8 (comerciales 1802).

26. *Ibid.*; and Elordi to Viceroy Pino, Buenos Aires, December 21, 1801 in AGN 9-31-1-8 (comerciales 1802).

cal José Marquez de la Plata, disagreed. Already the latter was engaged in a bitter, personal battle with Tomás Antonio Romero over a contraband case and he did not feel the government should grant any favors to the platine merchant establishment. The fiscal considered Elordi's justifications specious and flatly stated that the repeal of permission to utilize neutral craft prevented any such charters.[27]

Elordi was persistent. In a long communication to Pino the merchant cited precedent for such permission, particularly as in the past various legal loopholes regarding foreign participation in the Spanish American slave trade, as well as decreed exceptions to those laws, permitted similar charters. The request finally reached the Royal Audencia of Buenos Aires, the highest court in the viceroyalty. The result was rather predictable. The Audencia decided that "relative to foreign ships chartered to export products and hides in exchange for the import of slaves," such a charter was legal under a 1791 royal order, but that only in conjuncture with the 1797 permission for neutral shipping.[28] Since that latter permission had been rescinded in 1799, only charters could be granted to those craft which arrived in ballast *before* the grace period terminated. Obviously, the *James* did not conform to the permitted category.

The enforced detention of the *James* and the confused legal wrangling enraged Captain Gray. He had arrived in the Río de la Plata in early 1801; it was approaching the middle of 1802 and he was no closer to a cargo and departure than on his arrival. To be sure, Silas Atkins, a North American resident in Buenos Aires, who served the interests of many Yankee captains as supercargo, had obtained from Elordi 296 *marquetas* (crude cakes) of tallow for the ship's ballast. Atkins also acted as the agent of Gray for the proposed charter to Elordi so this ballasting of the vessel, with the permission of the port authorities, was not out of the ordinary.[29]

In early May Gray suffered from an unknown illness and had to spend some time ashore. The illness was the final straw for the Yankee captain. On the night of May 23-24, 1802 Gray and the *James* disappeared from Ballizas Harbor "without the knowledge of the *capitanía*."[30] He had left without the required license and with some 4,158 pesos worth of Elordi's tallow. Neither Atkins nor Elordi had any prior knowledge of Gray's intent and the supercargo made no attempt to defend his fellow North American's illegal exit. Atkins stated that Gray's action "in such critical circumstances has prejudiced not only the interests of the owners of the Goleta but also mine."[31] The supercargo promised he would do all possible to make right this embarrassing affair. The irony of this flight was underscored by the final decision some two months later in which the viceroy himself (tongue in cheek?) laconically ordered "that no obstacle be put to the departure of this ship [the *James*] with a legal cargo from profits of the slave trade."[32]

Atkins' assurances were not enough for Elordi who was out for blood. If he could not obtain satisfaction from Gray, then Gray's supercargo sufficed as an obvious target. In June of 1802 Atkins pleaded that he had no foreknowledge of Gray's departure and claimed no responsibility for the vanished tallow.[33] Again in February of the next year the supercargo asked that Elordi's complaint against him be dropped as "with the arrival of Goleta to any port in the United States, or elsewhere, the consignee [Gray] would deliver to Elordi . . . the referred-to tallow . . . ." Even this proved insufficient for the porteño merchant and Atkins also had to assert that Captain Moffet of a North American-built merchant ship owned by the platine merchant, Francisco de Sar, carried further instructions to Boston. In that city an associate of Atkins, Ysrael Trondik (Thorndyke?), would obtain for Elordi full restitution.[34] Atkins could do no more and it was apparent that the North American simply did not have the capital to reimburse the porteño merchant personally.

27. Fiscal José Marquez de la Plata, Buenos Aires, October 16, 1801 in AGN 9-31-1-8 (comerciales 1802).

28. "Acuerdo Real Ordinario de Justicia" of the Real Audencia de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, June 10, 1802 in AGN 9-31-1-8 (comerciales 1802).

29. Elordi to Viceroy Pino, Buenos Aires, May 24 (?), 1802 in AGN 9-31-1-9 (comerciales 1802).

30. Teniente de Fragata y subdelegado de Marina de Buenos Aires D.n Pablo Zizin, Buenos Aires, May 28, 1802 in AGN 9-31-1-9 (comerciales 1802).

31. "Declaración" of Silas Atkins, Buenos Aires, May 24, 1802 in AGN 9-31-1-9 (comerciales 1802).

32. Viceroy Pino, Buenos Aires, July 23, 1802 in AGN 9-31-1-8 (comerciales 1802).

33. Atkins to Viceroy Pino, Buenos Aires, June, 1802 in AGN 9-31-1-9 (comerciales 1802).

34. "Declaración" of Atkins, Buenos Aires, February of 1803 in AGN 9-31-1-9 (comerciales 1802).

Elordi may never have received payment for the tallow. As late as November 1804 Atkins was still under a form of house arrest in Buenos Aires while the *James* case awaited a final disposition.[35] No return to the Río de la Plata by Captain Gray has been discovered.

Perhaps, as the entry in the *Dictionary of American Biography* states, this Yankee captain satisfied himself with the North American coastal trade until his death in 1806. Certainly, between the Quasi-War in the South Atlantic and the vagaries of Spanish commercial policy, Captain Gray had no reason to remember the Río de la Plata with affection.

No one will deny that in this age of American merchant marine expansion great opportunities for profits awaited aggresive captains as new trade routes and markets arose in the wake of the war in Europe. Gray's two unfortunate voyages to the Río de la Plata revealed the other side of the coin. Not all the ventures of mariners ended with profit. New adventures may have abounded for Yankee captains in this era; but adventures were not what Gray and his fellow masters sought. On the contrary, an uneventful, profitable journey was far preferable. The hazards of the merchant marine were commonplace, however, and financial loss always a possibility.[36] For all his skill and experience, Captain Gray knew that very well.

35. "Relación de los Extrangeros que se han presentado a su Alcalde en cumplimento del vando publicado en 10 de Octubre de 1804. Quartel No. 5," Buenos Aires, November 10, 1804 in AGN 9-30-7-2 (Interior 1803).

36. The owners of the *Alert* and its cargo pursued their claims against Spain since that nation had permitted the prize court condemnation of the North American ship in Montevideo. The 1819 "Transcontinental Treaty" with Spain relieved the latter of any responsibility. See Clause Two of Article Nine of "Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits between the United States of America, and His Catholic Majesty," Washington, February 22, 1819 in Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and other International Acts of the United States of America. Volume 3. Documents 41-79: 1819-1835* (Washington, 1933), p. 10. For the transferal of the *Alert* claims to the United States Government see "Brig *Alert*. Robt. Gray French Spoliation Claims no. 773" in National Archives Record Group 123, French Spoliation Claims.

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Southern Hemisphere Fur Sealing from Atlantic Canada

A. B. Dickinson

Introduction

SEALS have provided man with a variety of products without major hunting risks. They can easily be killed in large numbers when breeding ashore and on ice, and pelagic hunting during migrations is also possible.

Although 16th-century southern hemisphere navigators hunted fur seals for food and oil, they were not commercially exploited to any large extent until increasing numbers of American and British vessels arrived during the last quarter of the 18th century on combined sealing and whaling voyages. Particularly valued for the luxuriant underfur, the skins were shipped to Canton for clothing the rich and to Britain and later America as substitutes for beaver skins in hat manufacturing and for sealskin coats. Great demand thus developed; expensive specialised catching equipment was unnecessary, and the industry was highly profitable while stocks and markets lasted. Unregulated hunting seriously reduced numbers by the first quarter of the 19th century, and sporadic exploitation for small cargoes was only possible thereafter.[1]

The Beginnings

The development of Canadian southern hemisphere fur sealing resulted from the late 19th-century overexploitation of Northern fur seals *Callorhinus ursinus* in the North Pacific Ocean, particularly by Canadian pelagic sealers.[2] Operating from British Columbia, they took some 720,000 of the approximately 1,200,000 killed on the Pribilof Islands and in adjacent waters during 1889-1910. This reduced the stock to some 237,000,[3] leading the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 7 July 1911 to prohibit pelagic sealing north of 30°N by signatory nationals.[4]

The success of pelagic hunting from British Columbia increased local demand for new schooners, particularly from Nova Scotia where they could be built for about $50 per ton compared to $75-100 per ton on the west coast.[5] These were then sailed around Cape Horn, the first, *Pathfinder* (Capt. O'Leary), arriving at Victoria in April 1886.[6] Experienced sealers in their crews possibly saw South American fur seals *Arctocephalus australis* swimming off Cape Horn, however contemporary high Bering Sea catches probably made it financially unnecessary to stop and hunt them.

The first Canadian vessel to catch fur seals in the southern hemisphere was *Director* (Capt. Frederick W. Gilbert) owned by the Victoria Sealing Co. Ltd. of British Columbia.[7] She left Halifax on 20 December 1894 for Victoria, however shortage of food and water when in the South Atlantic Ocean necessitated a course alteration for the Falkland Islands (Fig. 1). Her crew saw swimming fur seals, and killed 620 in 36 days of pelagic hunting. Poor weather prevented further sealing, and *Director* continued to Victoria where she arrived on 21 May 1895.[8] Word of the 'discovery' of

1. A.B. Dickinson, "Sealing in the Falkland Islands and Dependencies," Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1987.

2. V.B. Scheffer et al., "History of Scientific Study and Management of the Alaskan Fur Seal *Callorhinus Ursinus* 1786-1964." *NOAA Technical Report NMFS SSRF-780*, U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1984, pp. 1-70.

3. D.G. Paterson, "The North Pacific seal hunt, 1886-1910, Rights and regulations," *Explorations in Economic History*, XIV (1977), pp. 97-118.

4. United States Congress, "Protection of fur seals and sea otter", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives January 3 and 11 1912, H.R. 16571, (Washington, 1912).

5. C.A. McDonald, "Deposition," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Case of the United States*, Appendix I (Washington, 1892), p. 513.

6. E.W. Wright, *Lewis and Dryden's marine history of the Pacific Northwest*, 1897 (Seattle, 1967 reprint), pp. 425-455.

7. *Yarmouth Herald* (Nova Scotia), 10 July 1906. *Mecantile Navy List and Maritime Directory* (London, 1906-11).

8. J.A. Allen, "Fur seal hunting in the soutern hemisphere," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Appen-*



this potentially valuable[9] stock quickly spread, causing some sealers to return to their native Nova Scotia and induce local entrepreneurs to invest capital in the construction of vessels to be used off Cape Horn (Table 1).[10]

Beatrice L. Corkum (Capt. Reuben Balcom) and *Edward Roy* (Capt. F. W. Gilbert) were the first Canadian vessels to arrive at Stanley, Falkland Islands, for the specific purpose of sealing. They departed again on 14 January and 1 February 1902 for their southern hemisphere hunting grounds, and returned to Halifax in May with 7,700 skins.[11] This success further convinced others in Halifax of the potential of this new trade, which continued for the next decade.[12]

The Canadian vessels were schooners, similar to those used in the Grand Banks cod fishery but with extra bunks installed in the forecastle for the larger sealing crews. Much space was taken up with the extra provisions and water needed for the longer voyages, and salt for preserving the skins was carried in the fish hold and replaced by beach rocks as used, keeping the ship at optimum sailing trim.[13] Falkland Islanders considered them:

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dix to the Case of the United States, I (Washington, 1892), pp. 393-410. Wright, *Lewis and Dryden's marine history of the Pacific Northwest*, pp. 425-455.

9. *A.A. Mattsson "Fur seal hunting in the South Atlantic," American Neptune*, II, 2 (1942), pp. 154-166.

10. *Stanley Shipping Register*, Extracts (1901-12). Courtesy of E. Lawson, British Columbia, and S. Miller, Stanley F.I. *Mercantile Navy List and Maritime Directory* (London, 1906).

11. *Stanley Shipping Register*, Extracts (1901-12).

12. J.G. Smith, "The Romance of Sealing," *Canadian Magazine*, XXI, 5 (1903), pp. 393-401.

13. J.P. Porter, *Cape Breton ships and men* (Aylesbury, 1967), pp. 171-177.

Table 1
Canadian sealing schooners hunting in the southern hemisphere, 1902-1911[10]

Vessel Name	*Official Reg. No.*	*Port Registered*	*Port/Year built*	*Tons*	*Owner*
Agnes G. Donahoe	115482	Lunenburg, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1903	99	Sprott Balcom (Pacific Whaling Co., Victoria)
Alice Gertrude	111738	LaHave, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1902	81	John B. Young (Lunenburg)
Annie E. Larder	90837	St. John's, Nfld	Port Medway, N.S. 1900	93	Robert Moulton Burgeo, Nfld.)
Baden-Powell	111412	Lunenburg, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1900	94	Baden-Powell Sealing Co. (Halifax)
Beatrice L. Corkum	107130	Halifax, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1899	81	John A. Bechtel (Victoria)
E. B. Marvin	94810	Victoria, B.C.	Kennebunk, Mass. 1884	96	Victoria Sealing Co., Ltd. (Victoria)
Edith R. Balcom	116491	Lunenburg, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1903	100	Sprott Balcom (Pacific Whaling Co., Victoria)
Edward Roy	107962	Lunenburg, N.S.	LaHave, N.S. 1900	75	Sprott Balcom (Pacific Whaling Co., Victoria)
Florence M. Munsie	112094	Lunenburg, N.S.	Mahone Bay, N.S. 1902	97	William Munsie (Victoria)
Florence M. Smith	94771	Victoria, B.C.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1888	99	Victoria Sealing Co., Ltd. (Victoria)
Hattie L.M.	107641	Halifax, N.S.	Mahone Bay, N.S. 1899	88	The Pioneer Exploration Co. (Halifax)
Hilda R.	126904	Halifax, N.S.	LaHave, N.S. 1910	100	Canada Sealing Co., (Halifax)
Ida M. Clark	111687	Halifax, N.S.	Sable River, N.S. 1902	99	William McFatridge (Halifax)
Isabel May	126901	Halifax, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1910	123	John A. Bechtel (Victoria)
Latooka	111635	Lunenburg, N.S.	LaHave, N.S. 1901	99	Rufus Conrad (LaHave)
Leslie L.	111439	St. John's, Nfld	Shelburne, N.S. 1902	100	William Snow (Twillingate, Nfld)
Markland	112110	Lunenburg, N.S.	Mahone Bay, N.S. 1903	99	Victoria Sealing Co. Ltd. (Victoria)
Ola M. Balcom	112093	Lunenburg, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1902	99	Sprott Balcom (Pacific Whaling Co., Victoria)
St. Claire	107117	Lunenburg, N.S.	Lunenburg, N.S. 1898	98	Sprott Balcom (Pacific Whaling Co., Victoria)
Village Belle	116556	Maitland, N.S.	Maitland, N.S. 1907	99	John Clark (Maitland)
Yolando	116908	Parrsboro, N.S.	Parrsboro, N.S. 1907	77	David A. Huntley (Parrsboro)

> Very smart looking vessels, and as they carry lofty spars and a great spread of canvas there is no reason to doubt that they can sail along at 13 or 14 knots an hour. It may be convenient sometimes that they should be able to do this. Looked at under weigh, they are all graceful and dainty looking, more especially the *Ola M. Balcom* which is a new vessel and painted white.[14]

Their arrival at Stanley led to suggestions that a similar domestic industry should be started, since:

> We are told they worked on the most modern methods of sealing to which must be ascribed their great success. Would it not be possible for Falkland Islanders to take up this? No doubt it needs capital in the first, but it pays about forty men to come all that distance necessitating probably (between coming and going) six months without earning anything, it would surely pay those who are on the spot so to speak.[15]

Despite such exhortations, islanders did not resort to pelagic sealing, preferring instead to continue sheep farming and sporadic exploitation of South American fur seal rookeries around the coast.[16] A few were however employed on the Canadian vessels, making as much money in four months as in eight on the islands.[17]

The Industry

The voyage from Halifax to Stanley took about five weeks,[18] the vessels arriving in time to begin sealing in late September. Hunting continued until the breeding haul-out in early December, and animals were also killed when they abandoned their rookeries in the summer. They were pursued in dories approximately 19 ft. long and 4 ft. beam, carvel built in Nova Scotia from pine and birch or clinker built in British Columbia from cedar and fir.[19] A dory was often positioned in line with two seals, one was then killed outright with a head shot and the other shot in the back to paralyze the hind flippers and present an easy target for a second fatal shot. The ultimate destination of swimming seals and their highest concentration was often traced by following flying birds, on the assumption that both fed on the same schools of fish.[20]

Carcasses were hauled into the dory with a 17 ft. gaffe and placed on a skinning board consisting of two pieces of wood with canvas attached laid across the gunwales. Incisions were made in the anterior-posterior direction along the ventral surface, and around the flippers. The flensed pelts were transferred to the parent schooner and salted into barrels holding from 20-40 skins.[21] These were often brought to the sealing grounds knocked down for subsequent reassembly by the ship's cooper.[22] Filled barrels were then usually taken to Stanley for transhipment to C.M. Lampson & Co. of London for auction.[23]

The crews were unwilling to disclose their exact sealing grounds, perhaps fearing competition from Falkland Islanders and Chilean crews then hunting off Cape Horn and illegally on the Falkland Islands.[24] However, information gained from sealing master's by the Falkland Islands Co., the major island trading organization, suggested that most were taken from waters off Uruguay.[25]

There is also much evidence to show that the Canadians hunted on isolated islets off West Falkland (Fig. 2) in contravention of conservation legislation previously introduced by the Falkland Islands Government to protect low fur seal stocks and control an occasional domestic sealing industry. The Seal Fishery Ordinance 1881 prohibited hunting during the breeding season,[26] and unlicensed hunting was banned under the Seal Fishery Ordinance 1899.[27] Sheep farmers on these outlying islands often reported that the Canadian sealers carried out unregulated hunting in the absence of any protection vessels,[28] and suggested that this be

14. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XIV, II (March 1903).
15. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XIV, 2 (June 1902).
16. Dickinson, "Sealing in the Falkland Islands and Dependencies."
17. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XV, 2 (June 1903).
18. Parker, *Cape Breton ships and men*, pp. 171-177.
19. A.A. Mattsson, "Sealing boats," *American Neptune*, III, 4 (1943), pp. 327-332.
20. Mattsson, "Fur seal hunting in the South Atlantic," pp. 154-166.
21. Mattsson, "Sealing boats," pp. 327-332.
22. *Montreal Standard*, 24 May 1924.
23. W. Harding to Falkland Islands Co., London, 21 March 1902, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley, F.I.
24. Dickinson, "Sealing in the Falkland Islands and Dependencies."
25. W. Harding to Falkland Islands Co., London, 3 March 1903, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley F.I.
26. *Seal Fishery Ordinance 1881*, Falkland Islands Ordinance No. 4, 1881.
27. *Seal Fishery Ordinance 1899*, Falkland Islands Ordinance No. 1, 1899.
28. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XIV, 6 (October 1902).



prevented by surprise visits from British warships entering Stanley from South America.[29] The Admiralty considered this unreasonable since the value of the skins was considerably less than warship operating costs.[30]

Further indication of illegal Canadian hunting on the islands and subsequent stock depletion came from the low 1901-02 indigenous catch of 193 seals.[31] A committee of Governor William Lamond Allardyce, the Falkland Islands Executive Council, and Commodore Finnish of the Royal Navy's South Atlantic Squadron consequently suggested that the rookeries be protected by armed guards.[32]

HMS *Nymphe* of the South Atlantic Squadron was dispatched from Stanley on 18 November 1903 to visit the Jason, Carcass and New Islands and obtain direct evidence of poaching. Settlers on New Island had reported occasional sightings of unidentified vessels, however these may have been innocuous or illusions, the experienced crew of HMS *Nymphe* had themselves mistakenly identified two rocks as approaching schooners![33] Irrefutable evidence of a Canadian presence on the islands was ultimately obtained from the

29. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XIV, 8 (December 1902).

30. W. Harding to Falkland Islands Co., London, 31 March 1903, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley, F.I.

31. *Falkland Islands Annual Reports* (1846-1953), Public Records Office (London), PRO. CO. 81/1-95.

32. Harding, 31 March 1903.

33. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XV, 8 (December 1903).

log of *Baden-Powell*, found in Stanley Harbour[34] after she was driven ashore at Elephant Jason Island on 23 November 1907. The wrecking was also described by the son of a survivor from Hirtle Island, N.S. on board. He gave this account:

> Captain's name was Anderson, 1st mate Oswald Christian. Left Halifax, N.S. in September 1907, sealed off the River Plate, got 60 skins, arrived Falklands in October 1907. Hunted with the boats, 2 men to each. In November anchored in Gulch on North side of Elephant Jason Island. Mate was sure anchorage was safe. Wind arose from the North and the ship dragged onto a large rock and started to break up. Crew jumped onto this rock, passed food, guns and the boats across and hauled these up the cliff. The ship sank in very deep water. Crew stayed on the island for ten days, then rowed to Pebble Island which took two days. [They stayed there over Christmas helping sheep farmer Pitts and his staff of eighteen.[35]] The sister ship *Alice Gertrude* arrived three weeks after the wrecking. The crew were taken into Stanley in the Pebble Island boat *Richard William*. [Owned by John Dean of Pebble Island.[36]] Of the crew of 17-20, three stayed in Stanley. One had a broken leg, he later left for Canada. Two married in Stanley, Robert Hirtle, a Canadian and Karl Lindenberg, a Russian Finn. Also in crew a man named Corkum.[37]

Baden-Powell went ashore during a sealing voyage to the South Shetland Islands,[38] probably first visiting the Falkland Islands to undertake illegal hunting. Unfortunately, there was insufficient evidence on which to prosecute the master and owner,[39] although any "explanation that the *Baden-Powell* was at the Jason Islands to get shelter is untenable since it is a dangerous harbour."[40] The sinking had little effect on the conduct of Canadian sealers, and their illegal activities continued to be deprecated by the Falkland Islands Government. Nevertheless Governor Allardyce confessed to "a certain feeling of satisfaction namely that these ill gotten gains do not go into the pockets of foreigners,"[41] a reference to the sporadic presence of Chilean sealers.

The Canadians also visited the Dependencies, other circum Antarctic islands, and islands off Uruguay. Their voyages to the Dependencies provided skins of the Antarctic fur seal *Arctocephalus gazella*, considered by 19th-century sealers to yield a particularly fine pelt.[42] *Beatrice L. Corkum* (Capt. Sprott Balcom) and *Edward Roy* (Capt. F.W. Gilbert) were the first Canadian vessels to visit the Dependencies, arriving at the South Shetland Islands in early 1902.[43] The former also visited South Georgia before returning to Stanley on 10 March 1902 with 900 skins.[44] *Baden-Powell* (Capt. John Anderson) also arrived on 2 February 1906 from the South Sandwich Islands, followed by *Edith R. Balcom* (Capt. Reuben Balcom) on 19 February with 3,004 skins from the South Orkney Islands and possibly the South Shetland Islands.[45] These southern voyages greatly concerned the Falkland Islands Government, continued hunting might destroy any fur seal stocks redeveloping there after 18th- and 19th-century uncontrolled depredations by British and American sealers.[46] Since protection was impossible from the Falkland Islands, the British Consul in Montevideo optimistically instructed masters to obtain a sealing license from the Colonial Secretaries' office in Stanley, before proceeding to hunt around the islands.[47]

Illegal hunting at South Georgia was of particular concern, since sealing licenses had been issued to the Compañia Argentina de Pesca in 1909 as part of their whaling venture begun from Grytviken in 1904.[48] The resident magistrate on the island was thus asked to determine if *Agnes G. Donahoe, Hilda R., Isabel May, Latooka,* and *Yolando* were there, since crew mail held at Stanley Post Office indicated they were des-

34. I.J. Strange, "Sealing industries in the Falkland Islands," *Falkland Islands Journal* (1972).

35. *Evening Herald* (St. John's), 14 February 1908.

36. *Evening Herald*, op. cit.

37. E. Lawson, Transcript of January 1984 interview with Mr. Hirtle, 12 Drury St. Stanley.

38. *Falkland Islands Magazine and Church Paper*, XX, 2 (1908), p. 4.

39. W.L. Allardyce to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 February 1908, PRO. CO. 78/112.

40. W.L. Allardyce to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 November 1908, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge SPRI. MS. 240/1.

41. *Falkland Islands Magazine and Church Paper*, XX, 8 (1908), p. 6.

42. *Imperial Magazine*, II, 18 (1820), pp. 674-675.

43. Harding, 21 March 1902.

44. *Stanley Shipping Register*, Extracts (1901-12).

45. *Pacific Fisherman*, IV, 5 (1906), p. 19; IV, 7 (1906), p. 20. J.N. Tonnessen, *Verdensfangsten, 1883-1924. Del. I, 1883-1914* (Sandefjord, 1967), p. 139.

46. Dickinson, "Sealing in the Falkland Islands and Dependencies."

47. W.L. Allardyce to The British Minister in Montevideo, 10 February 1908, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

48. R.K. Headland, *The Island of South Georgia* (Cambridge 1984).

tined for the Dependencies.[49] Only *Agnes G. Donahoe* was sighted, a whale catcher from the Compañia Argentina de Pesca reporting her sailing towards the South Sandwich Islands on 21 December 1910.[50] She may have intended to meet *Village Belle*, recorded taking 80 skins from these islands in early 1911.[51]

The Canadian schooners also sailed further to the east, *Agnes G. Donahoe* (Capt. Reuben Balcom) visiting the Prince Edward Islands in 1906-07[52] and Marion Island with *Beatrice L. Corkum* in November 1908. During this latter voyage, the crews rescued 70 men from the Norwegian sealer *Solglimt* (Capt. Anders Harboe Ree) of Christiana, wrecked there on 16 October.[53] *Ida M. Clark* (Capt. F. W. Gilbert) and *Hilda R.* also visited Macquarie and Campbell Islands in December 1910 and January 1911. Gilbert found the shipwrecked crew of the whaler *Jessie Niccol* on Macquarie Island, and unsuccessfully offered to return them to their station on Campbell Island. The visit to Macquarie may have been made after press reports indicated that barrels containing 100 tons of seal and whale oil had been abandoned there.[54] *Hilda R.* returned to Campbell Island in December 1911, whereupon Capt. Mathew Ryan purchased at least 500 fur seal skins off shepherd's for £120. Ryan narrowly escaped subsequent arrest by a Capt. Highman and his son, sent to the island as special constables by the New Zealand Marine Department after they received a letter from a previous crewmember describing illegal sealing during her previous visit.[55]

Voyages to rookeries on the Lobos and Castillo Islands off Uruguay were also made, again for illegal sealing. The Government of Uruguay had far sightedly allowed licensed indigenous exploitation of South American fur seals on the Lobos Islands from 1823, resulting in 13,000 salted skins being annually exported to London in the 35-year period to 1908 although declining to some 7,000 annually during 1901-08,[56] Canadian sealers were blamed for reducing this stock to the extent that the Uruguayans could only export some 1,500 skins annually from the islands during 1909-22.[57] The Uruguayan Navy was more positive in its approach to this problem than the Royal Navy, their armed tug *Ingeneiro* (Capt. B. Valverde) arresting *Agnes G. Donahoe* (Capt. Mathew Ryan) on 11 November 1904 for alleged poaching on the Lobos Islands. Although Ryan professed to have landed solely to obtain fresh water, he and his vessel were confined to Montevideo harbor for ten months whilst protracted legal proceedings ensued. Her owners subsequently presented the Government of Canada with a recompense claim for $253,752 against the Government of Uruguay,[58] however, this was never paid.

It is difficult to accurately assess the number of fur seals killed in the southern hemisphere by Canadian crews. Although catch and transhipment records are often incomplete or contradictory, they show that at least 60,000 skins were exported from Stanley during 1902-11. The majority (58%) were shipped during the 1903-04 seasons (Table 2). Reduced shipments thereafter probably reflected overexploitation of a small stock. Transhipment records are also unrepresentative of the number of seals actually killed. Pelagic hunting was a wasteful process, Bering Sea estimates indicating that up to 60% of the carcasses subsequently sank. It was also difficult to determine the sex and ages of swimming seals, consequently many females and juveniles were also killed. 95% of those killed in the Bering Sea were pregnant cows, 4% were cows less than one year old, and only 1% were males.[59]

49. W.A. Thompson to the Magistrate, South Georgia, 21 January 1911, SPRI. MS. 1228/30/4.

50. J.I. Wilson to the Colonial Secretary, 22 February 1911, SPRI. MS. 1228/30/4.

51. *Yarmouth Herald*, 27 June 1911.

52. R.K. Headland, *Chronological list of Antarctic expeditions and related historical events* (Cambridge 1989).

53. B.B. Roberts, "Chronological list of Antarctic expeditions," *Polar Record*, IX, 59 (1958), pp. 97-134.

54. J.S. Cumpston, *Macquarie Island*, ANARE Scientific Reports, Series A (1), Pub. 93 (Canberra, 1968), pp. 230-232.

55. I.S. Kerr, *Campbell Island. A history* (Wellington, 1976), pp. 85-86.

56. Jordan, *The fur seals and fur seal islands of the North Pacific Ocean*, p. 175. C.H. Townsend, "Fur seals and the seal fisheries," Proceedings of the fourth International Fishery Congress. September 22-26 1908, *Bulletin of the Bureau of Fisheries*, XXVIII, Part I (Washington, 1910).

57. H.M. Smith, "The Uruguayan fur seal islands," *Zoologica*, IX (1927), pp. 271-294.

58. S.H. Pelton, Report to the Minister of Justice, Ottawa, 4 December 1905. PRO, FO. 371/161.

59. J. Kean, "Pelagic Sealing," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Appendix to the case of the United States*, II (Washington, 1892), p. 448. J. Kiernan, "Deposition," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Case of the United States*. Appendix II (Washington, 1892), pp. 448-450. I. Liebes, "Deposition," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Case of the United States*, Appendix II (Washington, 1892), p. 452.

Table 2
Fur seal transhipments through Stanley by Canadian vessels, 1902-11[60]

Vessel	*1902*	*1903*	*1904*	*1906*	*1907*	*1908*	*1909*	*1911*	*Total*
Beatrice L. Corkum	4,000	3,968	1,024	1,500		136	?		10,628
Edward Roy	3,700	3,498	715						7,913
Ola M. Balcom		3,594	2,436						6,030
E.B. Marvin		1,379	913	2,612	640	385			5,929
F.H. Smith		3,531							3,531
F.M. Munsie		1,861	2,671						4,532
Leslie L.		1,706	1,136						2,842
St. Clair		326	1,550						1,876
Edith R. Balcom			1,001	3,004	2,000				6,005
Agnes G. Donahoe			3,581		1,382				4,963
Annie E. Larder			1,050						1,050
Baden-Powell				?	844				844
Markland				1,000					1,000
Alice Gertrude					556	539			1,095
Latooka					?	?			?
Village Belle							1,600		1,600
Isabel May							?		?
Ida M. Clark									
Hilda R.							0		0
Unidentified							1,835		1,835
Total	7,700	19,863	16,077	8,116	5,422	1,060	3,435	—	61,673

Financial Aspects

The Government and people of the Falkland Islands benefitted little from this Canadian industry, despite the fact that under the Colony's Seal Fishery Ordinance 1899 all sealers were required to pay the Treasury 4/-royalty for each fur seal skin taken from island rookeries. The Canadians however avoided paying the royalty, hunting illegally onshore and not declaring their catch as such, or operating pelagically outside territorial waters. Any financial input into the Colony came mainly from cashing of money orders[61] and bank drafts drawn against the London account of C.M. Lampson & Co. to provide cash advances for the crews and purchase supplies.[62]

In a dual attempt to prevent further revenue loss and reduce poaching[63] the Falkland Islands Government introduced the Tariff (Amendment) Ordinance on 8 September 1903.[64] This now placed the duty on transhipments rather than catches, but did not become effective until 31 January 1904 to allow sealers time to tranship most of their 1903-04 catch duty free.[65] This delay may have contributed to the high catch for those seasons (Table 2), sealers possibly increasing their hunting efficiency to take advantage of the duty free period.[66] They may also have found new rookeries and pelagic herds as they became more familiar with the islands and adjacent waters.

The Ordinance imposed a 10/-tariff on each fur seal skin obtained during the November to February close season specified in the Seal Fishery Ordinance 1899, and 1/- per skin on those killed at other times.[67] The Government did not enforce this distinction, and the tariff effectively remained at 10/- per skin, since most were in fact procured illegally during the close season.[68]

The new tariff was received unfavorably throughout

60. *Stanley Shipping Register*, Extracts (1901-12).

61. Harding, 21 March 1902.

62. Harding, 3 March 1903.

63. A. Lyttleton to W. L. Allardyce, 15 November 1905, SPRI. MS. 140/1.

64. "Tariff Amendment Ordinance 1903," *Falkland Islands Gazette*, XIII, 10 (1903), p. 22.

65. W. Harding to Falkland Islands Co., London, 16 September 1903, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley F.I.

66. Strange, "Sealing industries of the Falkland Islands."

67. "Duty on seal skins, Order-in-Council 54," *Falklands Islands Gazette*, XIV, 7 (1904), p. 16.

68. *Falkland Islands Annual Report* (1846-1953).

the community,[69] particularly by merchants concerned that sealers would not return to Stanley and spend money in their establishments.[70] C.M. Lampson & Co. also protested from London, possibly fearing that they in turn would be deprived of a valued supply of skins. They argued that the Canadians had contributed much to the island's economy and "it is they that would suffer most, driven as they will be to the South American ports, where the treatment they will meet with is likely to be problematical in the extreme."[71] The sealing masters also held unsuccessful discussions with Governor Allardyce in an attempt to redress the situation, continuing to maintain that the skins came from waters outside his jurisdiction.[72] In protest, they did not return to Stanley in 1905, instead transhipping their cargoes duty free from Montevideo and Punta Arenas.[73]

Markland (Capt. LeBlanc) was the first Canadian vessel to return to Stanley, arriving on 1 January 1906 with 1,000 skins.[74] LeBlanc unsuccessfully attempted to bribe the government into ignoring the tariff regulations, asserting that his colleagues would be willing to compromise and pay the 1/- duty.[75] This offer was also not accepted, and LeBlanc continued to Punta Arenas with his cargo.[76] Governor Allardyce now admitted to feeling "such a brute to be turning away British ships and legitimate British trade from a British Colony into South American ports where they look upon us as semi-madmen."[77] Islanders also expressed similar feelings, hoping that the crews would at least return to winter in Stanley where there was little vice and frequent religious services![78]

Merchant opposition continued to increase, the tariff now being perceived to "penalise if not altogether destroy an important industry, and drive away British ships and British trade from the Falkland Islands without any compensatory benefit whatsoever."[79] Under these pressures, most islanders therefore signed a petition vehemently protesting that:

> We who live in this isolated Colony have a right to have our wishes regarded in a question which so vitally affects our welfare. Probably this is the only Colony in the world where no facility exists for ventilating the wishes of the inhabitants, for we have no newspaper in which our views could be expressed . . . we consider it the greatest injustice that a Governor and his three officials should have the power to pass a law setting at nought the opinion of the whole community.[80]

These statements now convinced Governor Allardyce to ask the Colonial Office to either abolish all duties or compromise by reducing the 10/- duty to 2/-per skin. This action was made all the more urgent by the fact that the Argentine government was now making concerted attempts to attract the Canadians with promises of superior facilities and duty free shipment.[81] The Colonial Office remained initially unsympathetic to these concerns from the islands,[82] but agreed, on 14 May 1906 to reduce the transhipment duty to 1/- per skin regardless of the time of year taken.[83] This action came too late to be of any significance, since by the end of the following year at least eight of the sealing vessels had been sold or wrecked (Table 3).[84] Most of those still operating continued to take their cargoes to Montevideo and Punta Arenas, forcing the Governor to conclude that there was little chance of them returning to Stanley unless the tariff was completely removed.[85]

In a belated attempt to entice them back, the Colonial Office instructed the Falkland Islands Government to abolish the transhipment tariff effective 30 August 1907.[86] Few of the remnant fleet returned, citing

69. Harding, 16 September 1903.

70. W. Harding to Falklands Islands Co., London, 18 August 1904, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley F.I.

71. C.M. Lampson & Co., to Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, 20 October 1903, PRO. CO. 78/103.

72. E.F. Robbins to W.L. Allardyce, 29 January 1906, PRO. CO. 78/108.

73. W. Harding to Falkland Islands Co., London, 2 March 1904, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley F.I.

74. *Stanley Shipping Register*, Extracts (1901-12).

75. W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 January 1906, PRO. CO. 78/108.

76. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, XVII, 10 (1906), p. 5.

77. W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 January 1906, PRO. CO. 78/108.

78. *Falkland Islands Magazine*, 1906.

79. Allardyce, 17 January 1906.

80. Petition to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 March 1906, PRO. CO. 78/108.

81. W.L. Allardyce to Colonial Office, 7 October 1906, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

82. Lyttleton, 15 November 1905.

83. "Order-in-Council," *Falkland Islands Gazette*, XVI, 9 (1906), pp. 111-112.

84. Official Shipping Registers, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. Parker, *Cape Breton ships and men*, pp. 171-177. *Schooners of Nova Scotia* (Halifax, 1975).

85. W. Harding to Falkland Islands Co., London, 26 March 1907, Falkland Islands Co., Stanley F.I.

86. "Order-in-Council 90," *Falkland Island Gazette*, XVII, 8 (1907), p. 100.

Table 3

Eventual fate of Canadian southern hemisphere sealing vessels[84]

Vessel	Date original register closed	Reason
Agnes G. Donahoe	1913	Wrecked, Digby Gut N.S. 1913.
Alice Gertrude	1913	Sold to Robert Irvin, Shelburne, N.S.
Annie E. Larder	1916	Lost at Sea, North Atlantic 1906.
Baden-Powell	1908	Wrecked 23 November 1907 on Pebble Island [Elephant Jason Island?], Falkland Islands. Crew saved.
Beatrice L. Corkum	1907	Sold to Halifax (or Liverpool) N.S.
E.B. Marvin	1921	Lost at sea, East Coast of North America 1912.
Edith R. Balcom	1908	Stranded, Argentine coast, 18 March 1908.
Edward Roy	1926	Transferred 1905 to Andrew King, St. John's, Nfld.
Florence M. Munsie	1905	Sold to 'foreigners' at Punta Arenas, Chile, 1905.
Florence M. Smith	?	?
Hattie L.M.	1908	Sold to Chile, 1906.
Hilda R.	?	Sold to John T. McRae of Harbour Grace, Nfld., for use in the saltfish trade. Sunk on 3 November 1917 by a German submarine 22 miles SE of Cape St. Mary, Spain during passage to Gibralter.
Ida M. Clark	1923	Transferred to Arthur Gillett, Twillingate, Nfld., 1923.
Isabel May	1911	Transferred to Halifax, N.S. 1911 and Victoria, B.C. 1916.
Latooka	1917	Transferred to Smith Company Ltd., St. John's, Nfld.
Leslie L.	1907	Lost at sea, 1907.
Markland	1906	Transferred to Victoria, B.C.
Ola M. Balcom	1905	Stranded, St. Pierre-Miquelon, 31 October 1905.
St. Clair	1905	Transferred to Robert K. Bishop, St. John's, Nfld., 1905.
Village Belle	?	?
Yolando	?	?

high prices for supplies, poor weather and navigation conditions, and crew preference for a "large" town for relaxation as reasons for continuing to enter South American ports. Although Governor Allardyce considered most of these reasons invalid, he was forced to concede that "a large seaport town has many more attractions to offer to Masters and seamen than a small settlement of 800 inhabitants, where indiscretions and peccadilloes are at times magnified into heinous crimes and assume abnormal proportions."[87]

The activities of *E.B. Marvin* particularly illustrate the reduction in this trade from Stanley. She had transhipped 1,148 skins from Punta Arenas and 1,014 from her home port of Halifax to London in 1905-06,[88] but only 640 from Stanley in 1907.[89] Others occasionally sailed directly to London with their catch, *Edith R. Balcom* taking 1,100 skins there in 1907.[90] She was subsequently wrecked on the Argentinian coast on 18 March 1908 after landing 450 skins at Montevideo.[91] Her crew were saved, but this loss of "The Queen of the Halifax fleet" was a financial setback for the owners.[92]

Stocks were by now probably reduced to the point where sealing was uneconomical, the master's interpreting that "the seals have left the grounds upon which they have been found during the past few years, and it will be necessary to seek them elsewhere."[93] Capt. Mathew Ryan of *Alice Gertrude* verified this depletion when he reported that six Canadian vessels took less

87. W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 May 1908, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

88. *Yarmouth Herald*, 10 July 1906.

89. *Yarmouth Herald*, 19 March 1907.

90. *Yarmouth Herald*, 18 June 1907.

91. *Falkland Islands Magazine and Church Paper*, XX 4 (1908), p. 2.

92. *Yarmouth Herald*, 24 March 1908.

93. Falkland Islands Co., Stanley, F.I. to London, 28 January 1908.

than 500 skins in 1907-08 after three months' work.[94] Owners also found it difficult to get experienced crews, many with pelagic experience in the Bering Sea had left the industry, in part dispirited by Japanese successes in hunting with guns[95] which Canadians were prohibited from using under the 1893 Paris Tribunal of Arbitration.[96] Despite these problems, the Falkland Islands Government optimistically thought that the industry could be revived, and entered into negotiations with the Canada Sealing Co. of Halifax after receiving a request from Capt. Mathew Ryan in 1907 for monopoly fur sealing rights.[97] The company had some £3,000 capital, its officers being a Mr. G.A. Wootten, Secretary; Capt. Mathew Ryan; one unidentified person; and a Mr. Redden, President, the latter in the Halifax leather trade. Enquiries were thus made of the Governor General of Canada for further information on the company and whether or not Redden was a reputable individual.[98] Presumably he was well regarded, since the Falkland Islands Government awarded the company exclusive fur sealing rights for five years on payment of £100 *per annum*, a £10 annual license fee for each rookery and the 4/- per skin royalty required by the Seal Fishery Ordinance 1899. An annual quota of 900 skins was specified, to be taken from five sites. Government Inspectors were to periodically visit these rookeries, with powers to revoke licenses if local stocks appeared overexploited. This control was considered necessary to prevent a reoccurence of the stock depletions experienced in previous years.[99] Unfortunately, particularly productive rookeries on the Jason Islands were already leased to one Sarah Hansen until 11 September 1914,[100] and although Capt. Ryan offered her £125 per year to transfer the remaining five years of the license to his company,[101] she refused to do this, having just bought a small boat to improve the efficiency of her operation.[102] The Canada Sealing Co. therefore withdrew from negotiations, considering anything other than an exclusive license to be uneconomical.

Canadian southern hemisphere fur sealing continued to decline after 1908, only one vessel *Beatrice L. Corkum* (Capt. Wentworth E. Baker) entering Stanley in 1909. No entries are recorded for 1910, although a slight resurgence occurred in 1911 when five vessels arrived (Table 2). This may have been an attempt to kill the few remaining animals for quick profit before the 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal Convention terminated pelagic sealing in the Bering Sea and threatened the future existence of the sealing companies. Unfortunately, the southern stocks were so depleted that one vessel, *Ida M. Clark* (Capt. Frederick W. Gilbert), was unable to take any. Her crew briefly mutinied in Stanley, having "nothing coming to them, and of course that makes it pretty hard: we know that poverty is no disgrace, but it is very inconvenient."[103]

Governor Allardyce suggested that the Colonial Office attempt to revive the industry by offering inducements for Canadian sealing vessels to overwinter in Stanley. These included improved docking and repair facilities, and lower prices for supplies.[104] Such proposals could not however be economically justified, and in any case it is unlikely that the vessel owners could survive on the profits from reduced southern hemisphere sealing alone. The transhipment trade consequently ended after *Ida M. Clark* (Capt. E.F. Robbins) and *Hilda R.* (Capt. Mathew Ryan) entered Stanley in ballast in 1912,[105] forestalling a belated request from Governor Allardyce that after the signing of the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention negotiations be commenced between Great Britain, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile to prohibit pelagic sealing below 33°S.[106]

Capt. Mathew Ryan sporadically continued the tradition however, taking 1,642 fur seal skins off the River Plate in 1913-14 from *Ida M. Clark*[107] and returning to the area on *Eva June* in the 1920s.[108]

94. *Loc cit.*

95. *Yarmouth Herald*, 17 November 1908.

96. United States Congress, "Seal and salmon fisheries and general resources of Alaska," 55th Congress., 1st sess., House Document 92, 4 parts (Washington, 1898).

97. A.W. Redden to W.L. Allardyce, 23 July 1907, PRO. CO. 78/111.

98. W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 February 1908, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

99. W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 February 1908, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

100. F. Seabright to Sarah Hansen. 24 December 1912, PRO. CO. 78/126.

101. Allardyce, 7 February 1908.

102. W.L. Allardyce, Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 February 1909, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

103. *Yarmouth Herald*, 27 June 1911.

104 W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 March 1911, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

105. *Stanley Shipping Register*, Extracts (1901-12).

106. W.L. Allardyce to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 August 1911, SPRI. MS. 240/1.

107. Parker, *Cape Breton ships and men*, pp. 171-177.

108. *Montreal Standard*, 24 May 1924.

The revenue loss to the Falkland Islands Government can only be inexactly estimated from cargo and auction records. Skin sale prices varied with size and quality, particularly since the need for speed during illegal hunting meant that some were often rapidly and poorly salted.[109] Those taken during pelagic sealing were also frequently damaged by bullet holes. An average price of £2 or about $10 at prevailing exchange rates was therefore generally obtained.[110] Those taken off the South Shetland Islands were of particularly good quality and brought higher prices, 588 obtained by *Edith R. Balcom* (Capt. Reuben Balcom) in 1906 selling for about £4 each.[111]

The 60,000 skins transhipped through Stanley were thus valued at some £120,000, about 6% of the value of all exports. £12,000 duty was therefore lost from the Colonial Treasury, some 8% of ordinary revenue. This would have increased to about 16% for the peak 1903 season.[112]

The owners expenses and profits from this limited Canadian southern hemisphere fur sealing are also difficult to estimate. Late 19th-century Bering Sea pelagic vessels cost at least $7,000 to build and outfit.[113] *E.B. Marvin,* for example, was valued at $9,500,[114] although sold by her original owners on 7 November 1892 for $6,000 including equipment.[115] Inflation and increased voyage time and expenses probably required greater outlay by the time the Canadian schooners arrived at the Falkland Islands at the end of 1901. The wrecked *Baden-Powell* was valued with her outfit at $12,000[116] and *Edith R. Balcom* at $16,000, although only insured for $7,000.[117] However, since some of the vessels were already quite old by 1902 (Table 1) construction costs had probably been recovered. Assuming therefore an absolute minimum outfitting and crew cost of $5,000 per season and an average sale price of $10 per skin, the industry was probably at best ony marginally profitable until 1906. Some crews thus transferred their attentions to more profitable pursuits. *Hattie L.M.* (Capt. McCleod), for example, left Halifax in 1903 for the Falkland Islands, but abandoned sealing and headed for gold deposits reported in Patagonia.[118]

Conclusion

This short-lived southern hemisphere sealing industry seems to have generated little interest in Canada. Official protests were not forthcoming when the transhipment duty was imposed, or after the Uruguayan arrest of *Agnes G. Donahoe*. No attempt was made to prevent crews from poaching, and the catches were not recorded in contemporary Annual Fisheries Reports although carried in Nova Scotia newspapers. This official reluctance to acknowledge the industry may have been designed to prevent further foreign antagonism towards Canadian pelagic hunting, particularly in the Bering Sea. Further, Canadian pelagic sealers may also have been shipping Northern fur seal skins to the Falkland Islands for subsequent export, in an attempt to disguise their true origin.[119] It is however difficult to see how such a deception could go unnoticed in Stanley and not be reported in contemporary Falkland Islands Government correspondence.

The Falkland Islands Government eventually prohibited fur sealing throughout the Colony and Dependencies in 1921[120] in an attempt to encourage stock recovery. Some 16,000 are estimated on the Falkland Islands, but stocks have increased more rapidly in the Dependencies. This has particularly occurred by recolonization from the estimated 1,000,000 at South Georgia.[121] All pinnipeds have been protected on the Falkland Islands since 1964,[122] in British Antarctic

109. Harding, *op. cit.*

110. C.M. Lampson & Co. to Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, 9 July 1906, PRO. CO. 78/109.

111. *Pacific Fisherman*, IV, 7 (1906), p. 20.

112. *Falkland Islands Annual Reports* (1846-1953).

113. W. Bendt, "Deposition," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Case of the United States,* Appendix II (Washington, 1892), p. 405. Liebes "Deposition," p. 452. C.A. Williams, "Pelagic Sealing," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Appendix to the Case of the United States,* II (Washington, 1892), pp. 540-547.

114. L.W. Myer, "Canadian Pelagic Sealing Industry." *Fur Seal Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Case of the United States,* Appendix I (Washington, 1892), pp. 507-511.

115. A.J. Henry, "Report of Special Agent Henry," *Fur Seal Arbitration, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Counter Case of the United States,* VII (Washington, 1892), pp. 245-249.

116. *Evening Herald,* 14 February 1908.

117. *Yarmouth Herald*, 24 March 1908.

118. *Courier* (Victoria), 19 June 1921.

119. E.W.H. Christie, *The Antarctic Problem, An historical and political study* (London, 1951).

120. Dickinson, "Sealing in the Falkland Islands and Dependencies."

121. T.S. McCann, personal communication (1986).

122. "Nature Reserves Ordinance 1964" *Falkland Islands Gazette*, LXXIII, 10 (1964), pp. 108-109. "Wild Animals and Birds Protection Ordinance 1964" *Falkland Islands Gazette*, LXXIII, 16 (1964), pp. 193-197.

Territory (now including the South Orkney and South Shetland Islands) since 1972[123] and on South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands since 1975.[124] Virtually non-existent markets for their skins and attitudes against the killing of marine mammals make it unlikely that once lucrative southern hemisphere sealing industries will be revived, at least by western nations.

123. "Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals" HMSO. Misc. XI, [Cmd. 5302] (London, 1973).

124. "Falkland Islands Dependencies Conservation Ordinance" *Falkland Islands Gazette*, LXXXIV, 4 (1975), pp. 17-21.

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The Founding of the Newport Naval Training Station, 1878-1883, An Exercise in Naval Politics

ANTHONY S. NICOLOSI

"THE Navy is our profession, politics another. . . ."[1] When Admiral Dewey uttered these words in 1900 he did so in deference to a long and honored American tradition, namely, the separation of the military from politics and the government decision-making process. While the tradition has served the nation well, in actual practice it has presented serious problems in terms of national security. And in this regard Dewey's statement actually touches on the essence of the problem, in effect, a dichotomy in the frames of reference of the government and of the United States Navy.

Speaking in the context of a period when the naval service was establishing its credentials as a profession in the accepted definition of the term, the esteemed hero of the Battle of Manila Bay sidestepped the important truism that the Navy's internal matters were totally at the mercy of non-practitioners, civilian secretaries of the Navy and members of Congress. Certainly, he was conscious of the problem and of its seriousness in the light of the ensuing modernity in which effective strategic planning was crucial to survival. However, he was also appreciative of the very sensitive question of civilian-military relations, and at the time may have entertained aspirations for the presidential nomination of his party.[2]

From the very beginning of the Navy Department in the years before 1800, civilian control was never the issue with the officer corps. On the contrary, this was a given with even the most ardent navalist. What was at issue, however, was a system which denied to the professional official status in matters which were strictly operational in nature.

Whereas the inherent fear of things military had brought about the prevailing condition and made change extremely difficult if not impossible, the *carte blanche* civilian administrative control carried in its wake grave consequences for naval professionalism and for the national body politic as well. Jeffersonian anti-Navy policy combined with the spoils system philosophy of the Jacksonians during the first half of the 19th century made a political football of the Navy. Patronage, state and local, took precedence over matters of national security. The passage of Navy appropriations in Congress depended on a wide geographic distribution of patronage and other spoils, naval personnel were selected on a geographical basis rather than on merit, public funds were squandered on poorly located installations and exorbitant prices were paid for materials and labor.[3]

Through it all certain voices were raised in the Navy for and against specific projects and programs that vitally affected the service as a whole; sometimes with significant results. Although at risk, these men bravely entered the realm of politics, pressuring Secretaries, Senators, Congressmen and even Presidents, and making use of other political stratagems to achieve their worthy objectives.[4]

A demonstration of 19th century naval politics at its best involved the founding of a naval training station at Newport, Rhode Island in Narragansett Bay in the early 1880's. In certain respects it may be viewed as a watershed in Navy-government relations, as indeed, it was in the relations of the state of Rhode Island and the federal government in matters of naval patronage.

Determining the locations of naval installations was,

1. Quoted in Andrew G. Nelson, "Politics and the Naval Officer," *United States naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 87, No. 9 (September, 1961), p. 29. Hereafter *USNP*.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 31

3. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 91-93, 122-123, 138.

4. Nelson, p. 31.



The Naval Training Station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, circa 1887. View is looking south toward Newport's inner harbor. In foreground recruits under arms and in marching formation. Background, left, the USS *New Hampshire*, station headquarters and recruit quarters ship.

strictly speaking, the business of the civilian Secretary of the Navy and of the political majority in Congress. Competition within the majority party was decided in favor of those sectors that had the most active lobbies and that could bring the most powerful resources to bear. Of course, the work of military committees, commissions, boards and individuals were routinely solicited and on occasion could prove consequential, but in the final analysis the decision was a political one—the decisive factors being influence on Congress and on the Secretary of the Navy.

Apart from proposals and investigations, the role of the Navy, i.e., the officer corps, was essentially one of accommodation, and in this, over the years, it proved to be remarkably versatile. Where as a preferred site might be passed over, working with a lesser though still viable place, was generally managed with ease. However, when a selection was totally anathema, the service could and often did, respond passively—according it minimal attention and resources, much to the chagrin of those in the region.

In the matter of a permanent home for recruit training at Newport, the Navy broke new ground in its dealings with the government and in a sense began to come of age politically speaking. Its performance in this connection was multi-dimensional, well coordi-

nated, and sophisticated. It was scrupulously deferential to the bounds of propriety and the sensitivities of the public and of its elected representatives. Above all, it proceeded with a clear appreciation for historical precedence and the obligation to achieve its goals through the medium of Congress. By implication, this meant a political alliance, and as logic dictated, one was forged with members of the Rhode Island delegation.

The leader of the Navy's effort was Captain (later Rear Admiral) Stephen B. Luce, the chief proponent of education and training in the service in the post-Civil War period. An *advant-garde* thinker in matters of naval professionalism and a person of strong commitment, Luce set in motion a number of programs aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the service to meet the exigencies of the new age of steel ships and rapidly advancing technologies.[5] Not least among these was the Naval Apprentice System for training boys ages 14-17 for careers as seamen.

The system began in 1875 with one ship, the *USS Minnesota*. Two years later Luce became commander of the *Minnesota*, and three other training ships were involved. The ships were stationed at different ports and independently received and trained applicants.

While the apprentice system was an improvement over the past, it did not work smoothly or to the complete satisfaction of the Navy. The independent efforts produced mixed results. Further, the training ships were not always made to feel at home in the ports where they were located. The *Minnesota*, for example, was the unwelcome guest of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and Luce experienced difficulties there in landing his young charges for exercises on shore.[6] As a result, it soon became apparent to all concerned that what was needed if the training system were to endure, was a uniform command and a locus of operations, a naval training station.

In March 1878, just three months after Luce joined the *Minnesota*, the Rhode Island legislature passed a resolution offering the Navy a site in Narragansett Bay for the establishment of "a training school for boys."[7] Whether or not this was at the instigation of Captain Luce is not known for certain, but what is known is that Luce had a very high regard for the region and that sometime earlier in his career he had made a conscious decision to help create a naval presence.[8]

The Rhode Island resolution was delivered to the Navy Department by a special committee of the Legislature headed by Governor Charles C. Van Zandt who, incidentally, was from Newport. The committee was well received in Washington by officials of the Navy Department, including Secretary of the Navy Richard W. Thompson. At Governor Van Zandt's invitation Thompson visited Narragansett Bay during the summer, and he came away favorably impressed. Not long afterward the *Minnesota* was ordered to Newport.[9]

The *Minnesota* remained at Newport through October, but it attracted few enlistments. Consequently, it returned to New York, much to the displeasure of many in the region and of Captain Luce who informed Van Zandt that he "had not foreseen this development."[10] Apparently the concept of a locus of operations for all the training ships had not gelled with the Department, and Newport was viewed merely as a potential training ship port. If indeed this was the case, then enlistments were an important factor in determining whether or not the vessel should remain.

In any event, Luce still had high hope for Narragansett Bay, and it was in this vein that he wrote to his immediate superior, Captain R. Shufeldt, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting before the *Minnesota* departed: "Should we succeed in creating a favorable impression among the people at the smaller places along the coast and find that we can get boys

5. The standard biography of Stephen B. Luce is Albert Gleaves, *Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925). More recent studies are: John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1975) and Anthony S. Nicolosi, "The Navy, Newport and Stephen B. Luce," *The Naval War College Reviews* (September-October 1984), 117-131.

6. Stephen B. Luce, "Historical notes concerning the U.S. Naval War College," Lecture delivered before the Conference, August 20, 1906, RG 14, Faculty and Staff Presentations, Naval War College Archives, Newport, R.I., p. 2.

7. "Resolutions of tender to the untied States of a location for a Naval Training School passed march 8, 1878" *Acts and Resolves passed by the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at the January session 1878, and at the Special Session, April 26 and 27, 1878* (Providence: E.L. Freeman and Co., printers of the State, 1878), pp. 190-191.

8. Luce, "Historical notes concerning the U.S. Naval War College . . . ," pp. 1-2. See also Hayes and Hattendorf, p. 148.

9. *Message of Charles C. Van Zandt, Governor of Rhode Island to the General Assembly at the January Session, 1879* (Providence: E.L. Freeman and Co. printers of the State, 1879), pp. 28-29, bound in *Acts and Resolves . . . January Session, 1879*.

10. Luce to Governor Van Zandt, Nov. 4, 1878, *ibid.*, p. 29.



The Training Squadron off Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, circa 1885. L to R, USS *Jamestown*, USS *Saratoga*, USS *New Hampshire* (flagship) tied up at South Point, and USS *Richmond*.

here, I am of the opinion that this would be a favorable place to winter."[11]

The *Minnesota* returned to Newport for a short visit early in 1879, but by this time circumstances had changed and another port, New London, Connecticut on the Thames River, had made a strong bid for the ship and conceivably, for the entire training squadron. In November the new head of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. Captain Earl English informed Luce that Secretary Thompson wanted the apprentice system "put on a uniform basis," and he instructed him "to devise and adopt a routine with that end in view." He noted also that New London would probably be the site for the training station.[12] At about the same time orders arrived from Secretary Thompson for the *Minnesota* to proceed to New London.[13]

The port of New London was designated a naval station in 1868. Despite the efforts of the city fathers, however, it never amounted to very much before 1900. In fact, its principal use was as a depot for laying up old ships.[14] It was quite natural, therefore, that the

11. Luce to R. Schufeldt, Oct. 16, 1878. Letters of Commanding Officers of the Training Ship Minnesota to Chiefs of Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. 1875-1881. RG 24. Records of the Bureau of Personnel. National Archives. Washington. D.C. (Hereafter. NA).

12. English to Luce, Nov. 8, 1879, Letters Received, Stephen B. Luce Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (Hereafter Luce Papers).

13. Richard W. Thompson to Luce, Nov. 7, 1879, *ibid*.

14. Robert Owen Decker, *The Whaling City* (Chester, Conn.: The Pequot Press, 1976), pp. 186-187. See also Paolo E. Coletta, ed., *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 328.

proponents of a larger naval presence should see in the naval apprentice system a reasonable opportunity, and the region's representatives in Congress were encouraged to proceed accordingly.

The *Minnesota* arrived in the Thames River in mid-December and remained there until the following May. What Luce's initial feelings were is not clear, but he was anxious for the training system to have a home and very likely concurred with English's advise: "The first move . . . toward starting the Apprentice System on a fair basis is to get the *Minnesota* established at New London and to feel that a definite rendezvous exists where all the boys enlisted can be sent."[15]

If, in fact, Luce did seriously contemplate the Thames as a viable home for training, the experiences of the winter of 1879-1880 persuaded him of the folly of such a course. Indeed, the place proved to be so inhospitable that he asked for and received permission to take the *Minnesota* back to New York. It departed the area on May 10, never to return.[16]

Having made the decision that New London would not do, Luce next set in motion a campaign to make Narragansett Bay the locus of operations for the training system. And in this connection most of his work was behind the scenes, the actual public measures being done by collaborators and interested citizens. To say that he orchestrated events may perhaps be too strong, but he was certainly aware of all that was going on, and when circumstances required special attention, he was quick to respond.

The campaign opened in February, 1880, while the *Minnesota* was still at New London, with a speech by Lieutenant Commander French E. Chadwick to the New York Branch of the United States Naval Institute entitled "The Training of Seamen." A year earlier Chadwick, under Department orders, had traveled to Europe to investigate training programs in England and France. His findings were incorporated in a published Senate Document shortly after his return.[17] The New York speech contained the essence of the report to which was addended his views on a proper training site. Completely discounting New London for a host of reasons, he went on to recommend:[18]

> As to the place for this central station, I think everything points to Narragansett Bay as being almost perfectly suited for such purposes; deep water, secure anchorage, a climate far milder than that of any other point near this latitude, its being the center of a great seafaring population, are a union of advantages which no other place can show.

As was true with many other naval officers of the period interested in the modernization of the Navy, Chadwick was deeply concerned with the sorry state of navy seamen, and the experience in Europe sharpened his desire to create a formal training system and in the best possible location. He expressed himself boldly in the New York speech and would continue to do so, come what may.

Chadwick's views were a reflection of those of his close friend and perhaps, mentor, Stephen B. Luce. Both men were familiar with Narragansett Bay from the Civil War period when Luce served as Assistant Commandant of Midshipmen and Chadwick was a member of the class of 1864 at the Naval Academy, which was resident in Newport for the duration of the conflict. Both also knew the Thames River very well—Luce especially from the experience of the winter of 1879-80 and Chadwick from a tour aboard the *USS Sabine*, a training ship, in 1866-1868.

The Chadwick report and speech, which was subsequently printed in the Institute's *Proceedings*, influenced many in the service, including Captain English, who in June 1880 informed Luce that he preferred Narragansett Bay over New London. However, he held out little hope for the former place since "the Connecticut influence in Congress was more active than that of Rhode Island."[19] Apparently, up to this point Luce had not expressed his strong bias to the Bureau Chief who concluded his letter with the query: "What are your convictions in regard to New London as a training station?"[20]

Predictably Luce responded at length on the merits of the bay, and he invited English to visit and judge for himself. English endorsed the proposal and subsequently did pay a visit to the region, which tended to strengthen his resolve.[21]

15. English to Luce, Dec. 3, 1879, Luce Papers.

16. Luce, "Historical notes concerning the U.S. Naval War College . . . ," p. 2. See also Gleaves, p. 155. New London *Evening Telegram*, May 10, 1880.

17. French E. Chadwick, *A Report of the Training System for the Navy and Merchant Marine of New England and on the Naval Training System of France made to the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, U.S. Navy Department, September 1, 1879* (Washington, D.C.: Gov't Print. Off., 1880).

18. French E. Chadwick, "The Training of Seamen," *USNIP*, VI, No. 11 (1880), 33.

19. English to Luce, June 9, 1880, Luce Papers.

20. *Ibid.*

21. English to Luce, July 9, 1880, *ibid.*

Meanwhile, in an effort to neutralize the pressure in Congress from the Connecticut lobby, Chadwick wrote to Rhode Island's Senator Henry B. Anthony for assistance. A portion of his letter, a lengthy piece, found its way into the Newport *Mercury* for July 3, 1880, signalling the beginning of a vigorous effort by the city's two newspapers to marshall support for the project.[22]

An interesting feature of Chadwick's letter was the mention of Coasters Harbor Island as a good site for the training station and that it should be given to the U.S. government without cost so as "to be on equal footing with New London" which had already made an offer of land on the Thames. The island, located two miles north of the center of town and separated from it by 900 feet of relatively shallow water, was home to the Newport Poorhouse and farm. The institution had been established in 1820 and enjoyed an enviable reputation among its peers in the New England region.[23] However, with the rise in value of waterfront property in the second half of the 19th century and the rising cost of maintaining the poor, many Newporters argued for using the island more profitably.

During the Civil War when the Naval Academy was in residence in Newport, the citizenry voted overwhelmingly to give the island to the federal government as a permanent home for the school.[24] For a while, at least, it seemed as though the government would oblige, but in 1864 a strong Maryland lobby in Congress succeeded in bringing the school back to the state at the end of the war. Many years later Luce, who was one of the prime movers for keeping the Academy in Newport, wrote that it was a political deal between Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and Senator James Grimes, Chairman of the Senate Navy Committee, that squelched the project.[25]

Pressure to make the bay home for the training system was also put on Secretary Thompson by the Committee of the Rhode Island Legislature head by Governor Van Zandt. In a letter of September 18, the committee reiterated its offer of 1878 and alluded to the presentation of a site at no cost to the U.S. government.[26] Thompson was now caught between two competing state lobbies and with the almost certain knowledge that if a locus of operations was not found soon, the fledgling training system would flounder as two earlier attempts had done.[27]

Rather than make the decision himself, the Secretary did the political thing; he established a board headed by Bureau Chief English to investigate the two sites and to make a recommendation. Whether or not he was aware of English's strong bias is not clear, but the board membership which included Luce and Chadwick, was conspicuously weighted on the side of Narragansett Bay.

Secretary Thompson's stance was at best ambivalent. In 1878 he showed himself disposed to Rhode Island. A year later and for basically political reasons, he went along with New London. After Chadwick's Senate report and article in the Institute *Proceedings* appeared in the Spring of 1880, he became less enamored with New London.

As if to strengthen the Navy's position, another article appeared at the end of the year on the subject of training. This time the journal was the *United Service*, popular with the military and those interested in the military.[28] The author was Master Aaron Ward, a member of the crew of the training ship *USS Constitution*. Ward made much of Chadwick's authoritative statements on naval training abroad and fully endorsed his recommendation for Coasters Harbor Island in Narragansett Bay noting: "Inquiries looking to its acquisition by the government as a training station met with an encouraging reception, and its cession could probably be secured if the spot were finally selected."[29]

On December 1, the Navy Board to select a site for the training station visited New London. The next day it journeyed to Newport, remaining there for several days. During this time it completed its report to the Secretary of the Navy which appeared in Newport's

22. Newport *Mercury*, July 3, 1880.

23. See Anthony S. Nicolosi, "The Newport Asylum for the Poor, 1820-1883, A Successful Nineteenth Century Institutional Response to Social Dependency," *Rhode Island History* March, 1989)

24. Newport *Mercury*, July 3, 18, 1880.

25. Luce, "Historical notes concerning the U.S. Naval War College . . . , p. 1.

26. Committee appointed by the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island to Secretary of the Navy Richard W. Thompson, Sept. 18, 1880, Register of Documents relating to public real estate in charge of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, April 1766-March 1902, RG 125, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), NA.

27. Aaron Ward, "Naval Apprentices," *United Service* (December , 1880), pp. 740-743.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*, p. 746.



A Sunday recruit parade at the Naval Training Station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, RI in 1914. The building in the background on the right is station headquarters. It was the original site of the Naval War College, pictured in the background center, and is now home to the College Museum.

newspapers and amounted to an unqualified recommendation for acquisition of Coasters Harbor Island.[30]

It was at this point that the media campaign moved into high gear and purposely to raise the consciousness of its readers and move local officials to action. The *Mercury* applauded the decision of the Board and suggested that the island be given to the Navy, wholly or in part, and that the occupants of the poorhouse be relocated to another part of the city. Concerning financial benefits, the paper cited the particulars of Chadwick's letter that had been printed earlier, and it went on to encourage "swift action and good terms" if the threat posed by New London was to be effectively countered. And in this last regard it noted further that a "prominent official warned that no time should be lost in offering the gift to the federal government."[31] As subsequent events were to prove, this person was the Rhode Island Congressman, Nelson Aldrich, who began to take a keen interest in affairs and to work closely with Newport's political leaders to move things along.

30. Newport *Journal*, Dec. 18, 1880.

31. *Ibid*, Dec. 11, 18, 1880.

On December 11, Thomas Coggeshall, Newport Postmaster, wroted assuringly to Aldrich: "I look for prompt action in our city council, then by vote of the taxpayers. . . . I shall be diligent in the matter."[32] Two days later, chairman of the state committee Charles Van Zandt, telegraphed a message of the same tenor.[33]

Besides the excellent newspaper coverage, the business community, in league with politicians, took several steps. A petition was circulated around town and netted almost 300 signatures calling for presentation of Coaster Harbor Island. A mass meeting was held in the Opera House at which prominent citizens and city officials spoke at length on the issue. And a special meeting of the city council was held at which, among other things, the petition was presented and an appeal made for action.[34]

The upshot was a referendum on December 22 which saw a majority of voters approve "tending the island to the state of Rhode Island to be by the state ceded to the United States" for location of the training station.[35] Three days later, one of Aldrich's associates could write: "We made quite a campaign of it and obtained an overwhelming victory." The congressman was informed too: "Your name was mentioned in such a manner as to endear you to the hearts of all Newporters."[36]

Meanwhile, Luce and his Navy associates were not idle. On December 16, Secretary Thompson signed Navy General Order 257 creating the training squadron and designating Coasters Harbor Island as the training station. The station was to be temporary until the island was officially accepted by the federal government.[37]

Unfortunately for the Navy and for Newport, the Connecticut lobby was also active. The decision of the Navy Board had come as a shock to New Londoners. The New London *Evening Telegraph* for December 8 informed its readers: "a few months ago the question was supposed to be virtually settled in favor of New London . . ." and went on to charge that the members of the Navy Board "preferred to summer at Newport . . . because of the greater society attraction." It was hoped that Secretary Thompson would come to realize this and also that New London was superior in all respects to Narragansett Bay.[38] To help him to do so a delegation set off for Washington, D.C.

Writing to an influential business friend in Providence, Major Henry A. Bartlett, USMC, stationed aboard the *Minnesota*, warned that the Connecticut group would try to change the Navy Board's report and that Rhode Island's Congressional delegation "had better be put on its guard."[39] The letter found its way to Congressman Aldrich. Bartlett, a native Rhode Islander, was the nephew of Senator Henry B. Anthony. A strong believer in the apprentice system and an admirer of its founder, Captain Luce, he was a principal influence on his uncle.

When the news of Navy Regulation 257 and of the Newport referendum reached New London, the *Evening Telegram* lamented: "New London may bid adieu to any hope of the *Minnesota*'s permanent station at the port."[40] There were those, however, who refused to surrender and as fate would have it, kept the issue current for nearly two years. In February 1881, the Connecticut lobby circulated a provocative leaflet in Congress which denounced the Navy Board decision of December 4 and leveled the charge that a naval station at Newport was wasteful since "a far better site is now in possession of the government on the Thames River."[41]

An equally grave threat to Newport's aspirations was the imminent reassignment of Luce. Major Bartlett played up the seriousness of the matter in a letter of February 8 to Congressman Aldrich: ". . . I don't know how our new Captain feels about Newport. He may possible be in favor of New London."[42] A few days late he wrote again to say that Luce would be in

32. Thomas Coggeshall to Aldrich, Dec. 11, 1880, Letters Received, Nelson Aldrich Papers, Manuscript Division, LC (Hereafter Aldrich Papers).

33. Charles C. Van Zandt to Aldrich, *ibid*, Dec. 13, 1880.

34. Newport *Journal*, Dec. 18, 1880.

35. Newport *Mercury*, Dec. 25, 1880.

36. Henry N. Fay to Aldrich, Dec. 25, 1880, Aldrich Papers.

37. General Order No. 257, Dec. 16, 1880, *General Orders and Circulars issued by the Navy Department from 1863 to 1887* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1887), p. 190 (Hereafter *General Orders and Circulars . . .*).

38. New London *Evening Telegram*, Dec. 8, 1880.

39. Henry A. Bartlett to H.W. Gardner, Dec. 8, 1880, Aldrich Papers.

40. New London *Evening Telegram*, Dec. 23, 1880.

41. "Headquarters of the Naval Training Station. Shall Coasters Harbor Island be accepted on the Report of a Committee unauthorized by Congress? It is not needed. A far better site is now in the possession of the Government on the Thames," February 7, 1881, enclosed in English to Aldrich, Feb. 22, 1881, Aldrich Papers.

42. Bartlett to Aldrich, Feb. 8, 1881, *ibid*.

Naval apprentices (recruits) at the Naval Training Station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, RI, circa 1885. The USS *New Hampshire*, station headquarters and recruit quarters ship is in the background.

Washington "and may call upon you as I have told him you take great interest in the affair."[43]

Just how responsible Aldrich was for what happened next is difficult to assess, but it was not long after Luce's detachment from the *Minnesota* that he received the appointment of Commander of the new training squadron and of the training station on Coasters Harbor Island. He would remain in the position for nearly three years, bringing his total service in the training system to over six years.

The meeting of Luce and Aldrich in February 1881 marked the beginning of a life-long friendship. Both men, albeit for somewhat different reasons, wanted a greater naval presence in Narragansett Bay, and they would collaborate to this end over the years. When Luce's project for a school for officers, a naval war college, got underway in 1883, Aldrich was in the wings providing valuable support in Congress. When the fledgling institution struggled against almost insurmountable odds, he responded effectively to its appeals for protection.

For various reasons the Rhode Island legislation presenting Coasters Harbor Island to the federal government was not enacted until early March 1881, giving the Connecticut opposition sufficient time to frame a strategy for preventing congressional acceptance. Major Bartlett learned of its machinations and once again gave the alarm, this time to Rhode Island's gov-

43. Bartlett to Aldrich, Feb. 14, 1881, *ibid.*

[illegible]ernor, senators and to Congressman Aldrich, he took the opportunity also to reassure all that the officers of the [illegible] "simply don't want to go there (New London)."

[illegible] information proved correct. Among other [illegible], the opposition [illegible] the faulty intelligence in [illegible] that the previous winter Newport's harbor had been clogged with ice and was impassable. [illegible] request for confirmation elicited the response from postmaster Coggeshall that the charge [illegible] and that he had asked Commander [illegible] to express his views on the [illegible] [illegible] Chadwick [illegible] Aldrich [illegible] in Congress.[45]

[illegible] New London [illegible] quite [illegible] Narragansett Bay [illegible] again. Luce [illegible] to ask for appropriations [illegible] give the op[illegible]" he wrote, "was [illegible] and then to lay [illegible] improvements . . . to ask for [illegible] year to year. . . ." In a con[illegible] in character, he proceeded to say of New London:[47]

I have no objection [illegible] New London or to the government [illegible] money, in the place as Congress may deem [illegible] But Connecticut has had her share of naval appropriations and she is welcome to them. Why add the additional sacrifice of the Training School. Why cannot the Navy be allowed to judge of its own wants? The Academy was sacrificed to political ends, must the Training School follow?

Captain English too went on the attack with a letter to Aldrich in which he reviewed the whole history of the training system and described the liabilities of New London and the benefits of Newport. Chadwick's great concern forced him to ask: "What chances do we have for acceptance this congress of Coasters Harbor Island?"[48] Like Luce he expressed disgust at the political machinations of the Connecticut lobby and offered: "I do not see how it could go to New London in any event, the place being so thoroughly unfitted for it, that an attempt to put it there would . . . . cause it to die of inanition in a very few years."[49]

While the issue in Congress remained uncertain, Luce was moving things along as best he could in Newport. In April 1881 he took command of the training squadron in Chesapeake Bay and by early May the vessels *Minnesota, Portsmouth, Saratoga,* and *Constellation* were anchored off Coasters Harbor Island. Shortly thereafter an agreement was struck with the Commissioners of the Newport Poorhouse for use of the southern portion of the island ,[50] and on June 16 the apprentices were landed and formal occupation ceremonies were conducted. There was a dramatic flag raising, the firing of a cannon salute and a review of the seamen before members of the city government.[51] The ceremonies were repeated several days later in an even more elaborate manner with Newport residents, and state officials present.[52] Luce was obviously endeavoring to raise the consciousness and the pride of the community and the state for the Navy in its midst.

It was at this point that a new Secretary of the Navy, William H. Hunt took over, and raised the hopes of the opposition.[53] The New London *Evening Telegram* continued to strike out at Newport commenting that it would not hold out such strong inducements to the training ships "if it were not for the claims of summer gaieties at the great watering-place which so irresistibly attracted the overworked naval officers." Luce's tactical occupation of Coasters Harbor Island, too, was not lost on the New Londoners who assessed it as precipitous and unauthorized.[54]

The Newport papers were not slow to respond. The

44. Bartlett to Henry B. Anthony, Feb. 10, 1881, *ibid.*
45. Coggeshall to Aldrich, Feb. 13, 1881, *ibid.*
46. Newport *Mercury*, Feb. 19, 1881. See also F. E. Chadwick to Aldrich, Feb. 15, 1881, Aldrich Papers.
47. Luce to Anthony, Feb. 21, 1881, Luce Papers.
48. English to Aldrich, Feb. 22, 1881, Aldrich Papers.
49. Chadwick to Aldrich, Feb. 28, 1881 in Doris D. Maguire, *French Ensor Chadwick, Selected Letters and Papers* (Washington, D.C.: Un. Press of America, 1981), pp. 15-16.
50. Minutes, June 13, 1881, Board of Commissioners of the Newport Asylum for the Poor Records, 1885-1884, Mss., City Hall, Newport, R.I.
51. Newport *Mercury*, June 18, 1881.
52. *Ibid.*, June 25, 1881.
53. *Ibid.*, May 14, 1881.
54. Newport *Journal*, July 2, 1881.

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN, photocopy of a painting by Frederic P. Vinton in the Naval War College.

Mercury informed its readers that "the New London people feel very unhappy over the fact that the little stream incorrectly called Thames River is not considered by the U.S. Navy to be superior to Narragansett Bay and its broad channel."[55] To another Connecticut paper's reference of the Thames site as "a place of supreme quietness," the *Mercury* responded that "it was a dead town just over the line of nowhere." The article concluded on a somber note, though, warning citizens that New London was "working energetically and persistently to get the training fleet located there" and that Newporters "must spare no pains to look after our Connecticut breathren, and prevent them from successfully playing any wooden nutmeg tricks."[56]

Friends of the naval station project in the city rose to the occasion and among other things established "a rendezvous for enlisting boys" for the training system.[57] Unquestionably, though, the most telling step was taken by the Navy which sent the *USS New Hampshire*, an old triple-decker, to Newport to serve as squadron flagship and apprentice quarters ship. The *New Hampshire* arrived off Coasters Harbor Island in July 1881.

While the idea of locating the large vessel at Newport originated with Luce, it was his close friend and staunch ally Admiral David Dixon Porter who made it happen.[58] Luce and Porter became fast friends from the 1840s when they served together aboard ship. When Porter became Superintendent of the Naval Academy in 1866, Luce was called upon to be his Commandant of Midshipman. By 1870 he had attained the rank of Admiral and became the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy.

Luce naturally turned to his old friend for support within the Department, and he was never disappointed. Apart from their mutual respect, Porter was seriously interested in formal recruit training, and what is more, he had a high regard for Narragansett Bay. It was largely due to his influence that the Naval Torpedo Station, the first permanent Navy installation in the region, was established on Goat Island in Newport's inner harbor in 1869.[59]

In August 1881 Porter notified Luce that there was "a powerful influence at work to get the training ships removed to New London" and that whereas the Connecticut lobby brought "all the influence they can bring to bear . . . neither of Rhode Island's senators bothered themselves much about it."[60]

The influence that Porter referred to had a telling effect upon Secretary Hunt for Porter advised Luce to proceed cautiously and not take anything for granted. For example, he was not to refer to Coasters Harbor Island as the Naval Station "for he (Hunt) does not recognize it in that light." Porter found Hunt to be a "peculiar man" and one who wanted full credit for setting up the training station. However, he was sure

55. Newport *Mercury*, June 25, 1881.

56. *Ibid.*, May 14, 1881.

57. Newport *Journal*, July 9, 1881.

58. "The Naval Apprentice System" in *The U.S. Naval Training Station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, R.I.* (N.Y.: E.H. Hart, 1889), p. 2. Copy in U.S. Naval Training Station, Newport, Records, RG 39, naval War College Archives, Newport, R.I. and in Office of the Commander, Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, R.I.

59. Nicolosi, "The Navy, Newport and Stephen B. Luce . . .," p. 122.

60. David D. Porter to Luce, Aug. 5, 1881, Luce Papers.

that he could in time "manage him." In the meantime he advised Luce:[61]

> Now in whatever way you write to the Department, do not ever hint that you know there is such a place as Coasters Island. All you have to do, in case you want to land anything on the island, is get permission from the authorities, and land it there without asking anybody.

Porter's alignment on the side of Newport found expression in the Newport press, very likely thanks to Luce and for whatever good effect it might have with the populace.[62]

At this juncture in time Luce's strategy was to secure the foothold on the island which was still occupied in the main by the poor. In November a sham battle took place and involved an amphibious landing of the apprentices from all the squadron ships. The operation was followed by a parade and review before a host of visitors.[63]

By the end of the year the situation in Washington remained unchanged. One hopeful event was the appointment of Aldrich to the Senate to complete the unexpired term of Senator Ambrose E. Burnside who had died in September. The change would prove highly beneficial, for the young, enterprising new senator, unlike his predecessor and Senator Anthony, was adept at using power. In time he would rise to leadership in the Senate.

Apart from Aldrich's move to the Senate, the outlook for Newport in the winter of 1881-1882 was as bleak as the weather. The Navy Department's recommended appropriations for 1882 contained no mention of the Naval Training Station. Rather, it included a large outlay for New London. Luce was deeply distressed at the shift in Department policy. Thomas Coggeshall tried to allay his fears by reassuring him that Aldrich was "watchful of our interests" and that a large outlay to New London was "not necessarily in antagonism to Newport."[64] Luce, on the other hand, was convinced that Secretary Hunt had decided against Newport, and he refused to be pacified. He informed Aldrich directly of his "shock and surprise that neither Captain English nor the Secretary did anything" and he concluded: "Can you help us?" To point up the desperation of the situation he noted futher: "I am about to lose my best men—Clark has lost heart and is going—Symonds talks of going . . . ."[65]

Aldrich responded quickly, advising Luce on a certain course of action which the Captain agreed to take.[66] It appeared that Secretary Hunt was about to be relieved, and Aldrich suggested that Luce apply to the new Secretary through Porter for a $5,000 appropriation for Coasters Harbor Island. Luce forwarded his appeal on April 12 and on the same day wrote Aldrich asking that he coordinate with Admiral Porter for the success of the effort in Washington.[67] The two men did come together for a collaborative effort which ultimately reaped success.[68]

Luce's request was received by the new Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, a New Englander, a consummate politician and a strong navy man.[69] The early evidence suggested that he would not oppose the Newport project. On the contrary, he aligned himself publicly with its supporters and helped to overcome congressional opposition.

During the summer of 1882, things changed dramatically. In early August a bill slipped through the Senate with an amendment by Aldrich providing $5,000 for the Training Station on Coasters Harbor Island. The measure was amended further in a Conference Committee to read: "And the cession by the State of Rhode Island to the United States of said island for use as a naval training station is hereafter accepted." To the surprise of most concerned in both Rhode Island and in Connecticut the bill was quickly passed and signed into law by the President.[70]

When the Newport *Journal* reported the event, it suggested that the Connecticut opposition had been "caught napping" and that "Senator Aldrich simply outwitted Senator Hawley."[71] Whether or not these assessments were correct is not known for certain but what is known is that it was common knowledge that Secretary Chandler was sympathetic to an increased

61. Porter to Luce, Aug. 15, 1881, *ibid.*
62. Newport *Mercury*, Oct. 22, 1881.
63. *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1881.
64. Coggeshall to Aldrich, Feb. 8, 1881, Aldrich Papers.
65. Luce to Aldrich, Feb. 19, 1882, *ibid.*
66. Coggeshall to Aldrich, April 6, 1882, *ibid.*
67. Luce to Aldrich, April 7, 1882, *ibid.*
68. Porter to Aldrich, April 21, 1882, *ibid.*
69. Luce to William E. Chandler, April 17, 1882, Letters received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons, 1841-1886, Training Squadron, 1882, 1885, RG 45, Records of the office of the Secretary of the Navy, 1776-1913, NA.
70. Newport *Journal*, Aug. 12, 1882.
71. *Ibid.*

naval presence in Narragansett Bay. Such began the case, it is quite possible that the Connecticut lobby reasoned that it was impolitic to continue its obstructionism.

While it is possible that the Act of August 1882 as amended was passed without the knowledge of the Connecticut delegation, it is not likely. Assuming that it knew of its provisions, then the failure to try to defeat it was predicated either on the basis that to resist was futile or that some benefit other than the original objective was to be realized. And in this last regard it is interesting to note that about this time the Thames River became a coaling station for small naval vessels, particularly the new torpedo boats that were beginning to be built.[72]

At the end of August Secretary Chandler in the company of several naval officers, Senator Aldrich and members of state and local governments conducted a close inspection of Coasters Harbor Island.[73] The *Journal* for September 2 reported, somewhat tongue in cheek:[74]

> Coasters Harbor Island is no longer ours, Secretary Chandler placed his official foot upon the sacred soil Saturday and after the manner of Christopher Columbus . . . took possession in the name of his country and his country's flag. . . . Secretary Chandler came, saw and conquered. Goodbye Coasters Harbor."

The battle won, the property secure in the hands of the United States, the only thing left to do to place the training station on a permanent footing was to pass a Navy Department regulation. But this was easier said than done, for dissension had broken out in the ranks of the Navy collaborators. For whatever reason Bureau Chief English and Station Commander Luce had a serious falling-out that threatened the short life of the enterprise.[75] Like the rightful mother in the Biblical tale of Soloman's justice, though, Luce willingly, though painfully, made the sacrifice to spare his creation. He described the incident in a letter to his son-in-law Lieutenant Boutelle Noyes:[76]

> I know that we could do nothing much in the way of progress till it—the T.S.— was put in charge of some bureau having money, and everyone said that English and myself should 'make up' as the small boy says. Having practiced 'eating dirt' since my first steerage mess claimed me as its own, I had no objection to taking one more gulp and so the thing was done.

The apology had the desired immediate effect for on June 3, Navy General Order No. 33 permanently establishing Coasters Harbor Island as the Naval Training Station was passed.[77] Nonetheless, Luce was not confident that the regulation alone would insure a bright future remarking to Noyes: "The shaking of hands over the bloody chasm did not result in any substantial good that I could see."[78] As a result he continued to stay close to his chief political ally. Concerning a forthcoming inspection of the training station by Chandler and English, he suggested to Aldrich that it would be a good idea if he could come down to Newport so that "we might walk over the ground, as it were, before their arrival."[79]

Like the father of the new nation, George Washington, when his tour as President was drawing to a close, Luce expressed certain doubts about the fate of the training station. Nevertheless he was certain that it was well worth the effort, and that although the support provided by the Department fell far short of what was needed, the site, Coasters Harbor Island, was a truly valuable acquisition. On this he confided to Noyes:[80]

> But there is a bright side to the picture. Everyone is charmed with the place as it appears in its vernal vestments. . . . Just now it is perfectly charming and people wonder and wonder how Newport could ever give such a place away.

To which he added that it was, of course, the substantial revenues that the comunity would realize from the presence of the training ships in the bay.[81]

A gala affair held on the island on Tuesday, June 26, marked the successful conclusion of the training sta-

72. Decker, *The Whaling City*, p. 187.
73. Newport *Journal*, Sept. 2, 1882.
74. *Ibid.*
75. the breech between the two men began to form in May when Luce appealed to Secretary Chandler for an additional $30,000 for repair of the training ships. The appeal was endorsed by Admiral Porter but vigorously opposed by English. (See docket entries, Luce to Chandler, May 8, 1882, letters received from Commanding Officers . . .). Another Luce appeal In February 1883 for $45,000 contained the statement: "This appropriation would have been asked for but for the belief that the Navy Department would have taken the necessary step in this direction." Luce to Chandler, Feb. 19, 1883, *ibid.*).
76. Luce to Boutelle Noyes, July 19, 1883, in Gleaves, p. 162.
77. General Orders and Circulars . . . , p. 223.
78. Luce to Noyes, July 19, 1883 in Gleaves, p. 163.
79. Luce to Aldrich, June 9, 1883, Aldrich Papers.
80. Luce to Noyes, July 19, 1883 in Gleaves, p. 163.
81. *Ibid.*

tion project. The honored guest at a naval review was quite understandably Senator Aldrich, who along with state officials had come down from Providence on a vessel provide by the Herreshoffs of Bristol, renowned builders of racing yachts, and soon to be builders of the Navy's new torpedo boats. Present also were former Governor Van Zandt, Newport city officials and a large number of Newporters of all classes.[82]

The exercise in Navy-politician cooperation that had reaped success was not lost on the strategy-minded Luce, who had set a new and more difficult course, the establishment of a Naval War College. To Noyes he remarked: "My great hobby now . . . is to erect a 'War School' . . . the prime object being to teach officers the science of their own profession—the science of war—including cognate branches . . . ."[83] For this purpose he believed that the old poorhouse building on Coasters Harbor Island would be quite adequate.[84]

Luce had already made his views public in a speech before the Newport chapter of the United States Naval Institute.[85] Now he was ready to call upon political support and in a letter of August 25 he invited Aldrich to join him in the awesome venture:[86]

> Such a school would give an entirely different character to Coasters Harbor Island, elevate the tone of the Station, and give it a value, both to the county and the state, it would never otherwise possess. But the plan has determined enemies—the buildings are wanted by many for other and less worthy purposes and success is hopeless unless we can mature our plans for carrying them through.

Aldrich was not slow to rise to the occasion and with his help the new and novel school was launched on October 6, 1884, with Luce as its first President.

82. Newport *Journal*, June 30, 1883.

83. Luce to Noyes, July 19, 1883, Gleaves, pp. 163-164.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Stephen B. Luce, "War Schools, *USNIP*, IX, No. 5 (1883), pp. 633-657.

86. Luce to Aldrich, Aug. 25, 1883, Aldrich Papers.

Mr. Nicolosi is the Director of the Naval War College Museum on Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, Rhode Island. He holds degrees in history from Rutgers University and Georgetown University and is a recognized authority on the history of the Naval War College and the naval heritage of Narragansett Bay. Articles by Mr. Nicolosi on these and related subjects have appeared in a number of scholarly journals.

Book Reviews

LEONARD F. GUTTRIDGE, *Icebound, The Jeannette Expedition's Quest for the North Pole* (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1986) 6¼" × 9¼", cloth, 347 pages, illustrations, reference section and index, $23.95.

Ostensibly this is a story about a great sea tragedy, of shattered dreams, with as grim an ending as could be conceived. This is the message of *Icebound*. Or has the author, in a very subtle way, presented a fascinating story of leadership emerging under extreme conditions?

The book itself tells about an ill fated attempt to prove a bogus theory under less than satisfactory circumstances. One can wonder how the expedition could ever succeed when it was basically a news making promotional scheme financed to a large extent by James Gordon Bennett, publisher of the *New York Herald*. Bennett apparently saw the *Jeannette* expedition as creating as much news as Bennett's sending of Henry Morton Stanley to Africa to find Doctor Livingstone. And if the *New York Tribune* could reach the North Pole, what a scoop for Bennett in those days of a flamboyant press in New York.

Why did the expedition fail?

1. The whole concept was based on flawed theories and ideas. The pole could be reached, it was felt, by assaulting it from the Pacific Ocean. All other tries were from the Atlantic. The Kuro Siwo, the black stream of Japan, was one of the fatal lures. Silas Bent, who had been with Commodore Perry to Japan in 1852, had made hydrographic surveys in the Eastern Pacific and he found a warm stream equivalent to the Gulf Stream, the Kuro Siwo.

The theory developed that these two ocean currents flowed north and met somewhere under the northern ice cap. All you need to reach the pole, it was said, was a good supply of thermometers—follow the warm trail. This idea was backed by Professor Petermann, a German map maker, described in the book by a Royal Geographical Society officer as a "self deluded charlatan." It was Petermann's maps that led the expedition astray when the *Jeannette* had to be abandoned at her sinking.

2. Because of Bennett's influence, the U.S. Navy got involved and the expedition was run as a Navy venture. But it was grudging support from the Navy, which did not want to offend Bennett, a man whose financial support of the project was somewhat niggardly. But it was a mistake for the Navy to get involved at all, Bennett or no Bennett.

3. Serious leadership flaws emerged as the expedition pushed on. The leader was Lt. George Washington DeLong of the U.S. Navy who had been involved in the project from Day One. It was he who bought the British Arctic ship *Pandora*, renamed for Bennett's sister, and he supervised everything done to make it ready for the trip that led him to his death in Siberia. His navigation officer had had mental problems but during the critical part of the trip, his long hidden syphilitic condition blinded him and made him useless for service. DeLong had to take along a couple of crew members which he did under pressure, one a purported meteorologist and the other a naturalist, both of whom were to be problems. Yet through the story, there emerges one man who could do anything. He was George W. Melville, assistant engineer of the ship, one of the few survivors. He went on to become chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering for the U.S. Navy at a time when development of steel ships and steam power was so critical. He emerges as the strongest leader in the whole tragic story.

And don't forget Emma, the ambitious wife of DeLong and her influence on her husband's dream of reaching the Pole.

4. The escape from the doomed *Jeannette* should have been a success but Petermann's false data about the settlements around the Lena Delta in Siberia led the crew astray. Melville's boat was the only one to reach an area where communication with civilization could be established.

From the day the *Jeannette* left San Francisco in July of 1879 until she sank in June of 1881, crushed by the ice that had held her trapped for two winters, the

tragedy deepened. The ice carried the ship along from north of Wrangel Island for 3,000 miles when wreckage of her was found in south Greenland three years later.

It would be interesting to give *Icebound* to each member of a management class in a business school to study it for leadership characteristics displayed by the crew of the *Jeannette*. This could very well be the subtle and quiet message Guttridge gives us in his book. The Naval Institute Press release about the book says of *Icebound*: "Often reading like a Gothic mystery . . . " It certainly does and the documentary evidence is terrific. A great book to read and ponder on.

JOHN R. HERBERT

Spring Hill, Florida

BRIAN LAVERY, *The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War, 1600-1815* (London, England, Conway Maritime Press, published and distributed in the United States of America and Canada by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1987) 288 pages, 12″ × 10″, cloth, illustrations, draughts, line drawings, photographs, appendices, notes, bibliography, index, $39.95.

Brian Lavery is rapidly becoming one of the foremost authorities on the technological development of the British Navy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. His masterful two-volume work, *The Ship of the Line*, established an innovative and engrossing style combining large format, contemporary illustrations, modern drawings, photographs and an authoritative text well grounded in primary source material. The books that resulted are useful to serious historians, modellers, naval buffs, students of early bureaucracy and public administration and nautical archaeologists, to name just the most obvious potential beneficiaries.

The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War continues and enlarges upon the scope of Lavery's earlier work. It is designed to combine with and complement two other major volumes, James Lee's *Masting and Rigging* and Peter Goodwin's *Construction and Fitting of the Sailing Man of War, 1650-1850.* Taken all together, the three books provide a comprehensive technological survey of British naval practice over two centuries. Lavery's contribution to the trilogy covers the areas of steering gear, anchors and capstans, underwater protection, pumps, guns, distribution of artillery, ordnance equipment, accommodations, internal fittings, ship's boats and deck fittings. His text is illuminated by many line drawings from his own work table, which reveal him to be a highly competent if somewhat austere draftsman. His coverage of each subject is orderly, chronological and packed with interesting detail that takes the reader well beyond the scope of most books on these topics. The vast bulk of the material presented here is also fresh and new. There is remarkably little overlap with his treatise on the *Bellona* and volume II of *Ship of the Line*, although a few illustrations are repeated and some subject matter is unavoidably carried over from the earlier works.

The overall quality of *Arming and Fitting* is very high, but there are a few lapses. Conway Maritime Press evidently works hard to keep the price of its books within reason, and so they dispense entirely with color plates and illustrations. The result is a book that is relentlessly monochromatic and deprives the reader of at least one valuable category of information, namely authentic color schemes and decorative embellishments. Also, in common with earlier Conway volumes, the publication of original small boat draughts and plans has resulted in some drawings being dim to the point of seriously impairing their usefulness. Hull contour lines, lift lines and hull geometry projections degenerate into dots or are lost altogether because of poor reproduction. Such plans should either have been redrawn or reproduced on equipment capable of achieving greater photographic contrast.

These problems nonwithstanding, *Arming and Fitting* is a very good book and would make a useful addition to the library of anyone who is interested in assembling a comprehensive collection of volumes on the technological development of the British sailing navy.

JAMES E. VALLE

Delaware State College

FRANK R. FARRAR, *A Ship's Logbook* (St. Petersburg, FL; Great Outdoors Publishing Company, 1988). 6″ × 9″, 40 illustrations, glossary, no index, 272 pages, hard cover $29.95, paperback $14.95.

The logbook of a ship at sea is usually a dry, uninteresting record of courses, speeds, and weather conditions interspersed with brief mention of noteworthy events affecting the ship's progress. For the most part it makes very dull reading. Recently published, however, is a book entitled *Between the Lines of a Ship's Logbook* which is something else again. This is the remarkable autobiography of a now retired shipmaster. The first three words of the augmented title are highly significant.

This book is unique or nearly so in that it covers the period of the Great Depression, when the author went to sea at age sixteen, through the years of World War II and the postwar period; more than two decades about which there is very little published in the way of personal accounts of seafaring as it really was. It is unique too in that it is a compilation based on letters written for the author's son while the father was away at sea. Each chapter covers a single episode or experience and could stand alone as a short story, an arrangement which makes for easy reading. In a real sense the author has made a significant contribution to maritime history whether he realized it or not.

The account is well written and, once started, is difficult to set aside. The author's "hilarious adventures as a young seaman; his doubts and fears during the grim days of the North Atlantic convoys; his frustrations while nursing tired Liberty ships, all contribute to armchair voyaging at its best, as seen through the eyes of a seaman." So says the publisher's advertising description and so says this reviewer. This is a master mariner whose hobby as well as his profession was navigation in which he could take pride and he honed his skills well.

Captain Farrar's first command was the Liberty ship *Augustus P. Loring* a fact that will be noted with special interest by long-term readers of the Neptune and other friends of the Peabody Museum of Salem.

Handsomely bound and profusely illustrated with photographs from the author's collection of memorabilia, the volume is available in both hardback and paperback editions.

In a lifetime of reading on maritime subjects of wide variety this reviewer has finally found a ship's logbook that is illuminating, interesting, and entertaining, altogether a most happy combination.

CHARLES S. MORGAN

Concord, Massachusetts

JOHN BACH, *The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821-1913* (Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1986), 9¾" × 7½", cloth, xii + 260 pages, maps and endpaper maps, bibliog. and notes, 65 photos and drawings. RRP $29.95.

In some important ways, the Public Record Office in its newer quarters at Kew Gardens, London, possesses one of the most sophisticated information retrieval systems in any research library. Readers select a seat in the reading room and then receive a pager which is keyed to their chosen seat number. Manuscripts and other documents are requested by key-entering their call numbers and the seat number into a computer terminal. Then the reader may march off to the cafeteria in full certainty that as soon as hot coffee is in hand, the pager will buzz a notification that the documents are waiting at the call desk. Even the old PRO in Chancery Lane seems efficient, in its nineteenth-century way, its fully circular reference room chock-a-block with scholars hunched protectively over fabulous long manuscript scrolls suspended on tall racks.

But in neither archive is it precisely possible to determine *which* documents must be called for in order to complete one's investigation. The PRO indexing is almost always adequate in the larger search, but often useless in the hunt for details. Like the Library of Congress and the Public Archives of Canada, for example, the PRO has saved a lot of paperwork, and never has time or money to properly register and record each possible cross-reference.

So when John Bach writes a book like *The Australia Station*, with chapter endnotes replete with references to the collections of the Public Record Office, I know he has done a good deal of searching, much more than a day's work of casting about in a single index.

In fact, John Bach must know more than anyone now living about the affairs of the British Navy in the South Pacific in the nineteenth century. I have utilized his trustworthy scholarship in my own explorations of the seafaring history of the Pacific Basin, and must necessarily do so again, should I ever find need to evoke the Royal Navy of a century ago, since his new work is encyclopedic as regards the policies and prerogatives that led to the formation, enlargement, and sometimes, the estrangement of the Australian Squadron.

He has chosen a formidable subject, in part because

the scene of action covers a huge geopolitical arena, with tremendously varied problems and uncertainties. The Royal Navy was charged, for example, with adjudication of sovereignty disputes, identification and punishment of murderers, and the settlement of civil dissention, all the while maintaining a social and political presence on behalf of Mother England among all her far-flung colonists from the north shore of Australia to Tasmania and beyond.

Furthermore, the Royal Navy was called upon to constantly reevaluate its power position in the Pacific, as steam came to replace sail, and as new "third-world" powers—Japan, for instance—began to exercize their military and political aspirations across the world's largest ocean. And this was all in a time of fecund peace, when Jack Tars weaned on the valorous yarns of the Napoleonic and Crimean conflicts were suddenly confronted with a generation of peacekeeping work, of police actions and false alarms.

Therein lies the heart of the matter. *The Australia Station* is not a book of sea wars and storms, of gallant young men furling the main royal, of the smoke-blind gun deck at the moment of the broadside. It is, I'm afraid, a dry book of policies and decision-making, and I must regret this, because there is not a drop of blood that could be in it, nor one teaspoonsful of salt-spray within its pages.

The source of the dryness is not John Bach, whose knowledge and enthusiasm can not be questioned. The failure is to be charged in large part to the august collections preserved by the Public Record Office. Britain has always favored the canonization of official wisdom, often to the exclusion of the informal and, dare I say, the ignoble. What John Bach found in the Public Record Office was an history of diplomacy and political intrigue within the Royal Navy. And he has crafted out of that a first-class policy history. It's a book suited to the concerns of a naval strategist, a political historian, even a maritime lawyer, perhaps. It's an invaluable reference work, but not an armchair sail.

The author succinctly describes the problem himself, at page 225, when he admits: "The human face of the Navy does not appear overmuch in the formal Admiralty correspondence. . . ." Whatever sea-air was once in that correspondence has by now fully vaporized out of it.

I learned *passim* of many naval encounters, and many storms, that were new to me. But I found my interests frustrated, because these events, which led in part to the formulation of the policy John Bach analyzes so carefully, were not discussed even in their most sketchy form. But I want to know what *happened* when the shore party from H.M.S. *Barracouta* went into battle with the natives. I want to know *what* force the men of *Danae* adopted against the local political opposition at Upolu.

And at page 121, for example, *what* dire consequence resulted, when the cannibal chieftain Cakobau withheld his favors from the colonists? Were the Englishmen eaten? As a Pacific historian, I suppose I should already know. But I don't. And neither, I think, do most of John Bach's readers.

The Australia Station also suffers—yea, how it suffers—from stumbling, unimaginative design. The most ugly maritime history books of the decade are being published in Australia, and it's a shame, because the topics have much to offer and their impact is frequently lost because of poor typography and shortfall of design. John Bach's intense work has been set in columns nearly five and one-half inches wide, and in relatively small type. It is tiring to read very much of that. Perhaps a slightly longer book, in a different shape, with narrower columns—but that would have cost more.

I also dislike the breaking-up of the text flow by placing the endnotes at the end of each chapter; better to have them at the bottom of the page, or at the end of the entire text, but not smash in the middle. And since they are not replete with substantive information, they could have easily been handled at the end of the book.

There is more suffering; the photo reproduction quality is mediocre, and in the review copy, at least, the pages were badly pressed in the binding process. One suspects that the case will fall off this book with a bit of use.

John Bach is to be highly commended, as always, for superior and meticulous scholarship. I only lament the fact that his preference for policy, to the complete exclusion of action, slows his book to a crawl. *The Australia Station* requires patience, good reading glasses, and a bookcase of Pacificiana to navigate by, if one is to mine the total of the author's lifetime admiration for the Royal Navy's effort in the southern latitudes.

ROBERT LLOYD WEBB

Maine Maritime Museum

RONALD KVERNDAL, *Seamen's Missions: Their Origin and Early Growth* (Pasadena, California: William Carey Library, 1986). 6¼" × 9¼" coated cloth, xxviii + 903 pages, 204 black and white illustrations, appendices, bibliography, notes and index. $29.95.

The author of this book was born in Great Britain of Norwegian parents. As a child he belonged to the Norwegian Seamen's Church located in the area of London that saw the birth of the 19th Century Bethel movement. He went to sea as a cabin boy in the North Sea trade and rose to become fourth mate of a ship that traded on the China coast. Later he served as an apprentice in an Oslo shipyard, did ship broking work in London, was in the consular service in France and earned a degree in marine law. While in France he became interested in the work of the Scandinavian Seamen's Church and decided that he wanted to be a chaplain to seafarers. In 1984 he was awarded a doctorate in theology by the University of Oslo. It was his original intention to do his dissertation on the prehistory of the Nordic seamen's missions, but his research led him to a much larger task. The result was to write the first world history of the Seamen's Mission Movement and to bring to that task a variety of insights and experiences.

This worldwide effort had its beginnings in Great Britain in 1779 with the formation of the Naval and Military Bible Society, whose goal was to put bibles into the hands of soldiers and sailors. By 1812 it had been observed that about two thirds of the requests for scriptures came from sailors. Meanwhile, an older organization, The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, had begun distributing books and tracts to the Navy. This group had close ties to the Anglican Church and to commanders in the Royal Navy. Other religious-minded individuals in 1779 formed the Religious Tract Society, a nondenominational effort to promote the spiritual awakening of the Navy. Out of these efforts came a growth of evangelistic concern among Royal Navy men both afloat and ashore during the Napoleonic wars. Sailors formed fellowship cells as a means of preserving and increasing converts. Officers and men of other ranks became involved in the movement both as leaders and participants. This, in turn, made those who came to scoff or to persecute their religious-minded shipmates decide that restraint and later respect were the wiser courses. One result of this evangelization was that Lieutenant Richard Marks left the Navy to become a minister and to work for the spiritual benefit of seamen. Another result was that an ex-sailor, the Reverend George Charles Smith, became the father of the Seamen's Mission Movement. As a young Baptist minister at Penzance, he was hailed by some seamen on the street and invited to come to their ship and to preach a sermon. He did so and became aware of a great hunger for religion on the part of seamen. This led to the Naval Correspondence Mission, an individualized form of maritime pastoral counseling by mail, that consolidated the results of the naval awakening. The stage was thus set for a series of efforts to save the souls, bodies and minds of sailors that eventually became worldwide.

Beginning in 1814, there were shipboard prayer meetings on ships anchored in the Thames. Next came floating chapels, land-based churches for seamen and missions in foreign ports. Nor were these activities aimed solely at naval and merchant seamen, but embraced whalers, fishermen, boatmen and all who worked the canals and waterways. While spreading religion, the sailor missionaries also fought prostitution, crimping, the exploitation of seamen by landlords and the evils of alcoholism. Not content to simply preach against evil, they established boarding houses, reading rooms, lending libraries and magazines aimed at sailor readers. Reformers called attention to the problems of wives, orphans and destitute children of seamen. They established day schools for children and tried to provide some employment and education. One of their more radical ideas involved attempts to care for aged and disabled seafarers. While some of these efforts were too ambitious for the available funds, the very act of raising the issues placed these missionaries decades before their time.

More than two-thirds of this volume is devoted to the work of British groups at home and abroad. Three chapters are given to the work of the American Seamen's Friend Society and its predecessors, and to the activities of local groups. All in all, the origins and work of more than fifty societies are discussed. To tell this story Kverndal had to search out widely scattered tracts, seamen's magazines, religious newspapers and the minutes of old and often defunct organizations. With such material in hand, he had to evaluate the conflicting claims of various organizations and to subject to scholarly scrutiny all the other evidence on the aims and achievements of men and societies. This was no mean achievement. Once he established the facts, he presented them in a graceful, highly documented and

compelling manner. Along the way he was able to correct many misstatements in previously published books and articles on the topic. After 15 years of toil, Kverndal has produced a landmark book on a much neglected topic.

While the major focus of this book is on the period 1779-1864, many chapters include a brief sketch of various organizations down to the 1980s. There are also two chapters on the background of the missionary enterprise, and four at the end of the volume explore the motivation, objectives, impediments and methodology of the maritime mission. Included also is an addendum on the emergence of organized Nordic Seamen's Missions. Documents and excerpts from minutes and meetings, as well as statistics, are published in eight appendices. Illustrations of men, ships, churches and locales in the narrative, as well as the variety of Bethel flags used, add a valuable dimension to this book.

HAROLD D. LANGLEY

Smithsonian Institution

JOHN DE COURCY IRELAND, *Ireland's Sea Fisheries: A History*, (Dun Laoghaire, Ireland: The Glendale Press, 1981). 7½" × 10", cloth, 184 pages, 117 b&w plates, 6 maps and index, IR£10.40.

Ireland's Sea Fisheries: A History by Dr. John de Courcy Ireland landed on this reviewer's desk at a very appropriate time, as my current project is a biography of the New England naval architect, Thomas Francis McManus (1856-1938). McManus's father, John Herbert McManus, the famous Boston sailmaker, emigrated as a successful young professional from the Irish fishing port of Skerries in the early 1850s. Dr. de Courcy's book, which is an economic history of Ireland's fishing industry from 500 B.C. to the present, does much to illuminate this curious emigration of McManus senior, and other apparently prosperous tradesmen, who directly served the Irish fishing fleet.

The book, which is profusely illustrated and makes effective use of maps, is divided logically into seven periods. It convincingly outlines the vicissitudes of the fishing industry and distinctly defines the relevance of friendly, unfriendly or indifferent legislation from either British or captive Irish parliaments to the possibility of profitable returns.

The inconsistency of friendly legislative support for the national fishing fleet is the underlying theme of the text. The fiscal swings from profitability to liability caused by this wavering approach to subsidy occur so frequently, particularly after the union with Great Britain, that the shipowners and workers in the industry rarely knew what to anticipate. In addition to the erratic legislative contributions, the typically impoverished state of the native fisherman precluded capital investment. This combination resulted in an inability to compete with foreign fishermen, even in Irish home waters. Dr. Ireland paints a dismal picture of Irishmen sallying forth in small boats to fish with hooked lines against foreign competitors manning large, modern fishing vessels equipped with nets. As improbable as it seems the Irish nation became an importer of fish products, despite its fish-rich waters. Perhaps this morass of misery provided the surprising spark of ingenuity that led to the invention of the modern y"otter trawl" in Ireland during the mid-1850s.

My criticisms of *Ireland's Sea Fisheries: A History* are few and relatively minor. The author assumes a knowledge of Irish history and geography that, although appropriate for the Irish (and probably British) market, is an unrealistic expectation when directed toward American readers. Although this is an excellent economic study, it pays less attention to vessel types and gives little explication concerning the manning of the fleet.

W.M.P. DUNNE

State University of New York at Stony Brook

ANTON OTTO FISCHER, *Focs'le Days* (Kingston, New York: Hudson River Maritime Center, 1987). 9" × 11", paper, xxl plus 85 pages, 19 illustrations, 1 plan, $20.95.

First issued in 1947, this book has been republished in the same format but with all the plates in color, a vast improvement, The artist/author tells about his early life as a seaman, culminating with a long voyage in the British bark *Gwyder Castle*, incidents of which he has illustrated with oil paintings in a way that photographs never could. The story is unusual in that it is told by a foremast hand, not by an apprentice or a passenger. Fischer left the vessel in New York in 1902 and eventually became a well-known marine and landscape artist.

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His memory having dimmed with the years, some of the background details are inaccurately rendered, but the figures are very well drawn. Fischer's account is a lively one and is recommended to anyone interested in latter-day sail.

ANDREW J. NESDALL

Waban, Massachusetts

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS, *Nomads and Crusaders A.D. 1000-1368* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988). 5″ × 8″, cloth, 1 & 213 pages, maps, index. $25.00.

In *Nomads and Crusaders* Professor Lewis has written a provocative, fascinating book which, it seems to me, provides a strikingly new historical thesis. His aim is to show that, whereas in 1000, the beginning of the High Middle Ages, there were in the world five major societies and civilizations (Western Europe, Byzantium-Russia, Islam, India, and the Far East), by 1368, the year of the end of the Mongol Empire, four of the societies had declined and only the Western European remained supreme. It is his thesis that this vast change in the position of the world empires came about as the result of the aggressions of two new forces, the nomads of Central Asia and Eurasia, and the violent attacks of the Latin Crusaders on the Byzantine and Islamic Empires—aggressions which destroyed or greatly diminished the force of their opposing powers. As a result, in 1368 Western Europe stood alone, preeminent in the world.

To demonstrate a thesis of such massive proportions, the author has had to draw on a commanding array of complex facts in the individual and interacting history of all five societies—a task that might well tax the powers of Gibbon. But the author shows himself equal to the task by providing a vast concatenation of material relating to each society, which he proceeds to interrelate to the other societies in order to implement his thesis. His knowledge of Western developments is impressive; of Byzantium-Russia very adequate (though I might disagree with several points adduced); and of Islam the same. As to India and the Far East, I cannot fairly evaluate the material presented because of my own ignorance of the fields.

Specialists have written no few monographs on the Latin Crusaders and on their impact on Byzantium and Islam. And individual monographs exist on the history of the Mongols, Turcomans, Pechenegs, and other nomads. But the great merit of this work is to combine all these various strains of interpretation into one grand overarching thesis that is compelling while making a great deal of sense.

As a Byzantinist I adduce a few points concerning the realm of Byzantium-Russia that the author might have also used in his work: first, Emperor Constantine VIII's warning in his *De Administrando Imperio* that later Byzantine rulers preserve at any cost Byzantium's close alliance with the Turkic Khazars who acted as the linch pin of Byzantine diplomacy in connection with the many nomadic, savage peoples in the area. Also I would not, without much qualification, agree that Michael VIII Palaeologus ruined the Byzantine Empire through his policy of religious union with Rome. With his archfoe Charles of Anjou so much more powerful militarily than himself, Michael had to concentrate almost exclusively on the threat Charles posed to Byzantium. Indeed, Michael's unionist policy with the Pope was the only possible way he could hope to block Charles' ambitions since Charles was the feudal vassal of the Pope. As the near-contemporary Byzantine historian Gregoras succinctly put it: Had Michael not then been emperor, Charles would surely have conquered Byzantium. Again with respect to Michael's policy of religious union with Rome, the author might have emphasized a significant factor almost always overlooked, the almost paranoid Greek fear of Latinization which the Greeks, still smarting over the oppressive Latin occupation, justifiably feared more than anything else. Moreover, had Michael not died so soon after the Sicilian Vespers and his decisive land victory over Charles of Anjou at Berat in 1282, he might well (as there is no doubt he fully intended) have attacked and even defeated the rising Ottoman Turks in Asia Minor (see my book, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, which is not included in the generally rich bibliography listed). A final observation—on Islam, how does the rise and development of the Ottoman Empire, by the 16th century the world's leading military power, affect the author's central thesis relating to the decline of Islam as a major force in world events?

On the basis of this volume one can believe that among modern American historians, the author possesses an almost unrivaled command of geographic, demographic, and especially maritime phenomena relative to the events he discusses. Besides these

many virtues, the book (surprisingly brief as it is) also reflects a conceptual boldness and power that is remarkable. The one deficiency of the work is its lack of documentation, that is footnotes, with the result that the scholarly basis for statements cannot be checked. One would hope that if the author intends to publish a second edition (as I think would be highly useful to comparative historians), he would provide an even fuller account of the various civilizations involved and support everything with detailed documentation. But these are only minor cavils about an important, truly authoritative work, the thesis of which explains more lucidly and effectively than I have before seen, one of the most meaningful of today's historiographical problems—why Western Europe emerged over other major societies as supreme in the modern world.

DENO J. GEANAKOPLOS

Yale University

ALVAH F. HUNTER, *A Year on a Monitor and the Destruction of Fort Sumter* edited and with an introduction by Craig L. Symonds (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1987). 6¼" × 9¼", cloth, xix + 184 pages, 8 illustrations, index. $19.95.

Considering the importance of the monitors in American history and their unusually high public recognition, it is a pleasure to welcome the publication of *A Year on a Monitor*. This book is a gem. Alvah Hunter had to be persistent in his attempts to join the Union Navy since he was underage. He finally shipped out as a "first-class boy" on the *Nahant*. His year's enlistment lasted from December 1862 to December 1863, a period that included much of the important action against the defenses of Charleston. Hunter wrote the book in the 1920s based on a journal he had kept at the time. He was both curious and observant. As an assistant to the wardroom steward he was in an excellent position to learn about the ship's operation from the top down. Among the many fascinating details of service life and life aboard a monitor, we learn that his wages were $8 per month. The *Nahant* participated in the capture of the USS *Atlanta*, an action Hunter describes. His share of the $300,000 in prize money was $176.16, a princely sum considering his monthly wage.

The reader will find many historical and technical details, presented as only a keen participant can. Important to my own research was a description of the use and storage of deck stanchions, one of which from the *Monitor* we may have identified in a recent survey of the area around that wreck. Also, there is considerable discussion of the use of an anti-torpedo raft, a contraption pushed in front of a ship to thwart floating mines. Not long ago we studied a fragment of one such washed up on the Texas coast, and there is another in Bermuda.

Hunter discusses battle damage and operational problems in detail, an interesting aspect of these seemingly impervious ships. We learn that divers visited the ship for hull cleaning. Ice was delivered to the ship occasionally. Sickness was a problem in spite of the newly conceived forced-draft ventilation. The armor was strengthened in several ways after experience in battle with this new type of ship. Hunter visited and described the Union siege works onshore. He waxes poetical about the rippling green light below deck created as waves washed over the deck lights due to the vessel's low freeboard. Such fascinating insights are too numerous to name them all.

The monitor in question is the USS *Nahant*. Her particulars were as follows: displacement 1,875 tons; length 200′; beam 46′; draft 10′6″; depth of hold 12′6″; speed 5 knots; complement 75 men; armament one 15″ Dahlgren smooth bore; one 11″ Dahlgren smooth bore; *Passaic* class monitor. The editor of the volume under review, Symonds, describes the *Nahant* as a clone of the original *Monitor*, one of ten in the *Passaic* class. *Nahant* was 25′ longer but virtually identical in design to the *Monitor*. Symonds succinctly described the monitors in his introduction (p. xv):

> What all these vessels had in common was a remarkable invulnerability to shot and shell, and an equally remarkable unseaworthiness. Ugly and ungainly with their low freeboard and iron hull, these bizarre-looking fighting platforms were "ships" unlike any the world had seen before. Their usefulness was not in traditional blockade duty where they might be required to pursue swift and elusive blockade runners, but in combat against shore fortifications. The presumed invincibility of the monitors made them the key to Navy Department plans to force an entry into Charleston Harbor and batter Fort Sumter into submission.

The monitors are placed in their international context in a recent review of four books on early ironclad vessels by Lyon in *The International Journal of Nautical Archeology* 7.3 (1988) 281. Lyon opines that the

monitor-type "represents a 'blind alley'—although for a while an influential and popular one—in the development of the warship." He goes on to grant their importance in Civil War history, although they are not comparable to the contemporary British and French seagoing ironclad warships. It is very interesting to note that in the early 1880s U.S. armored warships' strength was limited to 14 Civil War vintage monitors, all of which were laid up in ordinary, and five ships of more modern design laid down during the mid-1870s but still uncompleted. Ironclad warship construction may have flourished in the U.S. during the Civil War, but it took a surprisingly long time for the new technology to become dominant. The *Nahant* was even recalled to service during the Spanish-American War for harbor defense in New York.

It must be touched on in passing that the book has numerous typographical errors, a failing which in my observation has become common even in the products of major publishing houses. Is this failure of an important technical aspect of scholarship yet another symptom of the decline of the West? Otherwise, the book is admirably designed and illustrated. The title page illustration of a line of monitors laid up in ordinary is hauntingly evocative. Yet this account of an individual's experiences and observations is a truly important contribution to naval history and, because of its plethora of detail, to underwater archaeology, too. Reading it and enjoying it tremendously, I remember why I was drawn to this field in the first place . . . and why I persist in it.

J. Barto Arnold III

Austin, Texas

Daniel M. Masterson, General Editor, and others, *Naval History: The Sixth Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1987. 7¼" × 10¼", buckram, xv + 358 pages, 8 black and white illustrations, 3 maps, 3 tables, notes, appendices. $40.00.

This volume is a selection of the papers presented at the Sixth Naval History Symposium held at the U.S. Naval Academy in September 1983. That meeting saw the largest number of papers presented than at any previous symposium. It underscored the fact that Naval History is developing as an academic discipline. The scholars represented in this volume range from advanced graduate students, curators, administrators, university professors, and official historians to archeologists and retired naval officers. The time range is also extremely broad, from the days of Herod the Great in 22 B.C. to World War II. While this reviewer claims no expertise in many of the subject areas represented here, he believes that all the papers are of interest. In areas where the reader has no background, most of these chapters will provide him or her with a glimpse of the state of the art and of the thrust of some of the recent scholarship in the field.

Some of the material that was of particular interest to this reviewer includes Ronald Pollitt's discoveries about the contingency planning and the defeat of the Spanish Armada; Arthur N. Gilbert's presentation of the nature of mutiny in the 18th Century British Navy; Kurt Lautenschager's reconsideration of the *Dreadnought* revolution; and Daniel A. Baugh's discussion of Great Britain's blue water and continental commitment strategies in World War I. But above and beyond these reflections of individual taste, this volume serves as a literary guidepost to the range and diversity of the research in Naval History.

Harold D. Langley

Smithsonian Institution

Smith, Philip Chadwick Foster, *Philadelphia on the River*. Philadelphia: Philadelphia Maritime Museum, 1986; Distributed by University of Pennsylvania Press. 176 pp., illus., biblio., index, $29.00.

"One image" of the city of Philadelphia, Chad Smith reminds his countrymen and Philadelphians in this attractive volume, "is so conspicuous as to be blinding," namely, that Philadelphia "is a major port city." (p. 7) Its three hundred years as such is Smith's subject, but 'told' mostly through pictures; the entire text is positioned as captions. The author, a master maritime historian and author of several key works, chose this approach in order "to resurrect in the mind's eye of the present day the ambience of past times, long erased." (p. 9)

He has succeeded admirably. Philadelphia's waterway to the sea was and is the Delaware River—with the ancillary Schuylkill playing a secondary role; both provide the focus of the book. The inside covers are

maps of the environs, which, with an 1880s lithograph, enable the reader to pinpoint each of the 222 scenes: lighthouses, drydocks, range marks and landmarks, fortifications, grain elevators, coal wharfs, warehouses, terminals, bridges, locks, and much else. The history of the city's shipbuilding enterprises, notably Cramp's, is especially well depicted, while aerial views dramatically show the changing waterfront of the twentieth century. Although sailing schooners of the last century are deservedly the most prominent vessels shown, Smith has uncovered rarely-seen images of icebreakers, tugs, fireboats, dredges, and ferries, not to mention warships and modern merchantmen. The illustrations are concentrated from the years after the 1840s, almost ignoring the colonial and early national periods, both apparently not depicted extensively by artists of the day.

Unusual but thoroughly enjoyable scenes for a seaport history are winter ice-skating and related "ice hyjinks" that provided much merriment among the citizenry. Then there was the floating church, Gothic architecture on a flat boat barge hull of 1847. And Smith offers very nice touches indeed in tribute to the port's river shad industry by including recipes for Shad Roe Salad and Baked Shad.

One only wishes that the many (or even a few) reproduced paintings, especially those by the eminent Thomas Eakins and Civil War-period artist David J. Kennedy, could have been rendered in their original color, but the day of inexpensive color reproduction is not yet. Chad Smith has nevertheless done the next best things—painted an original color portscape for the dust jacket and relied on black-and-white to give us a vivid introduction to maritime Philadelphia.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS

College of Charleston

JEREMY BLACK AND PHILIP WOODFINE, eds., *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), xiii + 273 pages, maps. $39.95.

JOHN D. HARBRON, *Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), xiv + 178 pages, maps, illustrations. $29.95.

Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine have edited a remarkably homogeneous collection of essays on the British Navy between 1688 and 1815. Each of its thirteen essays is approximately 20 pages in length, is extremely well-researched and at least competently written, and is aimed at the professional historian or well-read naval history buff. These essays generally are on rather broadly conceived topics, such as naval strategy, the intersection of naval operations and diplomacy, or the wider dimensions of naval administration and shipbuilding. Black and Woodfine's book thus forms an almost total contrast to another excellent recent essay collection, Martine Acerra, José Merino, and Jean Meyer's *Les Marines de Guerre Européens, XVII-XVIII^e Siècles* (Paris, 1985). This other collection's ten English, ten French, and one Spanish essay vary widely in length and style and chiefly deal with a different set of problems in naval history, such as tactics, scientific application, social history, and the evolution of ship design.

Given the relatively narrow focus of the Black-Woodfine collection, its articles are quite provocative, indeed rather tantalizingly so. Since they are all so short, this book seems almost a sampler of the work of some of the best contemporary British, American, and Canadian naval historians; one is left wishing for more. The opening two articles, Jeremy Black's overview of the period and David Aldridge's survey of naval operations from 1680 to 1720, are perhaps the weakest of the collection; although scholarly they are discursive and unfocused. Black's subsequent article on the constraints affecting British naval deployment in the 18th century is considerably better. Even superior is Philip Woodfine's perceptive treatment of the political expectations about the Royal Navy during the War of Jenkin's Ear. Richard Middleton then discusses with his usual insight Anson's administration, while Julian Gwyn (in my favorite article) explains how the North American station grew in importance over the course of the 18th century. Three eloquent articles examine Britain's difficulties during the War of American Independence. Daniel Baugh believes the slowness to institute a major shipbuilding program retarded the achievement of naval superiority over the French and Spanish; he asserts but does not prove that men could have been found to man the extra ships. David Syrett shows the impact of military requirements upon naval deployments in American waters in 1776 and 1777. Kenneth Breen traces the 1780 quarrels between the various theatre commanders, which con-

tributed to the disasters of 1781. The final three articles deal with the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon. Paul Webb's study of British naval construction during the period is rather tentative in its conclusions, although it does reveal much about the historiographical problems of its subject. Alone among the collection Patricia Crimmins introduces us to some individual ships and their officers (as she looks at the Levant station between 1795 and 1805). Finally, Anthony Ryan presents the military and diplomatic activities of Admiral Saumarez in the Baltic between 1805 and 1812, a particularly well-researched piece which hopefully previews a monograph on the subject. In summary, this book is a feast but one comprised of hors d'oeuvres from a variety of kitchens.

John Harbron's book is not a monograph, as one might expect from the title, but rather a loose collection of essays introducing us to the 18th century Spanish Navy. They, too, whet our appetite, but these *tapas* are the work of a well-intentioned amateur. Harbron presents us with a variety of fare, ranging from dockyards and naval architects to explorers and warship captains. His overall theme is valid: the navy of Bourbon Spain had a great deal in common with those of Britain and France and its failures were largely due to factors beyond its control, such as the scarcity of sailors. The book's numerous illustrations are lovely and although repetitious and unsystematic it does contain a great deal of information. (Some of the most interesting, such as the ship lists, are not Harbron's own work.) Save this as a gift for yourself or a fellow naval enthusiast. If you read Spanish first try José Cervara Pery, *La Marina de la Ilustración* (Madrid, n.d.) or the more technical J.P. Merino Navarro, *La Armada Española en el Siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1981). Sadly, there is little on the 18th century Spanish Navy in English. The Spanish Navy was a worthy rival to the British for much of the century; let us hope the number of its historians eventually will rival the number of historians studying the British Navy, many of whom are so well represented in the Black-Woodfine collection.

JONATHAN R. DULL

Yale University

JOHN A. TILLEY, *The British Navy and the American Revolution* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 332 pages, maps and illustrations, $24.95.

Surely by now it must be said that the fields of the American Revolution represent well tilled historical soil. Especially after the spate of interest generated by the bicentennial, one would hardly expect a further study to add materially to our understanding of the period. While the fields have been well tilled, however, the waters have remained virtually uncharted.

The American Revolution was, in many ways, a naval war, yet that aspect of the conflict has received precious little attention from historians. It is not an event that many British historians have felt constrained to memorialize, and few Americans have leapt into this breach. The last major overview of the naval aspects of the war was published by William M. James in 1926, *The British Navy in Adversity: A Study of the War of American Independence*. This recent work by John Tilley fills a significant void in our knowledge; the need for such an overview is more evident after reading the book.

In an era dominated by particularistic studies, Tilley has opted for the broad canvas. He hypothesizes that the individual strategic and tactical failures of the naval war have a common ancestry, virtually preordaining the British loss of the continent. The Royal Navy was operating under doctrines that were a century old and developed for continental warfare with European nations. Just as traditional field warfare proved inadequate to the task of suppressing a widespread rebellion, so the classic fleet action failed to guarantee domination of the seas.

This book is a study in command. Tilley bases the work on the voluminous correspondence of each of the admirals serving as commander in chief during the war. He has then ferreted out details that corroborate and enhance the story that develops. The result is a very thorough overview of the strategic thinking that dominated the war effort, an overview that places in context the lone events that we are more accustomed to reading about. As Washington wrote in 1788, "In writing history, it is of infinite consequence to know the *springs* of action as well as the *events*." Such a study as Tilley's can give us that perspective. Such a study can also turn into a truly dry and boring book. Happily, Tilley avoids this pitfall through a combination of well-crafted prose and fascinating detail. We learn that the war was influenced by gout and admiral's debts, by the sandbar at New York and the teredo worms of the southern waters. The author weaves an intriguing tapestry, both highly readable and informative.

Tilley summarizes the unenviable position of the Royal Navy in his concluding chapter. "To ask a navy to suppress a revolution was to ask a whale to catch a bird: the excess of brute force was ludicrous but the only possible outcome of the exercise was frustration." That the effort ultimately ended in failure makes for no less interesting a story. This rendition of the story should find a place both on personal bookshelves and on lists of required reading in any course treating the Revolution.

JOHN O. SANDS

Williamsburg, Virginia

DAVID R. MACGREGOR, *Fast Sailing Ships, Their Design and Construction, 1775-1875,* London, England, Conway Maritime Press, LTD, revised edition, 1988, first published 1973, 8¾" × 11¼", cloth, 319 pages, 375 half-tone and line illustrations of which about half are small scale plans, foreword by Howard I. Chapelle, introductions to first and second editions, seven chapters, conclusion, four appendices, sources and bibliography, acknowledgements, references, and index, 24 pounds, sterling.

Since 1952 David MacGregor has given to British deep water shipping much of the same service provided by Howard Chapelle to our own maritime interests. His ten books, half of which have had multiple editions, represent a well detailed picture of seagoing merchant sailing shipping for the century 1775-1875. His background as an architect has fitted him to prepare many of the plans himself and to treat the subject with some engineering perspective. He occupies a unique position among living writers on naval architectural history.

The so-called "clipper ship" has fascinated all those interested in fast sailing vessels and much effort has gone into the study and exploitation of the subject. Captain Arthur H. Clark led the way and had the great advantage of being a master of sailing ships and an acquaintance of Donald McKay to whom he dedicated *The Clipper Ship Era in 1920.* Clark defined the era as the period 1843-1869 and presented the subject in an absorbing and seamanlike manner. In 1930 Carl C. Cutler, with *Greyhounds of the Sea* brought the subject from Clark's nearly first-hand account to the state of history and with an emphasis on performance records. Howard I. Chapelle's concentration in *The Search for Speed Under Sail,* 1957, was on design and included early work that may have contributed to development of the clippers. MacGregor's effort is somewhat in line with that of Chapelle; he goes back to early examples of fast sailing craft and describes some of the theory that contributed to later developments. A student of the broad subject must consult Clark, Cutler, Chapelle, and MacGregor to obtain the whole picture, but the last author has given us the best documented and illustrated presentations from both a technical and an aesthetic standpoint.

MacGregor has assembled a wonderful collection of old photographs and many of the numerous plans are direct reproductions of the originals. The reader should be familiar with other books by MacGregor that overlap the material covered in *Fast Sailing Ships.* These are: *The Tea Clippers* (1952, 1972, revised 1983), *Clipper Ships* (1979), and *Merchant Sailing Ships 1850-1875* (1984).

In spite of some repetition, these books supplement and extend the coverage of *Fast Sailing Ships.*

While it is natural for MacGregor to place his greatest concentration on British ships, he gives respectful and considerable coverage to those of the United States, and also goes beyond the scope of other writers in describing fast ships of Canada and European countries.

In the first chapter MacGregor gives a brief history of naval architecture in Europe and early attempts to develop formalized criteria for performance. Such efforts were extremely feeble when compared to modern methods, and an aura of mysticism remained over the practice of naval architecture until comparatively recent times. Chapelle analyzed results of the early work by preparing detailed tables of dimensions and coefficients for 100 ships of the period 1700-1855, including one factor of questionable value which he called a "camber length ratio", being the ratio of length and depth of the quarter-beam buttock below the load waterline. Chapelle expended considerable effort in (compiling dimensions including loaded drafts, and in computing displacements and coefficient of form), a large undertaking in the pre-computer age. Assuming that his figures are correct, they tell us only the relative fineness of hulls. MacGregor refers to Chapelle's work and discourses on the factors con-

tributing to the making of a fast and able sailing ship, but in the interest of simplicity, he uses the "coefficient of under deck tonnage", a more readily obtained substitute for the block coefficient. He clearly recognizes the problem faced by early designers in defining the optimum volume and form for a given service. He quotes the methods of contemporary authorities and from this information the reader can picture how the pioneers proceeded, choosing the shape of the midship section and relating to it the shapes of key sections near the ends. It is well recorded that fast passages were made by ships of relatively full form and it can be seen that in the frenzy to obtain speed ships were not infrequently built much finer than necessary for desired performance. A form that might look good on a model could well have characteristics requiring a percentage of ballast that harmfully reduced cargo capacity. Smoothness of the bottom, design and magnitude of the sail plan, condition of loading, and skill of the crew are all weighty factors, and most effective in long term performance. MacGregor also discusses the influence of early measurement regulations on hull form.

In Chapter Two MacGregor covers in considerable detail the early development of fast seagoing sailing craft. His studies indicate that, at least in Great Britain, the commercial shipbuilders were far more innovative than those of the navy, and indeed, the navy relied on the supply of existing fast merchant vessels for such service. It is apparent that a large ratio of sail area to displacement was a primary factor in attaining desirable speeds during this period, 1775-1815.

Chapter Three, covering 1815 through 1839, gives comprehensive coverage to developments in ship design leading up to the clipper ship period.

Chapter Four, entitled "The Aberdeen Bow: 1839-1850," describes the origin and development of this Scottish innovation which reduced registered tonnage as computed using the length for tonnage measured in accordance with the British Act of 1836. Both stem and stern posts were sharply raked, as a result of which the waterline endings became less concave than was common at that time. This also produced, in the bow, a rapid increase in buoyancy with increased immersion, and gave the ship greater lift in large seas. John W. Griffith adapted a rather similar form for the famous *Sea Witch* in 1846. The concept disappeared from use in the mid sixties. In this chapter, MacGregor also briefly describes comparative resistance tests with small models, performed by Alexander Hall and Son of Aberdeen.

Chapter Five, entitled "Progress of Shipbuilding 1850-1875" gives considerable detail on methods of construction, a field in which the Scottish builders were world leaders. They began the use of iron members when the supply of heavy framing timber became short and advanced through composite construction to all-iron and steel. It is interesting that composite construction was favored for its compatibility with sheet copper anti-fouling sheathing, before the development of suitable paint. The planking effectively isolated the copper to prevent galvanic action with iron or steel framing. Many variations were used, including diagonal planking. It is a tribute to these pioneer builders that many of their products survived a useful life of over twice Lloyd's initial assignment.

The builders frequently indulged in innovations beyond the scope of formalized construction rules. Rigging was developed to reduce manning and improve safety. It is wished that the several patented reefing systems were described in more detail.

Chapter Six covers the commonly recognized Clipper Ship era of 1850-1859. Here it is recommended that MacGregor's books *The Tea Clippers* and *Clipper Ships* also be consulted, although there is considerable repetition. *Fast Sailing Ships* presents the best coverage of design and construction details.

Chapter Seven, the last, continues the clipper ship story from 1860 through 1875, during which period the fast sailing vessel gradually became non-competitive with the steamship and the available low freight rate cargoes generated a demand for more burdensome but slower craft. MacGregor does not dwell at length on these successors to the clipper.

In his conclusion MacGregor gives a very good summary of the book. He makes the statement regarding development of the clipper, that "no strong American influences have been discovered in spite of much written this century to that effect." This may irritate some in the United States, but it appears to be confirmed.

There are four interesting appendices:

"Definitions of tonnage measurement and registration"

"Ships by Alexander Hall & Sons, Aberdeen, 1811-1875"

"Spar dimensions of *Thermopylae*"

"Specifications of iron sailing ship *Sarah Palmer*"

Over six pages are devoted to a description of sources and a bibliography. There is a well detailed index.

Fast Sailing Ships is an enlightening and stimulating book and MacGregor has given us documentation that can lead to further related study.

EDWARD G. BROWNLEE

Cherry Hill, New Jersey

THOMAS G. MANNING, *U.S. Coast Survey vs. Naval Hydrographic Office. A 19th Century Rivalry in Science and Politics* (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1988). History of American Science and Technology Series. 6″ × 9″, cloth, xiii + 202 pages, index, $21.95.

Author Manning set as the theme for his book, "—scientific rivalry between the military and the civilians and to the confrontation between the secretary of the navy and the head of the Hydrograpohic Office, on one hand, and the Coast Survey superintendent on the other" (p. 61). The conflict is traced historically and in detail throughout the administration of ten superintendents of the Coast Survey.

The U.S. Coast Survey was founded in 1807 with Ferdinand R. Hassler as superintendent, but little was done until after 1830. Alexander D. Bache became superintendent in 1844, and was succeeded by Harvard mathematician Benjamin Peirce in 1867. He in turn was followed by Julius E. Hilgard, a capable scientist and nationally recognized, but had personal problems which led to his downfall. From that time on, problems both scientific and political, plagued the Coast Survey.

After 1842 Matthew F. Maury placed work for naval hydrography on a practical basis, and in 1866 Congress established the Hydrographic Office in the Navy Department. Four years later Capt. Robert H. Wyman became the first "Hydrographer," followed by Commander John R. Bartlett.

Problems both personal and professional of the leaders, internal turmoil and conflicts of the two agencies with each other and with government officials, including presidents and cabinet members, are delineated in detail in this book. Rivalry was essentially over whether a military or civilian organization should direct operations, and too often matters were settled by politics and politicians rather than science and scientists. Progress was often hampered by political appointees, and the Coast Survey became a political football between the Republican Senate with its liberality and the Democratic House with its economy during 1886-88.

Rep. Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois ("Uncle Joe Cannon"—of Danville, but not referred to in that way in this book), was among the politicians who played important roles in getting eventual control for the Coast Survey. Thomas C. Mendenhall, seventh superintendent of the Coast Survey was one of the most successful (1889-94), but had to fight politicians who were against science in government and eventually forced him out of office. Cannon stated that "Mendenhall was the most competent person ever to preside as superintendent" (p. 103), but politics often won out over science.

One of the most colorful characters in this drama is Charles S. Peirce, son of superintendent Franklin Peirce of the Coast Survey. Irresponsible and lax in performing official duties, and often an irritation to his superiors, he was nevertheless a brilliant researcher with an international reputation for original work. He was both central figure in the controversy and a world leader in gravity research and measurement.

He was an eccentric individualist, but a genius in science and mathematics. Author Manning wrote, "The American government has never had a more famous thinker than Charles S. Peirce," (p. 111) but it is surprising that the research and publications on Peirce by Carolyn Eisele are not mentioned.

Com. John R. Bartlett (1883-88) and Com. Charles D. Sigsbee (1893-97) were among the most successful as head of the Hydrographic Office. Under Sigsbee, jurisdiction for mapping the Great Lakes Region was obtained and became an issue of contention with the Coast Survey. Both agencies sought control.

In the end, the Coast Survey emerged as victor in the rivalry and "The result was the most serious defeat for the military in nineteenth-century government science since the ouster of the Corps of Engineers from territorial research twenty years before" (p. 151). But not until 1900 was the Coast Survey a "completely civilian outfit" (p. 149). Long in the Department of Treasury, and resisting being attached to the navy, the Coast Survey finally got out and was in more suitable circumstances when the Department of Commerce was founded in 1903. A final chapter summarizes the formal organization and the scientific accomplishments during the 20th century by the Hydrographic Office and of what was originally called the Coast Survey.

Manning's subject was thoroughly researched, is carefully documented and well written. The only error I detected was a very minor one — William Healey

Dall, Assistant for the Coast Survey in Alaska, is named as William D. Hall, and while Spencer F. Baird, first U.S. Commissioner from Fish and Fisheries (1871) is not named, the work of the commission is briefly mentioned. Manning has given a full and excellent account of the protracted rivalry between two government agencies and between science and politics.

RALPH W. DEXTER

Kent, Ohio

ANDREW DAVID, editor, Rudiger Joppien and Bernard Smith, *The Charts and Coastal Views of Captain Cook's Voyages. The Voyage of the* Endeavor, *1768-1771, Hakluyt Society Extra Series No. 43* (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1988). 17½" × 11", cloth, lxiv + 322 pages, 18 plates, numerous maps and illustrations, introduction and index £100.

Ever since the Hakluyt Society published *The Journals of Captain Cook* between 1955 and 1967 the scholarly world has awaited the appearance of a fuller publication of the charts, coastal views and paintings which were made on his voyages or resulted from them and which have been relatively unavailable to the wider scholarly world. It is therefore with special pleasure that we greet the appearance of this magnificent volume which deals with materials resulting from his first Pacific voyage made by the *Endeavor* between 1768 and 1771. It is also important that this work be made available in a year which is celebrating the two hundredth anniversary of the first British settlement in Australia, that which took place in Botany Bay. This is because this settlement was made possible thanks to Cook's discovery and charting of this magnificent harbor and of the entire eastern coast of Australia during this voyage—a voyage that also saw him examine and chart in some detail the more distant shores of New Zealand. And it is clear that all who are interested in Australia will be especially pleased to find reproduced in admirable fashion on pages 276-282 of this volume Cook's original sketches and charts of Botany Bay itself which were made in April and May of 1770.

The volume itself begins with a long introduction which describes Cook's early career, his *Endeavor* surveys, especially as regards their accuracy, his coastal views or sketches and those of other surveyors, artists and draughtsmen who accompanied him. It continues with information concerning previous publishing of some of his charts and coastal views, select bibliographical references, and a descriptive inventory of the collections in Britain and Australia from which the materials found in this volume were drawn. And then it concludes with some comments on the *Descriptive Catalogue* in general which forms the rest of this work.

Next we have the body of this volume, the *Descriptive Catalogue* itself. Using it we follow the *Endeavor* from Tenerife in the Canaries and Rio de Janeiro to Tierra del Fuego with abundant graphic pictures and charts. Cook reached that later in January 1769. We then follow the same kind of records as the *Endeavor* sailed on to Tahiti by April of the same year and stayed in the Tahiti-Moorea area until mid-July. Next we find information gathered in and around the Society Islands until mid-August. This is followed by a long cartographic and artistic record of Cook's circumnavigation of the North and South islands of New Zealand for some six months between October 1769 and April 1770. We then conclude this section with charts and illustrations dealing with the eastern coast of Australia from April to late August of this same year, a view of some islands near Jakarta, Indonesia, and some sketches of Cook's *Endeavor* and its boats made during various periods of the voyage.

What one gains from all this is a remarkable view of the genius and the accomplishments of Captain James Cook. We come to understand that he was one of the great mariner explorers of all time in the tradition of Hanno, Pytheas and Marco Polo, of Columbus, Vasco de Gama and Magellan and of Francis Drake and Titus Bering. We can also learn from this volume much concerning the development of cartography, science, navigation and art during these last years of "The Age of Reason". Every library which is concerned with maritime history or with Australia, New Zealand and Oceania must have this book on its shelves. And those who cherish the sea can regularly return to it for sustenance.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS

Salem, Massachusetts

O.H.K. SPATE, *Paradise Lost and Found: The Pacific Since Magellan* Volume III (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1988). 7-3/4" x 9-1/4", xxii 410

pages, clothbound, index, maps, illustrations, $59.50.

This volume forms the third and last of O.H.K. Spate's wonderful trilogy on the Pacific since Magellan. It begins with four chapters telling how the Pacific was peopled before the arrival of Europeans and Americans in its waters. Then it describes the culture of the native peoples of Oceania, natives during these centuries. This section is completed with a discussion on the search for Australia.

Next the author tells us about the navigators and explorers who after 1763, opened up the Pacific and all its shores to discovery and exploration. In doing so it concentrates its attention upon the role of Captain James Cook in all this, though other explorers, Russian, French, British and American are not neglected.

The rest of this volume, as its title makes clear, is concerned with the impact of these European and American contacts upon the native peoples of the Pacific—especially in Oceania. Finally it deals with how Botany Bay was settled and how the Nootka Sound crisis was resolved. These two events, the author explains made possible the final integration of the entire Pacific area into the Western European and American modern state system which by 1815 had become a world-wide affair.

It is difficult to sum up the value of this volume to scholar and general reader alike. But a few things are clear. The author's vision is broad and sympathetic to all whom he writes about. His scholarship is impressive. His style is a delight. This book belongs, like its two predecessors, in every library of those concerned with this greatest of the world's oceans.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS
Marblehead, Massachusetts.

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All, Have at
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Anne, St.
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Belle, Village
Boy, Post
Brothers, Two
Claire, St.
Clark, Ida M.
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Lord, Annie
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Maru, Banryu
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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